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CHAPTER 1
Smartphone Notifications and Smarter Living
1.1 Abstract
Obesity looms as one of America’s top public health crises. Recent advances in mobile
computing have facilitated an interest in mobile health (or simply “mHealth”) as a means
of improving the timeliness of healthcare information and interventions (Klasnja and Pratt,
2012). In the realm of behavioral economics, loss aversion and reference-dependent util-
ity highlight the importance of reference points in influencing individual decision-making
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992; Kahneman et al.,
1991). A host of related work indicates that expectations and goals can set these reference
points (e.g. Koszegi and Rabin 2006, 2007, 2009). However, much extant behavioral re-
search on goals is either theoretical or experimental, and little attention has been given to
whether temporary goals suggested through mobile health platforms outside of a laboratory
might influence behavior. Existing mHealth studies in the domain of physical activity and
sleep are multifaceted in terms of strategies, environments, and samples (Klasnja and Pratt,
2012), rending cross-study comparison difficult, further stymied by small sample sizes and
therefore questionable robustness. It is unclear how best to set these goals in practice, and
for how long their impact might persist. Toward these ends, using data on a subsample of
hundreds of thousands of users of one particular commercially available wearable activity
tracker, I apply tools from behavioral economics to interpret and analyze 4 randomized
smartphone-based goal-setting interventions meant to spur either increased daily steps or
earlier bedtimes. These notifications, and the temporary goals they proffer (and hence ref-
erence points they attempt to set), were customized to either the specific day of the year
on which they were sent or a user’s recent activity. They were purposely chosen to consti-
tute modest improvements over expectations and recent performance, and hence were not
overly ambitious (i.e. typically much lower than the default goal and only slightly higher
than activity in preceding days). Their power is in framing not meeting the temporary,
1
modest goal as a loss, beneficially exploiting loss aversion to propel improvement. “Step
Intervention #1” targeted lack of physical activity on Thanksgiving by suggesting a user
try to meet her daily step average. “Step Intervention #2” targeted a user’s fourth day in the
system, suggesting she try to surpass her 2-day average by 500 steps (∼0.3 miles). “Step
Intervention #3” targeted lack of activity after a particularly sedentary week by encourag-
ing a user to surpass her recent (lower) average by 500 steps. Finally, “Sleep Intervention”
targeted lack of sleep after a particularly restless week and encouraged a user to get to
bed earlier. Initial day treatment effects were significant for “Step Intervention #1,” “Step
Intervention #2,” and “Sleep Intervention,” engendering ∼170 and ∼160 additional steps
per successful step intervention (∼0.1 miles), respectively, and ∼5 minutes additional rest
for the sleep intervention. Only the sleep intervention continued to have significant treat-
ment effects beyond the initial day, engendering about a minute more reported sleep per
night for as long as a user remained in the system. These results were robust to using an
indicator for whether a user met her default goal of 10,000 steps or 8 hours of sleep that
day as the outcome variable (instead of steps or minutes of sleep). They were also robust
instead to using an indicator variable for whether a user met her temporary, notification-
based goal (although this specification showed additional evidence of responsiveness to
both “Step Intervention #2” and “Step Intervention #3”). There was substantive treatment
effect heterogeneity with respect to day of the week: Thursdays and Saturdays drove the
effectiveness of “Step Intervention #2”; Tuesdays, Sundays, and Wednesdays drove the
effectiveness of “Sleep Intervention” (note this intervention was not fielded on Friday nor
Saturday nights). I find limited treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to gender, age,
and BMI. There was, however, substantial heterogeneity in challenge acceptance with re-
spect to demographics, as women, younger users, and higher BMI users were more likely
to opt into the challenges. These acceptance effects were stable across days of the week.
Overall, my results are consistent with users’ reference points being temporarily updated
by modestly ambitious notification-based goals. These goals positively exploit loss aver-
sion by framing not meeting the temporary, achievable improvement as a loss, promoting
physical activity in the short-term and increased reported sleep in the medium-term.
1.2 Motivation
Obesity looms as one of America’s top public health crises. Using data from the 2011-
2012 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Ogden et al. (2014) report that
more than one-third of American adults were obese1. According to the Centers for Disease
1Obese is defined as having a BMI greater than or equal to 30.
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Control and Prevention (CDC), citing estimates from Finkelstein et al. (2009), total annual
medical costs associated with obesity in the U.S. were $147 billion in 2008, amounting to
approximately $1,429 more in medical expenditures per obese person2. Using an instru-
mental variables approach that addresses the endogeneity of weight, Cawley and Meyer-
hoefer (2011) estimate that the per-person cost of obesity is almost twice as high.
The rise of the obesity epidemic has seen the concurrent rise of mobile computing as a
ubiquitous part of daily existence. Nearly two-thirds of Americans now own a smartphone
(Smith, 2015). The last few years has also seen a spectacular rise in the use of wearable ac-
tivity trackers (or simply “wearables”). These devices, typically worn on the wrist, enable
their users to track physical activity (e.g. steps and sleep) and observe the extent to which
they meet goals related to these outcomes through interactive smartphone applications (or
simply “apps”). These advancing in mobile computing have facilitated an interest in mo-
bile health (or simply “mHealth”) as a means of improving the availability and timeliness
of healthcare information and interventions. Klasnja and Pratt (2012) provide an excellent
overview of mHealth work up until that point, nothing mHealth platforms are useful given
the widespread adoption of computationally powerful mobile devices, people’s tendency to
carry these devices everywhere, and the ease at which mobile devices can capture personal
and contextual information. Quoting briefly from Klasnja and Pratt (2012), these technolo-
gies have sought to encourage physical activity; promote healthier diets; monitor symptoms
for diseases and disorders as broad-reaching as heart disease, diabetes, asthma, HIV, and
cancer; remind patients about taking their medication and attending appointments; help
with smoking cessation; and encourage sunscreen application.
Setting aside metabolic syndromes and physical disabilities, the formula for maintain-
ing a healthy weight is theoretically straightforward: healthier diet, more physical activity,
and a more consistent sleep schedule (Andersen, 1999; Patel and Hu, 2008; Patel et al.,
2006). Actual commitment to forming and fulfilling goals related to these outcomes, of
course, is more difficult, given difficulties with self-control and a human tendency toward
present-bias3. Bryan et al. (2010) describe two varieties of commitment devices meant to
help overcome these difficulties and help fulfill desired future behavior: “hard” devices4
2See also: http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html
3A related issue is over optimism: for example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) use data from U.S.
health clubs to show that people are optimistic about their future gym usage and end up overpaying with a
one-time yearly fee relative to a per visit fee.
4For example: Charness and Gneezy (2009) investigate the impact of an intervention aimed at promoting
gym visits per month. Not only did their scheme encourage attendance while monetary incentives were in
place, but the effects on attendance persisted for many weeks even after the financial incentives disappeared.
They noted substantial improvement in health outcomes such as weight and waist size. Using a large-scale
workplace field experiment, Royer et al. (2012) show that workers respond to financial incentives, but long-
term effects were modest unless the treatment had been combined with some commitment contract.
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harness financial incentives to encourage goal commitment, while “soft” devices harness
psychological disappointment. My focus here is on “soft” devices. Makers of wearable
and mHealth technologies are in a unique position to conduct experiments that attempt to
nudge their users toward healthier lives using such soft devices. These firms hold troves
of personal health data and can easily customize these nudges according to users’ recent
activity (or lack thereof). Their experimental platforms are advantageous given their pre-
existing user bases (which are typically large), as well as their customizability and ability
to be quickly modified to changing conditions.
In the realm of behavioral economics, loss aversion (i.e. concavity over gains and con-
vexity over losses), reference-dependent utility, and diminishing sensitivity (i.e. increased
sensitivity to changes closer to the reference point), highlight the importance of reference
points in influencing individual decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1991). These concepts formalize the psycho-
logical tendency of humans to detect and respond to relative changes. Indeed, loss aversion
has been observed in a broad range of domains (e.g. golf in Pope and Schweitzer, 2011;
football and domenstic violence in Card and Dahl 2011). However, the process through
which reference points are formed and updated is an area of active research. The status quo
is one potential source (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1990). On the other hand, Koszegi and Ra-
bin (2006, 2007, 2009) argue recent expectations and beliefs endogenously drive reference
point formation, although updating is often slow, even in the face of quickly changing be-
liefs. Experimental evidence for expectations and beliefs driving reference point formation
and hence behavior abounds (Abeler, 2011; Ericson et al., 2011). Goals can also explicitly
act as reference points via loss aversion5 to help overcome present-bias and self-control
problems (Heath et al., 1999; Suvorov and van de Ven, 2008; Koch and Nafziger, 2011),
yet excessively high goals can be counterproductive (Matthey et al, 2007). However, much
relevant research on goals is either theoretical or experimental, and little is known about
whether temporary goals suggested through mobile health platforms outside of a laboratory
might influence behavior via loss aversion and reference-dependent utility. Moreover, it is
unclear how best to set these goals, and for how long their impact might persist.
In terms of direct experimental evidence of the effectiveness of mHealth platforms,
Klasnja and Pratt (2012) highlight that broad evaluation is difficult because of the diverse,
multifaceted nature of relevant strategies, outcomes, and environments. With respect to
interventions that aim to increase the accessibility of health information about physical ac-
5Hsiaw (2013) uses an optimal stopping problem to show that loss aversion is not a necessary condition
for non-binding goals to act as reference points and help overcome present-bias (when commitment to goals
is sufficiently high). In Hsiaw’s framework, time-consistent agents can be harmed by goal commitment.
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tivity (via health messages, reminders, and glanceable displays), there exist a multitude of
small studies with sample sizes only in the hundreds (or even fewer), often focused only on
one particular subpopulation, many in the form of feasibility and pilot studies6. Many focus
on the effect of having an mHealth platform or app rather than designing particular inter-
ventions to target goal formation conditional on having that technology. A meta-analysis
by Lewis et al. (2015) reviews 11 articles that investigate physical activity interventions
implemented through wearable devices and their smartphone companion apps. These in-
terventions varied substantially from each other in terms of both subject pools and designs,
ranging from the introduction of a wearable device, emails, and companion apps; to spe-
cific text messages that were meant to target behavior; to counseling over the telephone and
in-person. They conclude that more high-quality randomized experiments are necessary to
evaluate how best to design such interventions and which demographic groups might be
best served by them.
The mHealth literature on sleep is even sparser. Rather than evaluating interventions,
most studies focus on the difficulties of measurement itself or specific sleep disorders. Jalali
and Bigelow (2015) provide an overview of current technologies with a focus on insomnia;
Kishimoto et al. (2006) focus on the difficulty of measuring sleep posture; Behar et al.
(2015) focus on deriving an algorithm for automatically detecting sleep apnea. The most
relevant study to my endeavor evaluates a randomized intervention aimed at improving the
sleep behavior of airline pilots (Van Drongelen et al., 2014). However, their intervention
only included the introduction of an app with tailored advice, compared to a control group
that were directed to a website with standard advice about fatigue. They find the treatment
group improved along self-reported dimensions of fatigue, sleep quality, strenuous phys-
ical activity, and snacking behavior. These conclusions, however, cannot be extended far
beyond the domain of airline pilots.
In the hopes of unlocking an mHealth-based solution to obesity, I apply tools from
behavioral economics to proprietary data from hundreds of thousands of users of one par-
ticular commercially available wearable activity tracker to interpret and analyze whether 4
interventions delivered through a smartphone were able to promote physical activity and
healthier sleep schedules by temporarily altering users’ goals and hence their reference
points. To my knowledge, these interventions outpace prior studies’ sample sizes by many
6For example, Cadmus-Bertram et al. (2015) use a sample of 31 postmenopausal, overweight women to
evaluate the effect of a randomized 16-week web-based self-monitoring intervention that included a wear-
able device, instructional session, and follow-up, comparing their treatment group to a group using a standard
pedometer. Thorndike et al. (2014) use a sample of 104 medical residents to evaluate the effect of a random-
ized 6-week intervention that gave feedback about steps and energy consumed, comparing their results to the
impact of using the same wearable without any interactive feedback.
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orders of magnitude. The evaluation of a sleep intervention aimed at promoting early bed-
times is almost entirely novel. These notifications, and the temporary goals they proffer
(and hence reference points they attempt to set), were customized to either the specific day
of the year on which they were sent or a user’s recent patterns of physical activity. They
represent an innovation relative to prior studies that lack: (1) the ability to target a spe-
cific day of the year with sufficient statistical power and (2) comprehensive baseline and
recent measures of activity on which to base suggestions. These interventions are fairly
straightforward to implement and constitute a low-cost means of potentially mitigating the
obesity epidemic in America. Although there are substantive fixed costs in setting up a sys-
tem to implement such interventions, these costs pale in comparison to the costs of obesity
cited above. Moreover, once such a system is in place, the marginal cost of an additional
notification is essentially zero.
Interventions were simple: treated users were greeted on the home page of the wear-
able’s smartphone app with a short message challenging them to a new one-day step goal
or bedtime goal. Users who accepted the challenge were pushed a notification to the home
screen of their smartphones later in the day, reminding them of their commitment. Users
who accepted the notification were also able to continue accepting the challenge on sub-
sequent days. Again, temporary goals were specifically chosen to target either the specific
day of the year (e.g. Thanksgiving) or how a user had been recently performing. They
were purposely chosen to constitute fairly modest improvements over expectations and re-
cent performance, and hence were not overly ambitious (i.e. typically much lower than the
default goal and only slightly higher than activity in preceding days). Their power (and
novelty) is in framing not meeting the temporary goal as a loss, beneficially exploiting loss
aversion. If the new reference point were set too high (relative to recent activity), dimin-
ishing sensitivity implies that people would not be particularly responsive. However, by
setting the reference point only slightly higher than recent activity, diminishing sensitivity
implies that people should be responsive.
First, “Step Intervention #1” targeted lack of physical activity on a typically gluttonous
holiday: Thanksgiving. The notification suggested maintaining one’s typical step average,
further nothing the average user walked 1,873 fewer steps (∼1.1 miles) during the prior
Thanksgiving. Second, “Step Intervention #2” targeted a user’s fourth day in the system
by suggesting a temporary goal that was 500 steps (∼0.3 miles) higher than her average
steps in the two prior days. Third, “Step Intervention #3” targeted activity during a partic-
ularly sedentary week. The notification told a user what her step average had been over the
preceding week, noting it was below average, and suggesting a goal 500 steps (∼0.3 miles)
higher than this recent, relatively sedentary average. Finally, “Sleep Intervention” targeted
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a user’s bedtime during a particularly restless week, suggesting a bedtime that, combined
with a user’s recent wake-up times, would get them within 30 minutes of 8 hours of sleep.
Initial day treatment effects were significant for “Step Intervention #1,” “Step Intervention
#2,” and “Sleep Intervention,” engendering ∼0.1 miles more walking per successful step
intervention and 5 minutes additional rest for the sleep intervention. “Step Intervention
#3” showed no significant treatment effect. Only the sleep intervention continued to have
significant treatment effects beyond the initial day, engendering about a minute more re-
ported sleep per night for as long as a user remained in the system. This semi-permanent
increase appears to have been driven by the initial notification itself, rather than subsequent
follow-up notifications.
These results were robust to using as the outcome variable (instead of steps or minutes
of sleep) an indicator for whether a user met her default goal of 10,000 steps or 8 hours of
sleep that day. Results were also robust to using instead an indicator variable for whether a
user met her temporary, notification-based goal. In addition to replicating the results of the
main and default specifications, the notification-based goal specification shows additional
evidence of responsiveness to both “Step Intervention #2” (lasting responsiveness to the
temporary goal for 6 days, including the initial day) and “Step Intervention #3” (∼0.3%
increased probability of meeting the temporary goal for 2 days, including the initial day).
Overall, my results are consistent with users’ reference points being temporarily up-
dated by modest, notification-based goals. These goals positively exploit loss aversion by
framing not meeting the temporary improvement as a loss, promoting physical activity in
the short-term and increased reported sleep in the medium-term.
1.3 Sample
My sample consists of a random subset of iPhone or Android smartphone users who pur-
chased (or were gifted) a particular brand’s consumer wearable activity tracker during 2013
and 2014. The sample was overrepresented7 by people who were (1) healthier in terms of
BMI, (2) city-dwelling, (3) in their mid-30’s, and (4) presumably wealthier (given they
purchased or were gifted a wearable activity tracker). The sample is also presumably more
motivated in terms of living healthy lives. All members of the samples I analyze use iden-
tical technologies and apps. This enables me to avoid any confounding that might arise
7Compared to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement, 2012). The Census indicates that 1.8% of the population is underweight (BMI less than 18.5),
31.2% of the population is healthy weight (BMI between 18.5 and 25.0), 34.0% overweight (BMI between
25 and 30.0), and 33.0% obese (BMI greater than or equal to 30). My wearable sample was overrepresented
by underweight and healthy individuals but underrepresented by obese individuals.
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from differences in software, hardware, or experimental platform. These differences can-
not be ruled out as driving differences in treatment responses among different groups in
comparing prior, smaller studies aimed at specific-subpopulations.
1.4 Four App-Based Smartphone Interventions
Interventions were triggered by either the day of the year or a certain pattern of recent step
or sleep activity. A random subset of users who would otherwise qualify for the treatment
were not sent an intervention (i.e. the control group, or the untreated group, or the group of
withheld users)8. Intervention notifications were sent to the home screen of the wearable’s
companion app in the wee hours of the morning on the day of the intervention, challeng-
ing the user to a new one-day goal. Treated users were able to accept, decline, or ignore
the challenge (and could easily navigate other features of the app while ignoring the noti-
fication/challenge, which remained on the home screen of the app). See Table 1.1 for an
overview of triggering conditions for each intervention and the content of the notifications.
See Table 1.2 for the sizes of treatment and control groups, as well as the number of days
each intervention was fielded. Note ”Step Intervention #1” had two different treatment
groups that only differed slightly in the wording of the notification.
If a treated user accepted the challenge on the home screen of the smartphone app,
the user was sent a push notification reminder of their commitment to the home screen of
their smartphone (not to the home screen of the app) at either 4pm for each of the step
interventions or an hour before promised bedtime for “Sleep Intervention.” If and when
the intervention was accepted and completed, the user received another push notification
congratulating them. Therefore, a user received a total of 3 notifications if they accepted
and achieved the goal, 2 notifications if they accepted and did not achieve the goal, and 1
notification just for being in the treatment group.
A user could be part of at most one treatment or one control group once per week.
After accepting an intervention, and either achieving or failing the challenge, a user could
also have agreed to “chain,” and thus take on the challenge again the next day. This could
continue indefinitely, where a ”chain” (if it lasted more than a week) overrode subsequent
potential treatment or control group assignment with respect to other interventions. The
treatment was therefore only multi-day to the extent that the user continued to accept app-
based challenges. It is important to highlight that these subsequent notifications do not
have another randomized control group associated with them. All subsequent-day analyses
8Balancing tests confirm no significant differences between control and treatment groups with respect to
step and sleep behavior leading up to the intervention, age, BMI, gender, and days as a user.
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Intervention Conditions Message
Step Intervention #1 Thanksgiving 2013. We slow down to give thanks.
Users averaged 1,873 fewer
steps last Thanksgiving. [v1:
Stay at flock’s front by meet-
ing your X step average.] [v2:
Stay at flock’s front by main-
taining your average today.]
Step Intervention #2 4th day as a user and 2-day
average steps is more than
500.
Aim for X steps today?
That’s 500 more than your 2
day average. We’ll keep track
of your journey.
Step Intervention #3 Activity in at least 4/7 past
days, user’s 7-day non-zero
daily step average is 80% or
less than average.
You haven’t been your active
self lately. Your 7 day step av-
erage of average of X is less
than usual. Start fresh with
500 extra steps today?
Sleep Intervention User’s 3-day average total
sleep is 20% less than their
sleep goal (with sleep logged
all 3 nights). It is not a Friday
nor Saturday.
You’ve been turning in late
recently. Remember, your
brain needs plenty of pillow-
time to sort new informa-
tion. Get in bed by [(av-
erage wakeup time) - (sleep
goal in hours) - (30 minutes)]
tonight?
Table 1.1: Summary of conditions that triggered each intervention, as well as the messages
sent to users through the companion smartphone application, indicating exactly how users
are nudged towards more steps or sleep.
are therefore based on the original control group randomization from the initial day of the
intervention.
1.5 Methodological Issues
There are a number of methodological issues worth keeping in mind before presenting my
results. First, with respect to the sleep intervention, it is important to understand exactly
how sleep is measured. The process was not completely automatic. Users were foremost
encouraged to track their sleep by putting the device into sleep mode right before going to
sleep and putting it back into awake mode after waking up. However, the wearable was
sophisticated enough to guess when a person was asleep even if sleep mode was never ac-
tivated. In this case, the user was sent a push notification to the home screen of their smart-
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Intervention Days Implemented Treatment Control
Step Intervention #1 1 17,509+17,131 17,988
Step Intervention #2 22 23,626 24,230
Step Intervention #3 194 556,127 138,597
Sleep Intervention 19 63,361 15,472
Table 1.2: Summary of number of days each intervention was implemented, and sample
sizes for treatment and control groups. Note that a user only appears at most once in a
given intervention. Sample sizes are based on data that has been trimmed only to include
treatment and control group members who opened the app on the day of the intervention
for “Step Intervention #2,” “Step Intervention #3,” and “Sleep Intervention.” The data to
do this trimming for “Step Intervention #1” was not available. Note also there are two
slightly different “Step Intervention #1” treatment versions (“v1” and “v2”) that differ in
whether they present users with their exact historical daily step average.
phone in the morning (after the device detected the person was awake) asking whether they
were indeed asleep during the proposed time. Users were able to verify the proposed sleep
duration or edit it to fix any mistakes. For any particular observation, I cannot tell which
method was used to generate that data point. Related, observed treatment effects from the
sleep intervention could be driven by any combination of at least three mechanisms: (1) in-
creasing actual sleep; (2) better reminding users to put the device into sleep mode, thereby
only better capturing existing sleep; and (3) encouraging users to over report, i.e. putting
the device into sleep mode for longer than they actually slept. I am unable to delve further
into which of these three forces drive observed treatment effects. I therefore simply discuss
the effect of the interventions on reported sleep.
Second, it is important to highlight that causal estimates derived from these interven-
tions are not directly comparable across different interventions given different selection
criteria. Once a user’s recent activity matches the pattern for a given intervention, she is
either randomly given the intervention or not. However, there is selection into the interven-
tion itself (i.e. the triggering conditions), thereby limiting external validity.
Third, although I am eager to interpret positive treatment effects for step interventions
as evidence of increased physical activity, it is possible that there are substitution effects
between steps and other unmeasured physical activities. For example, after receiving one
of our step interventions, it is possible a person decided not to go bike riding (as she
might usually) and instead only walked a bit more. To the extent that these substitution
effects exist, our causal estimates overestimate how much the interventions promote overall
physical activity. Because we cannot measure all physical activity or exercise a user might
engage in, I can do little to directly test how much of an issue these substitution effects
might have been in practice. In contrast, substitution across time within the categories
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sleeping or walking, e.g. I walk more today so I might slack off with respect to walking
tomorrow, can indeed be investigated. I find no evidence of such temporal substitution.
Fourth, and related to the previous point, it is possible that interventions have effects
across time on other activities not directly targeted by the interventions. For example,
sleeping a little more one night might positively or negatively impact steps the next day
(a well-rested person might be more active, but sleeping more literally takes time away
from potentially walking). For another example, walking more today might make someone
more tired, leading them to sleep more that evening (the effect could also work in the other
direction). Toward these ends, we could use step treatment status today as an instrument
for measuring the impact of steps today on sleep tonight. Similarly, we could use sleep
treatment status tonight as an instrument for measuring the impact of sleep tonight on
steps tomorrow. While I believe these are exciting ideas, these analyses are better suited
for follow-up studies. For the remainder of this paper, I therefore ignore cross-activity
substitution effects.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the interventions investigated herein were
not necessarily ideal from a survey design perspective. For example, Liao et al. (2015)
develop a just-in-time micro-randomized paradigm for mobile interventions in which each
participant might be part of thousands of randomizations located sequentially in time, en-
abling the detection of proximal treatment effects. The interventions I describe must be
taken as given and do not employ such sophisticated randomization strategies. While sim-
plicity facilitates communication and understanding of my findings, no doubt one could
have tested a more aggressive or complex set of interventions that varied, for example, the
exact wording of the notifications, the difficulty of the associated challenge, or the number
and frequency of notifications. One could have also better designed the interventions to
directly inquire about prior reference points, facilitating even better personal customiza-
tion. Randomizing the modesty of the notifications’ suggestions (i.e. the extent of the push
suggested by the challenges) would have also been advantageous. It is likely that some
designs could have yielded significantly larger9 average treatment effects. It is therefore
remarkable that despite the unobtrusive, light-handed nature of the interventions, we are
able to find significant effects on reference points and behavior.
9This highlights the tradeoff between researcher-designed experiments, which requires timely and costly
data collection but allow for greater control over experimental design and sample representativeness, and
corporate-designed experiments, which offer much greater statistical power and timeliness at the cost of
control over experiment design and recruitment.
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1.6 Average Treatment Effects
Randomization allows for straightforward evaluation of the causal impact of the interven-
tions. Following standard notation for the analysis of treatment effects, I let yi(1) and yi(0)
be the behavior of individual i under treatment and control, respectively. Let Ti be an
indicator for treatment status. My baseline analysis simply uses OLS to regress yi on Ti:
yi = β0 + β1Ti + i (1.1)
More specifically, i indexes all users who met conditions in Table 1.1 from both treat-
ment and control groups; yi denotes the outcome variable targeted by the treatments, ei-
ther current daily steps or minutes of sleep. βˆ1 therefore measures the mean difference
in outcomes between treatment and control, i.e. E(yi(1)|Ti = 1)–E(yi(0)|Ti = 0). Be-
cause Ti is randomized, we can further assume E(yi(0)|Ti = 1) = E(yi(0)|Ti = 0) and
E(yi(1)|Ti = 0) = E(yi(1)|Ti = 1). We can therefore also assume that average treatment
effects (ATE) equal average treatment effects on the treated (ATET), which also equal aver-
age treatment effects on the control (ATEC). For all interventions except ”Step Intervention
#1,” I trim both treatment and control groups to users who actually opened the app on the
day the notification was first sent. Note that users cannot view the notification without
opening the app. Data on whether a user opened the app or not was not available in 201310.
The difference amounts to measuring an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect in ”Step Intervention
#1” (from Thanksgiving 2013) but an average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) in
the other interventions (from 2014). In fact, for interventions where both sorts of treatment
effects can be measured, ITTs are all only slightly lower than ATETs. I have omitted these
results for brevity; I only report ITTs when the meta-data is unavailable, i.e. for ”Step
Intervention #1.”
I test the robustness of these estimates by adding covariates including age, gender,
BMI, as well as state and date fixed effects. In follow-up analyses measuring any lingering
impact of the initial notification days later, I use yi taken from the desired number of days
following the initial intervention. It is again important to highlight that any subsequent
notifications after the initial day do not have another randomized control group associated
with them. All subsequent-day analyses are therefore based on the original control group
randomization from the initial day of the intervention.
Prior literature on mHealth interventions for physical activity and sleep cannot strongly
inform our prior on the size of βˆ1. As argued above, this owes to the multifaceted differ-
10On a small number of random days in 2014 (sometimes only impacting Android devices and not iPhones)
this data is also not available. I’ve simply thrown away all observations from these days from both platforms.
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ences between past experimental designs and the one presented here, as well as the general
lack of research on sleep interventions. The following example serves to highlight the diffi-
culty of comparing mHealth interventions on different platforms and with different samples
to predict the magnitude of treatment effects. Wang et al. (2015) reports the effect of smart-
phone notifications on steps, finding that 3 text messages per day for 6 weeks engendered
1,266 extra steps per day only during the first week. Their setup differs from my interven-
tions in several ways, all of which push our expectations of βˆ1 below 1,266 extra steps per
day for a week. My interventions consisted of only a single in-app notification (which was
not pushed to the home screen of the smartphone and hence required opening the app to
view it) and a single push notification to the home screen of the smartphone (conditional
on accepting); notifications on subsequent days were only possible if a user accepted the
initial in-app notification and elected to continue “chaining” the challenges. This is in con-
trast with Wang et al. (2015)’s guaranteed 3 text messages per day. Their notifications were
also more salient given all 3 were pushed to the home screen of the smartphone. Moreover,
their 3 text messages were guaranteed to be repeated everyday for 6 weeks. Therefore, I
expected significant, albeit smaller effects than Wang et al. (2015) on the day of the noti-
fication itself, and small, if any, effects on the days following the initial notification. Prior
research unfortunately provides little in the way of expectations for the performance of my
sleep intervention.
Initial day treatment effects were significant for “Step Intervention #1,” “Step Inter-
vention #2,” and “Sleep Intervention,” engendering ∼170 and ∼160 additional steps per
successful step intervention (∼0.1 miles), respectively, and ∼5 minutes additional rest for
the sleep intervention. Only the sleep intervention continued to have significant treatment
effects beyond the initial day, engendering about a minute more reported sleep per night
for as long as a user remained in the system11.
1.7 Additional Analyses
Our large sample enabled several additional follow-up analyses that were not possible in
previous, smaller studies. First, I explore heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to
gender, age, BMI, days as a user, day of week, and recent average activity. Note that in-
formation on age, gender, and BMI is based on self-reported data entered by users through
the app12. There was substantive treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to day of the
11The interventions do not have any impact along the extensive margin, i.e. treated users do not end up
logging activity for more days than control users. In other words, there is no differential attrition from the
interventions.
12Users entered their weight and height from which BMI was calculated.
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week: Thursdays and Saturdays drove the effectiveness of “Step Intervention #2”; Tues-
days, Sundays, and Wednesdays drove the effectiveness of “Sleep Intervention” (note this
intervention was not fielded on Friday nor Saturday nights by design). On the other hand, I
find limited treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to gender, age, BMI, days as a user,
and recent average activity.
I also evaluate who was most likely to accept the interventions, with respect to gender,
age, BMI, days as a user, and evaluate the extent to which these effects were consistent
across days of the week. There was substantive heterogeneity in challenge acceptance:
women, younger users, and higher BMI users were more likely to opt into the challenges.
Interestingly, unlike main treatment effects, acceptance effects were consistent across days
of the week. Number of days as a user was also robustly associated with propensity to
accept the notifications; I must be careful to control for selective attrition (as a proxy for
motivation) in these analyses. Without further controls, those who had been in the system
the longest would tend to be the most motivated (by virtue of the fact that relatively less
motivated users would have already discontinued use), and hence were most likely to accept
a notification’s challenge. However, to correct for this selection issue, we can control for
total days the user ends up being a user for (only known ex post). After this control, more
experienced users were slightly less likely to accept a notification’s challenge.
See “Appendix: Demographic Mediators of Heterogeneity” for additional analyses of
how these findings mesh with predictions inferred from relationships between broader con-
cepts plausibly related to responding to smartphone notifications (openness to experience,
comfort with technology, conscientiousness, and risk aversion) and demographics.
I also delve into quantile treatment effects with respect to the distribution of daily steps
and minutes of sleep. This enables us to see how different ends of the activity and sleep
distributions are impacted by the interventions. For example, it is conceivable that people
who sleep very little might have responded to being reminded to get to bed early much
more than those who sleep closer to 8 hours.
Moreover, instead of investigating the impact of the interventions directly on a con-
tinuous measure of steps or minutes of sleep, I also analyze two threshold specifications
meant to judge the extent to which two potential reference points were salient. These act
as robustness checks on my main specification.
The first threshold specification uses an indicator variable as the outcome variable for
whether a person reached the default goal (i.e. not set by the intervention) of 10,000 steps or
8 hours of sleep. This tests for the saliency of the default goal in the treatment group versus
the control group. These goals are especially ambitious given the fact that the default goals
are typically much higher than recent activity. Results are entirely consistent with the main
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specification. “Step Intervention #1,” “Step Intervention #2,” and “Sleep Intervention”
engendered ∼1.0%, ∼1.1%, and 1.5% increased probabilities, respectively, of meeting the
default goal. “Step Intervention #3” continued to have no impact. The effect of “Sleep
Intervention” again lingered for as long as the user remained in the system.
The second threshold specification uses an indicator as the outcome variable for whether
a person reached the temporary, notification-based goal. This tests for the saliency of the
goal suggested by the intervention, which, by definition, was only revealed to treated users,
and was designed not to be overly ambitious relative to recent activity. Results are again
consistent with those found in the main specification, although this specification showed
additional evidence of responsiveness to both “Step Intervention #2” (lasting responsive-
ness to the temporary goal for 6 days, including the initial day) and “Step Intervention
#3” (∼0.3% increased probability of meeting the temporary goal for 2 days, including the
initial day). Unfortunately, missing data disallowed replication of this goal-based thresh-
old analysis for “Bedtime Steps.” However, because this intervention had a lasting, direct
impact on sleep, both with respect to the continuous outcome variable and the threshold
relative to the default goal, this follow-up analysis is less important.
1.8 Results
Most step notifications were effective on the initial day of the intervention, engendering
∼0.1 miles worth of walking on that day (the exception was “Step Intervention #3”). The
sleep intervention, ”Sleep Intervention,” engendered about 5 minutes of sleep on the initial
day, as well as a permanent additional minute of reported sleep per night as long as the
person remained a user. See 1.3 for these initial day treatment effect estimates, as well as
the percentage of users who accepted, declined, and ignored13 the notifications.
1.8.1 Step Intervention #1
”Step Intervention #1,” fielded on Thanksgiving 2013, caused those who received the no-
tification to walk on average 173.1 steps more on the day of the initial notification (Figure
1.1). This point estimate is stable to the inclusion of demographic covariates and state fixed
effects.
13It is important to remember that for “Step Intervention #1,” the “ignore” group includes both people
who did not open the app as well as people who opened the app but did not explicitly accept nor decline
(because data was not available from 2013 denoting who opened the app on a particular day). For all other
interventions, the “ignore” group only included people who opened the app but did not explicitly accept nor
decline. However, results for these 3 interventions do not differ substantially when we also include people
who did not open the app
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Intervention Treatment Effect Accept Decline Ignore
Step Intervention #1 173.1*** steps 13.8% 2.3% 83.9%
Step Intervention #2 161.7*** steps 26.2% 6.6% 67.2%
Step Intervention #3 12.4 steps 11.8% 3.6% 84.6%
Sleep Intervention 4.94*** minutes 22.5% 4.6% 72.9%
Table 1.3: Summary of initial-day treatment effects for the 4 interventions. Only “Step
Intervention #3” had an insignificant treatment effect (all others were significant at the
0.0001 level, indicated by ***). Because of limited data availability on who opened the
app, the “ignore” category for “Step Intervention #1” includes both those who looked at
the notification and ignored it and those who never opened the app. In other interventions,
the “ignore” category only includes the former, given availability of data on who opened
the app. Therefore, the treatment effect for “Step Intervention #1” is an ITT and for all
others are ATETs.
Quantile regressions at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of the step dis-
tribution indicate treatment effects were insignificant at low ends of the distribution, most
strongly significant at the median, still significant but lower in magnitude at the 75th per-
centile, and marginally significant (but larger in magnitude) at the 95th percentile (Figure
1.4).
I augment my baseline specification to include gender, BMI, age, and total days as a
user (the latter three standardized) as well as an interaction term for each with treatment
status (Figure 1.2). The only covariate that showed evidence of mediating treatment effects
was BMI: the treatment was most effective for those with lower BMI, on the order of 20
steps per standard deviation of BMI. I additionally test for heterogeneity with respect to
average steps over the six days leading up to the notification, see Figure 1.3. Those with
higher pre-treatment step averages were more impacted by the intervention: a one-standard
deviation increase in preceding average steps (around 3,790 steps) was associated with a
92-step larger treatment effect.
Recall that ”Step Intervention #1” actually consisted of two different treatment groups
(which are simply lumped together in the above analyses). The first encouraged a user to
maintain his or her daily average and included what that average actually had been (”Stay
at flock’s front by meeting your X step average.”), while the second omitted the latter
bit of information (”Stay at flock’s front by maintaining your average today.”). However,
the effect on steps between these treatments was statistically indistinguishable even after
controlling for age, BMI, and gender, as well as state fixed effects (Figure 1.5.
13.8% of users explicitly accepted the initial notification. 2.3% of users declined the
initial notification. 83.9% of users ignored the initial notification (or did not open the app).
Users who accepted the notification tended to be female, younger, and higher BMI, and
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had been users for longer at the time of the intervention (Figure 1.6). Given that users who
remained in the system were likely to be particularly motivated (by virtue of the fact that
less motivated users would naturally drop from the sample), I additionally control for the
total eventual number of days for which each user ended up being in the system (which is
only known ex post given we must wait for all users to attrite to calculate this number).
Point estimates with respect to age, gender, and BMI remain stable, but the sign of the
effect of total days in the system at the time of the intervention switches: more experienced
users were less likely to accept the notification. Interestingly, I find these results involving
propensity to accept the notification also hold for the other three interventions.
I also split the treatment group into those who chose to accept, decline, or ignore the
notification on the day of the initiation notification and calculate differences in mean steps
between each of these groups and the control group (Figure 1.7). These results cannot be
interpreted causally. Indeed, people sort themselves into these categories based on demo-
graphics, the kind of day they expect to have (”There is no way I’m going to make this
goal, so I am not going to try” sort of logic), their motivation on that day, the weather, etc.
Acceptance is significantly associated with over 2,235 steps more per person relative to the
control group; declining with 811 fewer steps; ignoring with 139 fewer steps.
Recall that contingent upon accepting the initial notification, a user was given the same
notification the next day (i.e. the day after Thanksgiving), which they may or may not
again accept. This ”chain” continued as long as a user continued to accept challenges.
Conditional on accepting the first notification, 45.2% of users accepted the second. Condi-
tional on accepting the second, 32.5% accepted the third. The remaining percentages (up
to the sixth) were 43.4%, 51.5%, 65.6%, and 70.9%, respectively. However, on these sub-
sequent days, there were no new randomizations (i.e. no new control groups from which
we randomly withheld notifications). I can therefore only compare the activity of the treat-
ment group X days after the initial notification to the control group X days after the initial
notification. At lags of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 14 days, there are no statistically significant
effects. This remains the case if I include demographics or state fixed effects as covari-
ates (as well as if I include relevant treatment effect interactions). I also consider lagged
treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to average steps over the 6 days preceding the
initial intervention, yielding no significant results. Consistent with these findings, there is
no significant difference in total number of steps (across all future days) or total steps per
day (again across all future days) between treatment and control groups (with or without
the full gamut of controls).
The default goal threshold specifications, which use an indicator variable for whether a
user reaches 10,000 steps as the dependent variable, are broadly consistent with my main
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specifications. Being in the treatment caused a 1.01% increased probability of reaching
10,000 steps on the day of the notification (Figure 1.8, robust to the inclusion of demo-
graphic covariates and state fixed effects). However, heterogeneity in treatment effects
with respect to BMI disappears (Figure 1.9). This is intuitive: higher BMI people walk less
on average and therefore struggle more to meet 10,000 steps, even with the nudge of the
intervention. There is no lasting impact in terms of likelihood of exceeding the default goal
on subsequent days.
The intervention-based goal threshold specifications, which use an indicator variable
for whether a user reaches their daily average (i.e. the goal suggested by “Step Intervention
#1”), are also consistent with the main specification. Being in the treatment causes a 1.76%
increased probability of reaching one’s daily average (Figure 1.10, also robust to inclusion
of demographics and state fixed effects). There is only marginally suggestive evidence of
heterogeneity with respect to BMI. There is also no evidence of any lasting impact of the
intervention in terms of likelihood of exceeding the notification-based goal.
1.8.2 Step Intervention #2
”Step Intervention#2,” which was fielded on a user’s fourth day in the system, caused those
who received the notification and opened the app to walk on average 161.7 steps more on
the day of the initial notification than their control group counterparts who also opened
the app (Figure 1.11). This result is robust to including demographic covariates and state
fixed effects. Including date fixed effects decreases the magnitude of the treatment effect
somewhat, indicating day-specific effects were important.
Quantile regressions at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of the step dis-
tribution indicate that treatment effects were fairly stable and significant throughout the
distribution (slightly stronger at the median), except at the very upper end of the distribu-
tion, where they were insignificant (Figure 1.14). This finding is intuitive: users who are
most active are less likely to be influenced by a small nudge.
I augment my baseline specification to include gender, age, and BMI (the latter two
standardized) as well as an interaction term for each with treatment status (Figure 1.12).
I cannot consider days as a user for this intervention because it was always pushed on a
user’s fourth day in the system. The treatment was slightly more effective for older users.
I also split the analysis by day of the week (Figure 1.13). Results indicate effects
on Thursdays and Saturdays were responsible for the average treatment effects (spurring
274.8 and 402.1 steps on the initial day of the notification, respectively). I am unable to
think of any particularly sound intuition for the Thursday finding. Saturday’s finding is
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more intuitive: with more free time, already-motivated people are particularly responsive.
This effect likely does not exist on Sunday because users sense the immanency of Monday
and the waning of the weekend’s freedom, and are therefore less responsive to suggestions
of increased physical activity.
I next test for heterogeneity with respect to average steps over the two days leading up
to the notification (i.e. their first full two days in the system). The relevant interaction term
is insignificant (results omitted).
26.2% of users explicitly accepted the initial notification. These users again tended to
be female, younger, and higher BMI (Figure 1.15). 6.6% of users declined the notification.
67.2% of users ignored the notification (but indeed looked at the app). These results are
completely consistent with those for “Step Intervention #1.” Although I cannot analyze
heterogeneity with respect to days as a user (given this notification is always pushed on a
user’s fourth day), I include additional specifications controlling total eventual number of
days for which each user ends up being in the system for consistency with other interven-
tions’ analyses. Interestingly, despite heterogeneity in treatment effects with respect to day
of the week, results involving propensity to accept the notification are consistent across the
week.
I again split the treatment group into those who chose to accept, decline, or ignore the
initial notification, showing differences in mean steps between each of these groups and
the control group (Figure 1.16). These estimates cannot be interpreted causally for the
same reasons as in “Step Intervention #1.” Acceptance was significantly associated with
859 steps more per person relative to the control group (point estimates for declining and
ignoring are negative, but insignificant).
As before, contingent upon accepting the challenge on the initial day, a user was given
the opportunity to accept the same challenge the next day. The ”chain” continued as long
as a user continued to accept challenges. Conditional on accepting the first notification,
31.6% of users accepted the second. Conditional on accepting second, 32.7% accept the
third. Conditional on accepting the third challenge, 43.8% accept fourth. However, on day
8 as a user, i.e. potentially the fifth day of the intervention, users who were initially in the
treatment group were all sent the notification as though they had continued to chain to that
point. 18.9% accepted this notification. Conditional on accepting this notification, 36.1%
accepted the next day; 37.5% accepted on the subsequent day. On day 11 as a user, i.e.
potentially the eighth day of the intervention, all users were again pushed the intervention
as though they had been chaining. 17.1% accepted this notification. Users continue to
chain in similar proportions. However, because there were no new randomly withheld
notifications at any point during this process (except on initial day of the notification), I
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can only compare the activity of the treatment group X days after the initial notification
to the control group X days after the initial notification. At lags of 1, 2..., 13 days, there
are no statistically distinguishable effects. In contrast to the successful initial notification
sent initially on day 4, the follow-up notifications sent to all active users on days 8 and
11 were ineffective. These conclusions continue to hold if I include state fixed effects, or
gender, age, and BMI as covariates (with interaction terms or not). They also hold if I
control for average steps over 2 days prior to the initial intervention (again including an
interaction term or not). Consistent with these findings, there is no significant difference in
total number of steps (across all future days) or total steps per day (again across all future
days) between treatment and control groups (with or without the full gamut of controls). I
omit these null findings for brevity.
The default goal threshold specifications are broadly consistent with the main specifi-
cation. Being in the treatment caused a 1.19% increased probability of reaching 10,000
steps (Figure 1.17). Results are robust to the inclusion of demographic covariates, state
fixed effects, and date fixed effects. However, heterogeneous treatment effects with respect
to age disappear at a 5% significance level (Figure 1.18).
The notification-based threshold specifications are also broadly consistent with the
main specification, albeit with additional evidence of responsiveness. Being in the treat-
ment caused a 2.91% increased probability of reaching the temporary goal (Figure 1.19).
This is robust to the inclusion of demographic covariates, state fixed effects, and date fixed
effects. Heterogeneity with respect to age remains, indicating a one standard deviation in-
crease in age is associated with a 0.12% increased likelihood of exceeding the goal. (Figure
1.20). These specifications, unlike the main or default specifications, show lasting respon-
siveness for up to five days after the initial notification, though with declining effect sizes
relative to the initial day (Figure 1.21. This is consistent with the temporary reference point
being salient among treatment group members for a several days even sans an improvement
in average steps on those days.
1.8.3 Step Intervention #3
”Step Intervention #3,” fielded after a particularly sedentary week, did not spur activity
among those who received the notification and opened the app on the initial day of the
notification as compared to their control group counterparts who also opened the app (Fig-
ure 1.22). Treatment effects remain insignificant if I include demographic covariates, state
fixed effects, or date fixed effects. Including main and interaction terms for gender, age,
BMI, and days as a user also yielded insignificant estimates. Splitting the analysis by day
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of the week did not indicate any particular day had significant treatment effects. There
were also no significant treatment effects when I split the sample into seasons of the year.
Moreover, testing for heterogeneity with respect to average steps over the seven days lead-
ing up to the notification did not yield anything significant. Given that the exact pattern
of activity leading up to the intervention might matter, I also tried stratifying the sample
by how many of the seven days leading up to the intervention had exactly zero recorded
activity; each stratum had insignificant treatment effects. This remained true if I instead
stratified by how many of the seven days leading up to the intervention had fewer than 500
steps. I omit these null results for brevity.
11.8% of users explicitly accepted the intervention, while 3.6% of users declined the
notification and 84.6% ignored the notification (but indeed looked at the app). Users who
accepted the notification again tended to be female, younger, higher BMI, and were in
the system longer at the time of the intervention (Figure 1.23). Point estimates with re-
spect to age, gender, and BMI remain stable when I additionally control for total eventual
number of days for which each user ended up being in the system (i.e. controlling for se-
lection), but the sign of the effect of total days in the system at the time of the intervention
switches: more experienced users were less likely to accept the notification after control-
ling for tenure. Results with respect to propensity to accept are consistent across seasons
of the year and again across days of the week.
I next split the treatment group into those who chose to accept, decline, or ignore the
notification, showing differences in mean steps between each of these groups and the con-
trol group (Figure 1.24). Again, these results cannot be interpreted causally. Acceptance
is significantly associated with 1106 more steps per person relative to the control group;
declining 478 more steps; and ignoring 156 fewer steps.
Chaining for this intervention worked just like ”Step Intervention #2” except there
were no days on which the notifications were re-sent to everyone regardless if they had been
chaining to that point. Unsurprisingly, there are no significant lagged treatment effects.
The default goal threshold specifications also yielded nothing regardless of the inclu-
sion of covariates and interactions (both for the day of the initial notification and subsequent
days). Stratifying the sample by the number of days with zero recorded activity over the
preceding week also yielded nothing. However, the notification-based goal threshold speci-
fications show marginally significant effects on the initial day (0.30% increased probability
of meeting the goal) and one day later (0.29% increased probability of meeting the goal).
These effects were driven entirely by people who had zero days of missing data in the
week preceding the intervention (with effect sizes of 0.80% and 0.59%, respectively, at p
< 0.0001). Taken at face value, these results are consistent with the temporary reference
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point being salient among particularly active treatment group members for a couple days
even without engendering a direct improvement in average steps in that group.
1.8.4 Sleep Intervention
”Sleep Intervention,” which targeted an earlier bedtime after a particularly restless few
days, spurred an additional 4.94 minutes of reported sleep on the evening of the initial
notification among those who received the notification and opened the app as compared
to their control group counterparts who also opened the app (Figure 1.25). This effect
was almost entirely driven by earlier bedtimes (not waking up later). Treatment effects
remain stable with the inclusion of demographic covariates, state fixed effects, and date
fixed effects.
Quantile regression at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of steps indicate
that treatment effects are insignificant at the extremes of the distribution and are strongest
at the 75th percentile (see Figure 1.28). In other words, people who already tended to get a
bit more sleep (but not too much) were most responsive.
I detect no treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to gender, age, nor BMI (Fig-
ure 1.26). I also test for heterogeneity with respect to average minutes of sleep over the
seven evenings leading up to the notification; the interaction term is insignificant. I next
split the analysis by day of the week, excluding Fridays and Saturdays, since notifications
were never sent on those days (Figure 1.27). Mondays and Thursdays had insignificant
treatment effects. Mondays are usually particularly stressful as people recover from being
back to work, so it is unsurprising that the intervention was unsuccessful. The lack of re-
sponsiveness is particularly surprising on Thursday given we observed particularly strong
responsiveness on Thursdays for “Step Intervention #2.” Tuesdays had the strongest treat-
ment effects (7.10 minutes), followed by Sundays (6.93 minutes) and Wednesdays (4.25
minutes). Although strong effects on Sunday are fairly intuitive given people generally
catch up on sleep before the start of the new workweek, strong effects on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays are a bit more surprising.
22.5% of users accepted the notification, while 4.6% of users declined the notification
and 72.9% of users ignored the notification (but indeed looked at the app). Users who
accepted were again likely to be female, younger, higher BMI, and in the system longer at
the time of the intervention (see Figure 1.29). Point estimates with respect to age, gender,
and BMI remain stable when I additionally control for total eventual number of days each
user ends up being in the system, but the sign of the effect of total days in the system at the
time of the intervention again switches. These results are stable across days of the week
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and consistent with all prior discussed interventions.
After splitting the treatment group into accepters, decliners, and ignorers, and again
noting the following cannot be interpreted causally, I find acceptance is associated with
24.4 more minutes of sleep and declination with 11.6 fewer minutes of sleep (Figure 1.30,
with an insignificant coefficient for ignorers).
Chaining for this intervention works just like “Step Intervention #3.” Among those
who accepted the initial notification, 6.7% accepted the notification on the second day.
Conditional on accepting the notification on the second day, 12.8% accepted on the third
day. For subsequent days the percentages were 39.7%, 57.3%, and 46.0%, respectively.
However, unlike the other interventions, there were significant longitudinal effects (Figure
1.31). One day lagged from the treatment still saw the treatment group reporting on aver-
age 3.32 minutes more sleep than the control group; 2 days lagged saw the treatment group
reporting 2.12 minutes more sleep; 3 days lagged, 3.55 minutes more; 4 days lagged, 4.03
minutes more; 5 days lagged, 1.62 minutes more (marginally insignificant); 6 days lagged,
2.35 minutes more (back to highly significant); and 14 days lagged, 1.88 minutes more
(only significant at the 5% level). Results are robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects,
demographic covariates (gender, age, and BMI), and total days as a user at the time of
the intervention (not reported for brevity). Including these covariates and their interactions
with initial treatment status yield no heterogeneity in lagged treatment effects (also not
reported). There was also no heterogeneity with respect to lagged treatment effects and
average minutes of sleep over the seven evenings preceding the initial notification. Amaz-
ingly, the treatment appears to have a semi-permanent impact on reported sleep behavior,
engendering 1.19 minutes of additional reported sleep per evening, averaged across all
evenings the user remains active in the system starting with the evening of the initial no-
tification (Figure 1.32. This semi-permanent effect is robust to the inclusion of state fixed
effects and demographic covariates.
Two forces could drive these semi-permanent effects: (1) the “chaining” notifications
might continually spur earlier bedtimes, or (2) the initial notification alone might spur
a persistently earlier bedtime. Given low acceptance rates associated with the chaining
notifications, the latter is probably the relevant mechanism. Indeed, only 13 users chain to
a seventh notification, while persistent treatment effects are observed well after a week. To
directly test this hypothesis, I re-ran the longitudinal analysis excluding treatment group
members who ever chain after the initial notification (i.e. anyone who accepts and repeats
the challenge). Point estimates and significance levels are almost identical to those in
the main specifications, indicating the chaining itself was not the relevant mechanism, but
rather the initial notification had a lasting impact on behavior. Of course, as caveated above,
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we cannot rule out reporting effects.
The default goal threshold specifications, which use an indicator variable for whether
a user reaches 8 hours of sleep as the dependent variable, are broadly consistent with the
main specification. Being in the treatment caused a 1.54% increased probability of reaching
8 hours of sleep (Figure 1.33). Results are robust to the inclusion of additional covariates,
state fixed effects, and date fixed effects. There continue to be no heterogeneous treatment
effects with respect to gender, age, BMI, or total days as a user (Figure 1.34. However, ex-
cept for Wednesday, heterogeneities with respect to day of the week persist (Figure 1.35).
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, missing data disallowed undertaking the goal-based
threshold analysis for this intervention. However, the fact that this intervention had a last-
ing, direct impact on sleep, both with respect to the continuous outcome variable and the
threshold relative to the default goal, makes the robustness check in this instance less inter-
esting.
1.9 Difference-in-Differences Robustness Checks
I also employ a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the robustness of my initial-
day average treatment effects. I first evaluate the within-person difference between steps
or minutes of sleep on the initial day of the notification and steps or sleep on the day prior.
I do this separately for treatment and control groups and take averages, finally computing
the difference-in-differences. Results for all interventions are consistent with my main
specification’s findings.
For ”Step Intervention #1,” we expect people to walk less on the first day of the no-
tification compared to the day prior. In fact, people in the treatment walked 360 steps
on average less on the day of the notification compared to the day before. People in the
control walked 434 steps less on average. Both differences are highly significant. The
difference-in-differences, 74 steps, has a p-value of 0.06. This is a bit smaller than the
main specification’s ITT. Users in ”Step Intervention #2” walked 54 steps more on aver-
age on the day of the notification compared to the day before (p-value of approximately
0.05). People in the control walked 91 fewer steps (p-value less than 0.01). The difference-
in-differences, 145, is highly significant and only a little smaller than the main specification
ATET. Users in “Step Intervention #3” walked 4,348 steps more on the day of the notifi-
cation compared to the day before; people in the control 4,346 steps more. This speaks to
people naturally ”bouncing back” after a few low-step days, i.e. mean reversion (regardless
of receiving a notification or not). The difference-in-differences is insignificant. This null
finding is consistent with my main specification, which found an insignificant ATET even
24
on the initial day of the notification. Finally, for ”Sleep Intervention,” recall we targeted
users who had recently not been sleeping well. People in the treatment slept 52 minutes
more on the day of the notification as compared to the day prior; people in the control 46
minutes more. The difference-in-differences (6 minutes) is highly significant. This again
speaks to people naturally ”bouncing back,” i.e. mean reversion (this time with respect to
minutes of sleep). However, unlike “Step Intervention #3,” the “Sleep Intervention” noti-
fication furthered that recovery. Notice that the 6-minute effect size is also consistent with
the main specification’s ATET.
1.10 Conclusions
Smartphone notifications fielded outside of a laboratory setting can indeed harness loss
aversion and reference-dependent utility to promote pro-health behavior. Temporary goals
were specifically chosen to target either the specific day of the year (e.g. Thanksgiving)
or how a user had been recently performing. Moreover, these goals were chosen to con-
stitute fairly modest improvements over expectations and recent performance, and hence
were not excessively ambitious (i.e. typically much lower than the default goal and only
slightly higher than activity in preceding days). Their power is in framing not meeting the
temporary goal as a loss. If the new reference point were set too high (relative to recent
activity), diminishing sensitivity implies that people would not be particularly responsive.
However, setting the reference point only slightly higher than recent activity facilitated re-
sponsiveness to the temporary goal. Indeed, treatment effects for “Step Intervention #1”
and “Step Intervention #2” were on the order of 0.10 miles on the initial day of the notifi-
cation, but were not persistent, while “Step Intervention #3” showed no significant effect
on physical activity on either initial or subsequent days. Initial treatment effects for ”Sleep
Intervention” were on the order of 5 minutes of additional rest that night. These sleep-based
effects persisted for as long as a user remained in the system, engendering approximately
an additional minute reported sleep per night (driven by the initial notification itself rather
than follow-up notifications). Analyses investigating the interventions’ impact on the prob-
ability of exceeding either the default goal or the notification-based goal were broadly
consistent with my main findings. The latter showed additional evidence of responsiveness
for “Step Intervention #2” (for six days, including the initial notification) and “Step In-
tervention #3” (for two days, including the initial notification), indicating salience of the
reference point even sans an improvement in behavior. Moreover, there was limited treat-
ment effect heterogeneity with respect to gender, age, and BMI, but substantial treatment
effect heterogeneity with respect to day of the week. However, users who were female,
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younger, and higher BMI were robustly more likely to accept the challenges proffered by
the interventions across all days of the week.
To my knowledge, these results constitute the largest mHealth study of physical activity
and sleep, and the first to channel tenants of reference-dependent utility and loss aversion
toward improving behavior. Results are encouraging, indicating that a small number of
smartphone notifications which propose modestly ambitious goals relative to a particular
day or pattern of recent activity can temporarily alter reference points. These goals posi-
tively exploit loss aversion by framing not meeting the temporary improvement as a loss,
promoting physical activity in the short-term and increased reported sleep in the medium-
term. More broadly, my results indicate that applying tools from behavioral economics to
other sorts of mHealth interventions is a promising avenue for future research.
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1.12 Figures
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(1) (2) (3)
steps steps steps
treatment 173.1∗∗∗ 170.7∗∗∗ 181.9∗∗∗
(48.03) (47.42) (47.75)
age -28.33∗∗∗
(1.703)
bmi -134.9∗∗∗
(4.097)
male -87.91
(45.32)
State FE No No Yes
r2 0.000247 0.0296 0.0141
N 52628 52423 52628
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.1: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Column (1) shows mean difference
in steps between treatment and control groups. The independent variable ”treatment” is
treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is total steps on the initial day of the inter-
vention. Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates.
Column (3) includes state fixed effects.
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(1)
steps
treatment 199.6∗∗
(68.01)
male -50.47
(77.61)
treatment X male -55.89
(95.69)
bmi (std) -122.4∗∗∗
(6.907)
treatment X bmi (std) -19.30∗
(8.580)
age (std) -29.10∗∗∗
(2.909)
treatment X age (std) 1.205
(3.591)
system days (std) 0.351
(0.333)
treatment X system days (std) -0.567
(0.410)
r2 0.0298
N 52423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.2: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Estimates from regression of daily
steps on the initial day of the intervention on treatment status, an indicator for male gen-
der, BMI, age, system days (how many days someone has had their wearable band for),
and interaction terms between each and treatment status. BMI, age, and system days are
standardized.
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(1)
steps
treatment 123.7∗∗
(39.27)
recent lagged steps (std) 2953.5∗∗∗
(32.08)
treatment X recent lagged steps (std) 92.00∗
(39.40)
r2 0.333
N 52539
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.3: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Estimates from regression of daily
steps on the initial day of the intervention on treatment status, average steps on the preced-
ing 6 days (standardized so it has mean 0 and variance 1), and an interaction term.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
steps 5 steps 25 steps 50 steps 75 steps 95
main
treatment 47.00 99.00∗ 202.0∗∗ 136.0∗ 297.0∗
(41.36) (48.10) (71.84) (64.61) (133.5)
r2
N 52628 52628 52628 52628 52628
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.4: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Columns indicate quantile effects
for the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.
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(1) (2) (3)
steps steps steps
treatment12 45.93 45.88 51.18
(56.48) (55.71) (56.15)
age -27.98∗∗∗
(2.113)
bmi -141.6∗∗∗
(5.114)
male -109.4
(56.13)
State FE No No Yes
r2 0.0000191 0.0310 0.0155
N 34640 34504 34640
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.5: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Comparison of the two treatments.
Treatment12 is an indicator that takes on a value of 0 if the notification included the person’s
step average (”Stay at flock’s front by meeting your X step average.”) and a value of 1 if
the message did not (”Stay at flock’s front by maintaining your average today.”). Column
(1) shows mean difference in steps between the treatments. The dependent variable is total
steps on the initial day of the intervention. Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator
for male gender as covariates. Column (3) includes state fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
accepted accepted declined declined ignored ignored
age -0.00299∗∗∗ -0.00348∗∗∗ -0.000404∗∗∗ -0.000478∗∗∗ 0.00340∗∗∗ 0.00396∗∗∗
(0.000140) (0.000142) (0.0000611) (0.0000622) (0.000149) (0.000151)
male -0.0499∗∗∗ -0.0467∗∗∗ -0.000384 0.000101 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗
(0.00371) (0.00370) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00395) (0.00393)
bmi 0.000814∗ 0.00104∗∗ 0.000000264 0.0000337 -0.000814∗ -0.00107∗∗
(0.000338) (0.000336) (0.000148) (0.000148) (0.000359) (0.000358)
system days 0.0000564∗∗∗ -0.000102∗∗∗ -0.000000436 -0.0000243∗∗ -0.0000559∗∗∗ 0.000127∗∗∗
(0.0000159) (0.0000181) (0.00000693) (0.00000793) (0.0000169) (0.0000192)
Total Days No Yes No Yes No Yes
r2 0.0186 0.0278 0.00130 0.00242 0.0199 0.0306
N 34504 34504 34504 34504 34504 34504
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.6: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Linear probability model estimates
for the impact of anthropomorphics on accepting, declining, or ignoring the notifications
(mutually exclusive categories). Note that the “ignore” category includes those who look at
the app and ignore the notification and those who simply don’t look at the app. Even num-
bered columns additionally include a covariate for total days the user ended up remaining
in the system for, meant to control for selection effects.
(1)
steps
accepted 2235.3∗∗∗
(84.37)
declined -811.8∗∗∗
(188.0)
ignored -138.8∗∗
(49.17)
r2 0.0169
N 52628
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.7: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Column (1) shows the mean differ-
ence in steps between the omitted control group and those who either accepted, declined,
or ignored the initial notification. These estimates should not be interpreted causally.
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(1) (2) (3)
threshold default threshold default threshold default
treatment 0.0101∗ 0.00998∗ 0.0107∗
(0.00426) (0.00423) (0.00425)
age -0.00147∗∗∗
(0.000152)
male -0.0170∗∗∗
(0.00405)
bmi -0.00965∗∗∗
(0.000366)
State FE No No Yes
r2 0.000106 0.0177 0.00811
N 52628 52423 52628
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.8: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. The independent variable ”treat-
ment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the person
met the default goal of 10,000 steps on the initial day of the intervention. Column (2) in-
cludes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates. Column (3) includes state
fixed effects.
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(1)
threshold default
treatment 0.0139∗
(0.00607)
male -0.0121
(0.00693)
treatment X male -0.00776
(0.00854)
bmi (std) -0.00891∗∗∗
(0.000617)
treatment X bmi (std) -0.00112
(0.000766)
age (std) -0.00129∗∗∗
(0.000260)
treatment X age (std) -0.000280
(0.000321)
system days (std) 0.0000348
(0.0000297)
treatment X system days (std) -0.0000345
(0.0000366)
r2 0.0178
N 52423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.9: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. Estimates from regression of an
indicator for whether the person met the default goal of 10,000 steps on the initial day of
the intervention on treatment status, an indicator for male gender, BMI, age, system days
(how many days someone has had their wearable band for), and interaction terms between
each and treatment status. BMI, age, and system days are standardized.
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(1) (2) (3)
threshold goal threshold goal threshold goal
treatment 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗
(0.00455) (0.00456) (0.00453)
age -0.000291
(0.000164)
male -0.00333
(0.00436)
bmi -0.00287∗∗∗
(0.000394)
State FE No No Yes
r2 0.000285 0.00151 0.0120
N 52628 52423 52628
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.10: Step Intervention #1, Thanksgiving 2013. The independent variable ”treat-
ment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the person
met the notification-based goal, only presented to the treatment group (average daily steps).
Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates. Column (3)
includes state fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
steps steps steps steps
treatment 161.7∗∗∗ 155.4∗∗∗ 159.1∗∗∗ 127.4∗∗
(45.09) (44.79) (45.04) (45.36)
age -28.44∗∗∗
(1.829)
bmi -101.6∗∗∗
(3.888)
male 177.5∗∗∗
(44.98)
State FE No No Yes No
Date FE No No No Yes
r2 0.000269 0.0236 0.00637 0.00410
N 47856 47250 47856 47856
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.11: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Column (1) shows mean
difference in steps between treatment and control groups. The independent variable ”treat-
ment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is total steps on the day of the initial
notification. Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates.
Column (3) includes state fixed effects. Column (4) includes date fixed effects.
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(1)
steps
treatment 102.4
(63.96)
male 125.2∗
(63.22)
treatment X male 104.7
(89.96)
bmi (std) -99.87∗∗∗
(5.504)
treatment X bmi (std) -3.573
(7.777)
age (std) -32.17∗∗∗
(2.573)
treatment X age (std) 7.516∗
(3.658)
r2 0.0237
N 47250
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.12: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Estimates from regression of
daily steps on the day of the initial notification on treatment status, an indicator for male
gender, BMI, age, system days (how many days someone has had their wearable band for),
and interaction terms between each and treatment status. BMI, age, and system days are
standardized.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
steps steps steps steps steps steps steps
treatment 136.8 -155.6 19.84 133.7 274.8∗ 36.98 402.1∗∗
(123.7) (121.3) (119.0) (109.7) (117.9) (116.2) (125.9)
r2 0.000176 0.000277 0.00000456 0.000195 0.000825 0.0000140 0.00137
N 6950 5937 6102 7606 6583 7245 7433
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.13: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Estimates from regression
of daily steps on the day of the initial notification on treatment status by day of the week.
Column (1) is Sunday, Column (2) is Monday. . . , Column (7) is Saturday.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
steps 5 steps 25 steps 50 steps 75 steps 95
main
treatment 151.0∗ 129.0∗∗ 186.0∗∗∗ 164.0∗∗ -59.00
(67.79) (40.30) (53.72) (59.62) (140.7)
r2
N 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.14: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Columns indicate quantile
effects for the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
accepted accepted declined declined ignored ignored
age -0.000616∗∗ -0.00137∗∗∗ 0.00100∗∗∗ 0.000831∗∗∗ -0.000393 0.000531∗
(0.000234) (0.000237) (0.000132) (0.000135) (0.000249) (0.000252)
male -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.0825∗∗∗ 0.00181 0.00210 0.0817∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗
(0.00575) (0.00572) (0.00325) (0.00325) (0.00614) (0.00609)
bmi 0.00592∗∗∗ 0.00607∗∗∗ -0.000256 -0.000222 -0.00570∗∗∗ -0.00588∗∗∗
(0.000493) (0.000491) (0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000527) (0.000523)
Total Days No Yes No Yes No Yes
r2 0.0140 0.0252 0.00248 0.00434 0.0124 0.0272
N 23330 23330 23330 23330 23330 23330
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.15: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Linear probability model
estimates for the impact of anthropomorphics on accepting, declining, or ignoring the initial
notification (exclusive categories). Note the “ignore” category excludes users who did not
open the app that day (as does the control group). Even numbered columns additionally
include a covariate for total days the user ended up remaining in the system for, meant to
control for selection effects.
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(1)
steps
accepted 859.0∗∗∗
(70.02)
declined -150.1
(128.7)
ignored -81.06
(50.24)
r2 0.00379
N 47856
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.16: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Column (1) shows the mean
difference in steps between the omitted control group and those who either accepted, de-
clined, or ignored initial notification. These estimates should not be interpreted causally.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
threshold default threshold default threshold default threshold default
treatment 0.0119∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0101∗
(0.00430) (0.00429) (0.00430) (0.00433)
age -0.00174∗∗∗
(0.000175)
male 0.00951∗
(0.00431)
bmi -0.00809∗∗∗
(0.000372)
State FE No No Yes No
Date FE No No No Yes
r2 0.000159 0.0143 0.00467 0.00234
N 47856 47250 47856 47856
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.17: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. The independent variable
”treatment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the
person met the default goal of 10,000 steps on the initial day of the intervention. Column
(2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates. Column (3) includes
state fixed effects. Column (4) includes date fixed effects.
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(1)
threshold default
treatment 0.00491
(0.00613)
male 0.00305
(0.00605)
treatment X male 0.0130
(0.00862)
bmi (std) -0.00766∗∗∗
(0.000527)
treatment X bmi (std) -0.000867
(0.000745)
age (std) -0.00207∗∗∗
(0.000246)
treatment X age (std) 0.000674
(0.000350)
r2 0.0144
N 47250
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.18: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Estimates from regression of
an indicator for whether the person met the default goal of 10,000 steps on the initial day of
the intervention on treatment status, an indicator for male gender, BMI, age, system days
(how many days someone has had their wearable band for), and interaction terms between
each and treatment status. BMI, age, and system days are standardized.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
threshold goal threshold goal threshold goal threshold goal
treatment 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(0.00453) (0.00456) (0.00454) (0.00456)
age 0.000211
(0.000186)
male 0.00470
(0.00458)
bmi -0.000991∗
(0.000396)
State FE No No Yes No
Date FE No No No Yes
r2 0.000860 0.00102 0.00239 0.00555
N 47856 47250 47856 47856
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.19: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. The independent variable
”treatment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the
person met the notification-based goal, only presented to the treatment group (average daily
steps over the preceding 2 days + 500 steps). Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an
indicator for male gender as covariates. Column (3) includes state fixed effects. Column
(4) includes date fixed effects.
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(1)
threshold goal
treatment 0.0317∗∗∗
(0.00651)
male 0.00718
(0.00644)
treatment X male -0.00528
(0.00916)
bmi (std) -0.00132∗
(0.000560)
treatment X bmi (std) 0.000654
(0.000792)
age (std) -0.000368
(0.000262)
treatment X age (std) 0.00117∗∗
(0.000372)
r2 0.00128
N 47250
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.20: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Estimates from regression of
an indicator for whether the person met the notification-based goal (average steps over the
preceding 2 days + 500 steps) on the initial day of the intervention on treatment status, an
indicator for male gender, BMI, age, system days (how many days someone has had their
wearable band for), and interaction terms between each and treatment status. BMI, age,
and system days are standardized.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1d-Lag 2d-Lag 3d-Lag 4d-Lag 5d-Lag 6d-Lag 7d-Lag 8d-Lag 9d-Lag 10d-Lag 11d-Lag
treatment 0.0125∗∗ 0.0122∗∗ 0.00976∗ 0.0104∗ 0.0128∗∗ 0.00704 0.00414 0.00355 0.00548 0.00588 0.00582
(0.00453) (0.00453) (0.00454) (0.00454) (0.00453) (0.00454) (0.00456) (0.00456) (0.00456) (0.00457) (0.00457)
r2 0.000159 0.000150 0.0000967 0.000110 0.000167 0.0000501 0.0000173 0.0000127 0.0000301 0.0000346 0.0000339
N 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856 47856
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.21: Step Intervention #2, fourth day in the system. Estimates from regression of
lagged indicator for whether the person met the notification-based goal (average steps over
the preceding 2 days + 500 steps) on treatment status, for lags of 1 to 11 days. Regressions
additionally controlling for state fixed effects, time fixed effects, or age, gender, BMI,
and days since becoming a user (not shown) are essentially identical in terms of lagged
treatment effect magnitudes and significances.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
steps steps steps steps
treatment 12.35 15.86 12.06 15.03
(15.47) (15.39) (15.44) (15.36)
age -29.46∗∗∗
(0.478)
bmi -101.3∗∗∗
(1.117)
male 137.2∗∗∗
(12.39)
State FE No No Yes No
Date FE No No No Yes
r2 0.000000918 0.0205 0.00421 0.0158
N 694724 686587 694724 694724
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.22: Step Intervention #3, after a particularly sedentary week. Column (1) shows
mean difference in steps between treatment and control groups. The independent variable
”treatment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is total steps on the day of the
initial notification. Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as
covariates. Column (3) includes state fixed effects. Column (4) includes date fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
accepted accepted declined declined ignored ignored
age -0.00179∗∗∗ -0.00225∗∗∗ -0.0000528∗∗ -0.0000941∗∗∗ 0.00184∗∗∗ 0.00235∗∗∗
(0.0000336) (0.0000343) (0.0000195) (0.0000199) (0.0000376) (0.0000383)
male -0.0634∗∗∗ -0.0629∗∗∗ -0.00995∗∗∗ -0.00990∗∗∗ 0.0733∗∗∗ 0.0728∗∗∗
(0.000869) (0.000866) (0.000503) (0.000503) (0.000971) (0.000967)
bmi 0.00466∗∗∗ 0.00486∗∗∗ 0.000934∗∗∗ 0.000952∗∗∗ -0.00559∗∗∗ -0.00581∗∗∗
(0.0000783) (0.0000780) (0.0000453) (0.0000453) (0.0000875) (0.0000872)
system days 0.0000806∗∗∗ -0.0000533∗∗∗ -0.0000510∗∗∗ -0.0000630∗∗∗ -0.0000296∗∗∗ 0.000116∗∗∗
(0.00000325) (0.00000386) (0.00000188) (0.00000224) (0.00000363) (0.00000431)
Total Days No Yes No Yes No Yes
r2 0.0184 0.0256 0.00265 0.00283 0.0183 0.0252
N 549596 549596 549596 549596 549596 549596
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.23: Step Intervention #3, after a particularly sedentary week. Linear probability
model estimates for the impact of anthropomorphics on accepting, declining, or ignoring
the initial notification (exclusive categories). Note the “ignore” category excludes users
who did not open the app that day (as does the control group). Even numbered columns
additionally include a covariate for total days the user ended up remaining in the system
for, meant to control for selection effects.
(1)
steps
accepted 1106.0∗∗∗
(24.37)
declined 401.5∗∗∗
(39.02)
ignored -156.3∗∗∗
(15.71)
r2 0.00514
N 694724
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.24: Step Intervention #3, after a particularly sedentary week. Column (1) shows
the mean difference in steps between the omitted control group and those who either ac-
cepted, declined, or ignored the initial notification. These estimates should not be inter-
preted causally.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mins bedtime waketime mins mins mins
treatment 4.943∗∗∗ -5.150∗∗∗ 0.184 4.866∗∗∗ 4.925∗∗∗ 4.904∗∗∗
(0.841) (0.849) (1.069) (0.835) (0.841) (0.838)
age -0.373∗∗∗
(0.0250)
bmi -0.971∗∗∗
(0.0585)
male -16.31∗∗∗
(0.669)
State FE No No No No Yes No
Date FE No No No No No Yes
r2 0.000438 0.000466 0.000000376 0.0168 0.00187 0.00629
N 78833 78833 78833 78517 78833 78833
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.25: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Column (1) shows
mean difference in minutes of sleep between treatment and control groups. The indepen-
dent variable ”treatment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is total minutes
of sleep on the day of the initial notification. Columns (2) and (3) consider bed and wake
times as the outcome variable (in minutes relative to 7pm the evening of the notification).
Column (4) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates. Column (5)
includes state fixed effects. Column (6) includes date fixed effects.
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(1)
mins
treatment 5.064∗∗∗
(1.161)
male -16.07∗∗∗
(1.510)
treatment X male -0.415
(1.685)
bmi (std) -0.971∗∗∗
(0.131)
treatment X bmi (std) 0.00343
(0.146)
age (std) -0.332∗∗∗
(0.0566)
treatment X age (std) -0.0570
(0.0632)
system days (std) 0.00387
(0.00601)
treatment X system days (std) 0.00415
(0.00670)
r2 0.0169
N 78517
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.26: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Estimates from
regression of daily minutes of sleep on the day of the initial notification on treatment status,
an indicator for male gender, BMI, age, system days (how many days someone has had their
wearable band for), and interaction terms between each and treatment status. BMI, age, and
system days are standardized.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mins mins mins mins mins
treatment 6.933∗∗∗ 2.756 7.102∗∗∗ 4.253∗∗ 2.737
(1.797) (2.494) (1.942) (1.627) (1.803)
r2 0.000816 0.000132 0.000923 0.000348 0.000133
N 18229 9220 14482 19609 17293
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.27: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Estimates from
regression of minutes of sleep on the day of the initial notification on treatment status by
day of the week. Column (1) is Sunday, Column (2) is Monday. . . Column (5) is Thursday.
Note this intervention was not fielded on Friday nor Saturday nights.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mins 5 mins 25 mins 50 mins 75 mins 95
main
treatment 7.000∗ 4.500∗∗∗ 5.000∗∗∗ 5.550∗∗∗ 3.000
(3.551) (1.093) (0.720) (0.671) (1.535)
r2
N 78833 78833 78833 78833 78833
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.28: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Columns indicate
quantile effects for the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
accepted accepted declined declined ignored ignored
age -0.00585∗∗∗ -0.00641∗∗∗ -0.000987∗∗∗ -0.00105∗∗∗ 0.00684∗∗∗ 0.00747∗∗∗
(0.000123) (0.000125) (0.0000627) (0.0000638) (0.000131) (0.000132)
male -0.0707∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗ 0.000325 0.000594 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.0678∗∗∗
(0.00329) (0.00327) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00349) (0.00347)
bmi 0.000704∗ 0.00110∗∗∗ 0.000607∗∗∗ 0.000655∗∗∗ -0.00131∗∗∗ -0.00176∗∗∗
(0.000287) (0.000287) (0.000146) (0.000147) (0.000305) (0.000304)
system days 0.000109∗∗∗ -0.0000759∗∗∗ -0.0000460∗∗∗ -0.0000684∗∗∗ -0.0000634∗∗∗ 0.000144∗∗∗
(0.0000130) (0.0000150) (0.00000662) (0.00000768) (0.0000138) (0.0000159)
Total Days No Yes No Yes No Yes
r2 0.0424 0.0512 0.00497 0.00550 0.0480 0.0579
N 63106 63106 63106 63106 63106 63106
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.29: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Linear probability
model estimates for the impact of anthropomorphics on accepting, declining, or ignoring
the initial notification (exclusive categories). Note the ”ignore” category excludes users
who did not open the app that day (as does the control group). Even numbered columns
additionally include a covariate for total days the user ended up remaining in the system
for, meant to control for selection effects.
(1)
mins
accepted 24.38∗∗∗
(1.082)
declined -11.65∗∗∗
(1.891)
ignored -0.0183
(0.866)
r2 0.0110
N 78833
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.30: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Column (1) shows
the mean difference in minutes of sleep between the omitted control group and those who
either accepted, declined, or ignored the initial notification. These estimates should not be
interpreted causally.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1d-Lag 2d-Lag 3d-Lag 4d-Lag 5d-Lag 6d-Lag 14d-Lag
treatment 3.328∗∗∗ 2.123∗ 3.553∗∗∗ 4.035∗∗∗ 1.622 2.446∗∗ 1.882∗
(0.914) (0.974) (0.983) (0.950) (0.954) (0.938) (0.929)
r2 0.000197 0.0000741 0.000207 0.000286 0.0000460 0.000109 0.0000694
N 67170 64069 62970 63050 62771 62620 59164
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.31: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Estimates from
regression of lagged minutes of sleep on treatment status, for lags of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
14 days. Regressions additionally controlling for state fixed effects or age, gender, BMI,
and days since becoming a user (not shown) are essentially identical in terms of lagged
treatment effect magnitudes and significances.
(1) (2) (3)
mins per evening mins per evening mins per evening
treatment 1.189∗∗ 1.138∗∗ 1.163∗∗
(0.394) (0.380) (0.393)
male -15.43∗∗∗
(0.305)
bmi -0.986∗∗∗
(0.0266)
age -0.365∗∗∗
(0.0114)
system days 0.00411∗∗∗
(0.00121)
State FE No No Yes
r2 0.000116 0.0707 0.00431
N 78833 78517 78833
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.32: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Column (1) shows
estimates from a regression of minutes of sleep per day averaged across all days the user
remains active in the system (including the day of the initial notification and after) on first-
day treatment status. Columns (2) and (3) additionally control for state fixed effects and
gender, BMI, age, and days since becoming a user, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
threshold default threshold default threshold default threshold default
treatment 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(0.00326) (0.00325) (0.00326) (0.00326)
age -0.00174∗∗∗
(0.0000975)
male -0.0514∗∗∗
(0.00260)
bmi -0.00151∗∗∗
(0.000228)
State FE No No Yes No
Date FE No No No Yes
r2 0.000284 0.0110 0.00172 0.00547
N 78833 78517 78833 78833
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.33: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. The independent
variable ”treatment” is treatment status Ti. The dependent variable is an indicator for
whether the person met the default goal of 8 hours of sleep on the day of the initial no-
tification. Column (2) includes age, BMI, and an indicator for male gender as covariates.
Column (3) includes state fixed effects. Column (4) includes date fixed effects.
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(1)
threshold default
treatment 0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00452)
male -0.0502∗∗∗
(0.00588)
treatment X male -0.00162
(0.00656)
bmi (std) -0.00133∗∗
(0.000509)
treatment X bmi (std) -0.000221
(0.000569)
age (std) -0.00149∗∗∗
(0.000220)
treatment X age (std) -0.000312
(0.000246)
system days (std) -0.0000124
(0.0000234)
treatment X system days (std) 0.0000231
(0.0000261)
r2 0.0110
N 78517
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.34: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Estimates from
regression of an indicator for whether the person met the default goal of 8 hours of sleep on
the day of the initial notification on treatment status, an indicator for male gender, BMI, age,
system days (how many days someone has had their wearable band for), and interaction
terms between each and treatment status. BMI, age, and system days are standardized.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
threshold default threshold default threshold default threshold default threshold default
treatment 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.000530 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.00806 0.00746
(0.00730) (0.00988) (0.00730) (0.00611) (0.00696)
r2 0.000838 0.000000312 0.000915 0.0000888 0.0000664
N 18229 9220 14482 19609 17293
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 1.35: Sleep Intervention, after a particularly restless few days. Estimates from
regression of an indicator for whether the person met the default goal of 8 hours of sleep
on the day of the initial notification on treatment status by day of the week. Column (1) is
Sunday, Column (2) is Monday. . . Column (5) is Thursday. Note this intervention was not
fielded on Friday nor Saturday nights.
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1.13 Appendix: Demographic Mediators of Heterogeneity
It is plausible that openness to experience, conscientiousness (a more specific domain of
time-preference), comfort with technology, and risk aversion are concepts related to ac-
cepting and responding to smartphone notifications. I lack direct measures of these broader
concepts, but they each differ on average by demographics such as gender, age, and BMI.
I use these generally accepted associations between demographics and those broader con-
cepts to form predictions about demographic heterogeneity in responsiveness.
1.13.1 Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness
Costa and McCrae (1992) describe high openness to experience (or simply high open-
ness) as being associated with keen imagination, intellectual curiosity, behavior flexibility,
and attitudes and beliefs that tend to be fluid and nondogmatic. I expect these traits were
associated with being influenced by, and accepting, smartphone-based walking or sleep
interventions.
Because of the multi-faceted nature of the more general economic domain of time
preference14, I hone in on the personality trait of conscientiousness to form my hypothe-
ses. Costa and McCrae (1992) describe high conscientiousness as being marked by self-
discipline and diligence, hence related to the direction of impulses, and notions of self-
control (O’Gorman and Baxster, 2002). Self-control intuitively predicts physical health (in
addition to substance abuse, crime, and personal finances, see Moffitt et al., 2010). Indeed,
I expect more conscientious people to be less impulsive and hence were more likely to
accept, and be influenced by, my smartphone interventions.
There are significant average differences in personality traits between the genders (Del
Giudice et al., 2012, N > 10,000 Americans). Western men tend to be more open to
experience, while western women tend to be more conscientious (Lehman et al., 2013, N
> 19,000 Germans; and Schmitt et al., 2008, N > 17,000 people from 55 international
cultures). To the extent that women are more conscientious on average, I expect them to
be more likely to have accepted a smartphone notification. They might also have been
14Conscientiousness is a specific example of the economic concept of time preference. Frederick et al.
(2002) provides an excellent review of time preference, the details of which are beyond the scope of this
paper. They conclude that time preferences are difficult to measure because of the particularly strong in-
fluence of framing effects and domain-specificity. They also highlight that longitudinal studies evaluating
the consistency of measures of time preference are lacking, and their correlation with plausibly related real
world activities are modest at best (e.g. smoking, credit card use, seat belt use, exercise, dental checkups,
vaccination). Indeed, splitting up “time preference” into more specific categories, e.g. impulsivity, compul-
sivity, inhibition, is likely the best path forward (Lowenstein et al., 2001; Khwaja et al., 2007; Borghans and
Golsteyn, 2006; Ikeda et al., 2010).
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more likely to act on the notification’s suggestion and hence be impacted more by the
intervention itself. Male openness to experience, however, would tend to predict the same
for men. Results are consistent with gender only mattering along the extensive margin (i.e.
acceptance) consistent with female conscientiousness, but not male openness. Gender did
not appear to matter along the intensive margin (i.e. treatment effect heterogeneity).
On average there are also differences in personality with respect to age. Lehman et
al. (2013) finds average neuroticism and extraversion are negatively related to age, agree-
ableness and conscientiousness are positively related to age, and openness to experience
exhibits a curvilinear relationship with age (highest at midlife). Soto et al. (2011) uses a
cross-sectional sample of over 1.2 million people, finding negative trends for openness from
late childhood into adolescence, but positive trends for both genders into adulthood and
middle age (with men being somewhat more open throughout adulthood, consistent with
the above hypotheses focused solely on gender). Evidence is consistent with the open-
ness at least increasing from early adulthood to middle age (the age groups most highly
represented in my sample), implying that becoming “set in ones ways” may only operate
much later in life. Given our sample is concentrated slightly below middle age, through
the channel of openness, older people therefore ought to be more likely to accept, and be
impacted by, the notifications. With respect to conscientiousness, Soto et al. 2011 finds a
strong negative trend from late childhood into adolescence, but a strong positive trend from
adolescence into emerging adulthood and beyond (with women showing slightly more con-
scientiousness overall, again consistent with above hypotheses focused solely on gender).
This reinforces my predictions based on openness, namely that older people should have
been more likely to accept, and be impacted by, the notifications; indeed, I find they were
slightly more impacted by “Step Intervention #2.” However, older people were robustly
less likely to accept all notifications, likely driven by the dominant influence of lack of
comfort or familiarity with technology.
The majority of evidence points to there being a modest negative relationship between
BMI and openness, implying we might have expected higher BMI’s to be associated with
less acceptance of the notifications (and more declining and ignoring) and smaller treat-
ment effects (Brummett et al., 2006; Van Reedt Dortland et al., 2012). However, many
studies find zero or mixed results in measuring the relationship between BMI and openness
(Chapman et al. 2009, Terracciano et al. 2009; Sutin et al. 2011; Shim et al., 2014). Evi-
dence points to high BMI being associated with lower conscientiousness (Brummett et al.,
2006; Shim et al., 2014), potentially exacerbating low acceptance and smaller treatment
effects induced by openness. Of course, we sampling from the upper end of the motiva-
tion distribution. This is likely particularly relevant for BMI; I expect these people to be
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particularly motivated and this effect to dominate. In fact, higher BMI people were more
likely to accept the notifications. However, on Thanksgiving, higher BMI users were less
responsive, although high BMI users still accepted the notification in greater numbers on
Thanksgiving.
1.13.2 Comfort with Adopting New Technology
Comfort with adopting new technology is a particularly relevant sub-domain of openness
to experience. We might expect that above and beyond the predictions of general openness,
those who are particularly at ease with new technologies might have been more responsive
to our interventions.
There is little research on anxiety or comfort in specifically adopting wearable or app-
based activity trackers. Rai et al. (2013) is one notable exception, surveying 1,132 Ameri-
cans about their mHealth use, finding older people were less likely to adopt mHealth plat-
forms (as might have been guessed based on the above discussion about openness). They
also found women were more likely to use mHealth as a complement to traditional doctor
visits (in contrast with male openness to experience), but no other relevant heterogeneity
with respect to gender. They do not investigate BMI. I therefore employ older, better-
researched technologies surrounding comfort with Internet use and adoption to ascertain
whom we should expect to be most at ease accepting and responding to smartphone inter-
ventions.
Findings with respect to gender are somewhat mixed, though many studies report that
women are on average more anxious about adopting new technologies (Broos, 2005; Huff-
man et al., 2013 noting that the common finding of increased technology self-efficacy for
men is driven in-part by gender roles rather than biological sex alone). He and Freeman
(2009) highlight that past findings are mixed with respect to gender; while many find
women are more anxious about technology adoption and less likely to adopt, many also
report no gender gap. Their study digs deeper by evaluating how gender plays a roll in
forming beliefs about information technology. If we accept the hypothesis that women are
on average less keen to adopt new technologies, it implies women should have been less
likely to accept, and be impacted by, my smartphone interventions. In fact, while I ob-
serve no impact in terms of gender on the intensive margin of the interventions, women
were indeed more likely to accept the challenges proffered by the interventions, calling
into question the relevance of predictions based on comfort with technology with respect
to gender.
Smith (2014) reports results from a large Pew Institute Survey, finding that 59% of
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seniors report using the Internet (as opposed to 86% of all US adults). Czaja et al. (2006)
confirms these findings, noting further that that relationship between age and adoption of
technology is mediated by cognitive ability (fluid and crystallized intelligence). Porter and
Donthu (2006) develop an advanced version of the technology acceptance model (TAM) to
explain, in part, the age gap in technology adoption, finding that age (as well as income,
education, and race) are associated with certain beliefs about the Internet, and these beliefs
ultimately drive usage. This is consistent with Smith (2014), which points out that two
distinct groups of seniors make up Internet users. Younger, more wealthy, and more highly
educated seniors have adoption rates almost as high as the broader adult population, while
older, less wealthy, and less healthy seniors tend to be completely offline and more skeptical
of its benefits. Our sample is likely to be drawn primarily from the former. However, given
the novelty of an mHealth intervention delivered through a smartphone app, paired with a
wearable fitness tracker, it still seems plausible that older individuals would be less likely
to accept, and be influenced by, my smartphone interventions (Rai et al., 2013). With
respect to acceptance, this intuition turns out to be true: older people were less likely to
accept the challenges. Along the intensive margin, however, these predictions fell flat.
Only “Step Intervention #2” showed heterogeneity along the intensive margin, indicating
that older people were slightly more responsive. This is consistent with predictions based
on conscientiousness, but less so openness or comfort with technology.
1.13.3 Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is also plausibly related to willingness to accept, and respond to, smartphone
interventions aimed at increasing physical activity and sleep. It is well established that
risk aversion is associated with a broad range of risky-taking activities, including smoking,
drinking, being overweight, seat belt use, having insurance, and investing (Anderson and
Mellor, 2008; Barsky et al., 1997). If we deem responding to a smartphone notification
a preventative, pro-health behavior (like wearing a seatbelt, investing in insurance, or not
smoking or drinking), we should expect more risk averse people to accept, and be influ-
enced by, my smartphone interventions. However, given that risk aversion tends to explain
a small percentage of the variation in a range of risky outcomes (Barsky et al. 1997), we
should be hesitant to expect predictions based on demographic differences in risk aversion
to be particularly informative as to acceptance of, or responsiveness to, my interventions.
Men are generally more risk tolerant than women (Barsky et al 1997, Eckel and Gross-
man 2008, Borghans et al. 2009, Kimball et al. 2008, Sapienza et al. 2009). Therefore,
with respect to risk aversion, we should expect women to more likely to accept, and re-
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spond to, the smartphone interventions. While this turned out to be true with respect to
acceptance, I find no evidence of heterogeneity with respect to gender and the intensive
margin.
Older people are generally less risk tolerant (Sahm 2013 using within-person variation
in gambling responses, citing several other papers finding the same thing using alternative
methods). Therefore, with respect to risk aversion, we should expect older people to more
likely to accept, and respond to, the smartphone interventions. This was indeed true with
respect to responsiveness to “Step Intervention #2.” However, with respect to acceptance,
predictions based on risk aversion and age were incorrect.
Higher risk aversion is also intuitively associated with decreased likelihood of having a
high BMI (Anderson and Mellor, 2008). I therefore expect high BMI individuals to be less
responsive to the interventions. With respect to accepting, this turned out to be incorrect.
However, with respect to “Step Intervention #1,” this prediction held.
1.13.4 Results
My findings about challenge acceptance were constant across all interventions. Users who
accepted the notification tended to be female, younger, and higher BMI. These results are
consistent with predictions involving greater female conscientiousness and risk aversion
(but not greater male openness nor comfort with technology). They are also consistent with
older people being less comfortable with technology and more risk averse (but not the ten-
dency of older people to be more open and conscientious). However, they are inconsistent
with predictions involving BMI, likely driven by our self-selected sample of particularly
motivated users.
In ”Step Intervention #1,” the only covariate that showed evidence of mediating treat-
ment effects was BMI: the treatment was most effective for those with lower BMI, on the
order of 20 steps per standard deviation of BMI. Despite the fact that we are drawing from
a disproportionately motivated sample, the direction of this effect is consistent with the
above predictions of higher BMI people being less openness to experience, less conscien-
tious, and less risk averse.
In ”Step Intervention #2,” the treatment was slightly more effective for older users.
This is consistent with predictions regarding older users being more conscientious, open,
and risk averse. However, this is inconsistent with my prediction regarding older people
being less comfortable with, and hence less responsive to, new technology.
”Step Intervention #3” and ”Sleep Intervention” show no evidence of treatment re-
sponse heterogeneiety with respect to gender, age, and BMI.
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CHAPTER 2
Reconsidering Risk Aversion *
* with Daniel Benjamin and Miles Kimball
2.1 Abstract
Policymakers, economists, and the popular media have long been worried that Americans
may not be investing appropriately in preparation for retirement. Setting default options
associated with investing for retirement requires knowing at least the average level of risk
aversion in the population. However, quantitative measures of an individual’s risk toler-
ance vary, depending on a variety of factors that should not matter according to standard
normative axioms, notably how the problem is framed. Our aim is to develop a surveying
procedure, based on the philosophical tradition of deliberative thinking and logical recon-
ciliation among contradictions, which attempts to overcome framing biases in measuring
risk aversion. In moral philosophy, and more recently in the field of decision analysis (e.g.
Raiffa, 1968), there is a long history of having individuals attempt to resolve their inter-
nal inconsistencies and thereby discover their preferences through reasoning. However,
we are not aware of work that has developed systematic procedures for helping people
think through their preference in important economic contexts such as investing for retire-
ment. Using a sample of 628 subjects, the vast majority of whom are Cornell students,
we first elicit “untutored” risk preferences among 5 different investment plans, which in-
volve gambles over “how much you have to spend each year during retirement, from age
65 on.” We ask questions of each subject using 7 different ways of framing the decision
(e.g. varying whether irrelevant information is provided, whether independent choices are
made sequentially or simultaneously, whether subjects are able directly to choose their fa-
vorite choice or can only choose between many pairs of pre-determined plans, and whether
lotteries are already reduced). “Untutored” preferences are those measured before any sort
of guidance or explicit effort on our part to engender reconciliation of logical contradic-
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tions among frames. We then lead subjects through a reconciliation phase, allowing them
to update their choices where they have made inconsistent or intransitive decisions (con-
tradictions according to normative axioms of rational choice), finally reaching “reasoned”
preferences, which we define as those measured after two rounds of inconsistency and in-
transitivity resolutions. We also allow subjects to update already-consistent preferences
to test whether our procedure’s results are driven by experimenter demand. While sub-
jects readily update toward consistency (and transitivity), they rarely move in the other
direction. However, few subjects completely endorse all the normative axioms implied by
differences between similar frames. There is also substantial heterogeneity across frames
in both original consistencies and propensity to update. Initially, subjects are particularly
apt toward consistency in frames in which they could directly choose investment plans (or
pieces of those plans), as opposed to frames in which they were forced to compare every
potential pair of investment plans. They are particularly unlikely initially to endorse Re-
duction of Compound Lotteries, although this axiom also sees the most resolution toward
endorsement. A subset of participants was invited back for a second wave of the experi-
ment 2-4 weeks later. We observe some persistence in preferences across waves as well as
further movements toward consistency across frames. Finally, using maximum likelihood
estimation, we quantify risk aversion and incidence of decision errors among frames and
over the course of our survey. Despite our large sample, analyses of some frames are still
statistically underpowered. Among well-powered analyses, across the course of our sur-
vey, we see limited convergence in risk aversion among frames and an overall reduction in
decision errors. While our study constitutes significant progress, we require a bigger sam-
ple to make concrete default recommendations. We are weighing several further tweaks to
our procedure, including (1) designing a more heavy-handed reconciliation procedure (to
facilitate even more updating toward consistency), (2) direct elicitation of second-, third-,
and fourth-favorite choices (to allow for greater comparability across frames and boost the
statistical power of our MLE procedure), (3) bringing subjects back into the lab for third
or even fourth waves (to test the extent to which our procedure “sticks” over the course of
more than a few weeks), and (4) collecting data from more nationally representative sample
(given concerns about external validity).
2.2 Background and Motivation
Policymakers, economists, and the popular media have long been worried that Americans
may not be investing appropriately in preparation for retirement (e.g., Poterba et al, 2005).
Americans face the dilemma of complex financial and health decisions combined with a
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high incidence of cognitive decline with age. Since default options matter enormously for
actual investment choices (Beshears et al., 2008a), policymakers have turned to defaults as
a policy tool for influencing individuals’ asset allocations (e.g., the Pension Protection Act
of 2006). But what default asset allocation is appropriate?
This project focuses on the practical question of how to measure risk preferences for
calibrating long-term retirement savings, especially for setting fund contribution defaults,
but also for personal investing. The difficulty is that knowing what a “good choice” is for an
individual depends crucially on knowing her preferences. The key preference parameter in
the simple benchmark theory of optimal portfolio choice (relevant for retirement savings as
well as investment choices) is risk aversion, while the optimal saving rate depends on time
preference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) as well as risk aversion.
However, the very fact that individuals tend to stick to arbitrary default asset allocations
and savings rates in defined contribution plans strongly suggests that, for many Americans,
actual retirement saving and investment decisions do not reflect their preferences (Beshears
et al., 2008b). Setting appropriate defaults requires at least knowing the average level of
risk aversion, time preference, and EIS in the population, and ideally knowing each individ-
ual’s parameters. These questions pose serious challenges despite economists’ and decision
analysts’ extensive work on this issue over many years (e.g., Arrow, 1983). For example,
quantitative measures of an individual’s risk tolerance vary considerably, depending on a
variety of factors that should not matter according to standard normative axioms, namely
how the problem is framed (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1981). For determining optimal portfolio choice, it is particularly troublesome that risk
aversion depends on whether the risks are larger-stakes or smaller-stakes1. For example,
among Health and Retirement Study (HRS) respondents, we calculate that the mean esti-
mated coefficient of relative risk aversion is 9.3 for gambles that could double permanent
income, compared with 106.1 for gambles that could increase permanent income by 20%.
Relative risk aversion of 106.1 strikes many economists as implausibly high, but risk aver-
sion appears even greater at smaller stakes. In fact, individuals’ choices in risky choice
problems are inconsistent across stake sizes regardless of the functional form of the utility
function, and hence these choices violate very basic assumptions of normative economic
models (Rabin, 2000). A particular question of this project is whether individuals might be
making an error in either their smaller-stakes choices or in their larger-stakes choices.
There are some economic models that can accommodate seemingly-inconsistent risk
1Evidence on time preference suggests equally important inconsistencies. For example, individuals are
more patient between two future dates than between today and a future date (Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981).
Estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution range widely from about zero (Hall, 1988; Dynan,
1993) to well over 1.0 (Mulligan, 2002; Gruber, 2006). Our focus here is on risk aversion.
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aversion2 over smaller stakes and risk tolerance over larger stakes (e.g., Koszegi and Ra-
bin, 2006). Although these models that accommodate anomalous behavior are written as
non-standard preference specifications, most are explicitly meant to be descriptive (rather
than derived from normative axioms). Hence these “preference-based” theories admit the
interpretation that non-standard behaviors represent decision errors, rather than features of
actual preferences (Beshears et al., 2008b). Ideally, saving and investment defaults would
be set based on measures of risk preferences, time preference, and the EIS that are uncon-
taminated by decision errors.
When a person’s decisions are inconsistent with normative axioms, the problem arises
of distinguishing choices due to decision errors and choices due to preferences. Individ-
uals with greater cognitive ability are generally less risk-averse (Dohmen et al. 2008).
Moreover, experimentally reducing available cognitive resources via “cognitive load” (a
cognitively-demanding task performed concurrently) increases risk-averse behavior (Ben-
jamin et al., 2006). These findings suggest that high degrees of risk aversion may be driven
at least in part by cognitive limitations. In moral philosophy, and more recently in the field
of decision analysis (e.g., Raiffa, 1968), there is a long history of having individuals at-
tempt to resolve their internal inconsistencies and thereby discover their own preferences
through reasoning. Guided decision-making is taught widely in business schools today
and is integrated in existing financial planning software, such as Lawrence Kotlikoff’s ES-
Planner. Indeed, many financial advisors currently implement a version of this idea, albeit
usually with simple measures of risk tolerance and rules of thumb about optimal behavior,
rather than with the results of economic research (e.g., TIAA-CREF, 2008). Few papers
have measured reasoned preferences in a similar spirit as we propose here. For example,
Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) found that subjects were more likely to maximize the
expected discounted value of cash flows after they were provided subjects with arguments
for and against doing so. Druckman (2001) focuses on the popular “Asian disease problem”
and suggests using the “both” frame as an appropriate baseline for ascertaining true pref-
erences. McNeil et al. (1988) turns to the realm of medical decisions, suggesting eliciting
preferences by asking a positive frame, a negative frame, and a combination of the two as a
sort of sensitivity analysis. However, we are not aware of work that has developed system-
atic procedures for helping people think through their preferences in important economic
context like investing for retirement.
Our central contribution is a procedure for identifying decision errors in standard sav-
ings and investment decision problems. After answering an initial set of investment ques-
2Similarly, there are models that can accommodate inconsistency in time preference over various horizons,
such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997).
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tions, we provide subjects with an opportunity to update their choices (both when there
are actual inconsistencies between similar frames, as well as “placebo” inconsistencies,
allowing subjects to update choices that are already consistent). Our premise is that if an
individual himself acknowledges having made a mistake after having updated his choices,
then we have identified a decision error. Furthermore, once we have vetted an individual’s
choices in this way using a variety of checks for consistency (and transitivity), we tenta-
tively accept the final choices as being closer to the individual’s preferences. The basic
idea is to allow individuals to revise their choices when they have exhibited inconsistent or
intransitive behavior without being heavy-handed or suggesting that we want them to up-
date their choices. Of course, it would be extremely difficult (and probably pointless) to try
to explain to a typical experimental subject why an entire combination of choices is con-
sidered normatively problematic. A crucial feature of our experimental procedure is that
no subject was ever asked to understand this whole chain of reasoning. Instead, depend-
ing on the subject’s particular pattern of normatively inconsistent choices, we confronted
the subject with individual links of the chain of logic, each of which is relatively easy to
understand.
Let us call the initial set of choices untutored preferences, and the final set of choices
a person makes after our reasoning process reasoned preferences. Our proposed procedure
for eliciting reasoned preferences is a means toward better understanding the risk prefer-
ences on which appropriate retirement saving and investment depend. We detail which
normative axioms people initially endorse, where they are most likely to correct where
they have said they have made a mistake, and toward which frames people revise. We
also focus on how estimates of risk aversion vary by frame across untutored and reasoned
preferences. By better estimating the values of average reasoned risk preferences, we hope
to reduce the range of uncertainty about risk aversion and therefore help identify optimal
default asset allocations. Our more general aim is to develop techniques for identifying
“reasoned preferences” for the even larger set of preferences that matter for difficult deci-
sions that Americans face, even beyond the retirement saving decision. While our initial
rounds of surveying have yielded significant progress in terms of reducing this range of
uncertainty for risk aversion, we have not observed enough convergence in risk aversion
among different frames to make exact default recommendations.
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2.3 Importance of Setting Portfolio Defaults and Savings
Rates Appropriately
If an individual is defaulted into a saving rate and asset allocation that is optimal for a dif-
ferent level of preference parameters than her own, she could suffer large expected welfare
losses. Consider the continuous-time, 35-year-long investment-saving problem faced by a
household with annual discount rate ρ and initial wealth w0 > 0 (and no labor income),
as in Merton (1969), except with Kreps-Porteus preferences that separate the EIS s from
relative risk aversion γ. In each instant, the household chooses what fraction of wealth
to consume, and what fraction to invest in a risky asset whose excess return is stochastic,
with mean µ and standard deviation (per square-root of time) σ as opposed to a safe asset
with rate of return r. However, suppose the household’s allocation is optimal with respect
to the (possibly wrong) risk aversion, time preference, and EIS parameters: γˆ, ρˆ, and sˆ.
Let u(γ, γˆ, ρ, ρˆ, s, sˆ;w0) denote the expected discounted utility, calculated using the house-
hold’s true preference parameters γ, ρ, s of the state-contingent saving-investment path
implied by solving the household’s problem with risk aversion γˆ, ρˆ, and sˆ. Then let the
real-valued function c(γ, γˆ, ρ, ρˆ, s, sˆ;w0) denote the certain, constant level of consumption
that, if consumed at every moment from now on, would give expected discounted utility
equal to u(γ, γˆ, ρ, ρˆ, s, sˆ;wo). We measure the welfare loss from choosing the suboptimal
investment-saving path by:
c(γ, γˆ, ρ, ρˆ, s, sˆ;w0)
c(γ, γ, ρ, ρ, s, s;w0)
=
(
1− e−aT
a
) 1
1−s
(
1− e−mˆT
mˆ
) −s
1−s (1− e−aˆT
aˆ
)−1
(2.1)
a = (1− s)(r + µ
2γ2σ2
) + sρ (2.2)
aˆ = (1− sˆ)(r + µ
2γˆ2σ2
) + sˆρˆ (2.3)
mˆ = ρ+ (1/s− 1)(r + µ
2γˆ2σ2
(2γˆ − γ)− aˆ) (2.4)
This ratio equals 1 if the household’s portfolio choice is optimal for its preferences
but will be less than 1 otherwise. Given the assumptions on preferences, the ratio is in-
dependent of w0, and it can be interpreted as the proportional reduction in initial wealth
(and hence consumption in all states) that is equivalent in terms of welfare to the mistaken
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γ = 1 γ = 2 γ = 4 γ = 8
γˆ = 1 0.00 0.14 0.56 0.94
γˆ = 2 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.29
γˆ = 4 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.03
γˆ = 8 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.00
Table 2.1: Welfare cost of investing with ”wrong” preferences. Wealth loss (in percent)
that is equivalent to mistaken behavior. True risk aversion, γ, is along the columns. Risk
aversion used for portfolio choice, γˆ, is along the rows.
behavior. Table 2.1 presents illustrative calculations, where we set T = 35, r = 0.03,
µ = 0.03, σ = 0.15, s = sˆ = 0.375, ρ = ρˆ = 0.075, and we let γ and γˆ take on each of 1,
2, 4, and 8.
Even though existing literature has focused on the mistake of non-participation in fi-
nancial markets (e.g., Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), Table 2.1 shows that the more severe
mistake is behaving less risk-aversely than one actually is (because the extra risk is ex-
tremely costly). If a household with risk aversion γ = 1 behaves like γˆ = 2, the welfare
loss is equivalent to 6% of wealth. By contrast, if γ = 2 and γˆ = 1 (the household takes
on too much risk) then the welfare loss is 14%. If γ = 8 and γˆ = 1, then the loss is 94%!
These calculations imply it is important to choose a default allocation appropriately; a one-
size-fits-all default may be particularly harmful for individuals who are more risk-averse
than the chosen default.
2.4 Frames and Axioms
We first elicit “untutored” risk preferences among 5 different investment plans. The 5
investment plans are labeled: A, BCE, BDF, BDE, and BDF, ordered weakly from safest to
riskiest. All questions involve hypothetical payoffs in “how much you have to spend each
year during retirement, from age 65 on.” We ask questions of each subject using 7 different
ways of framing the decision (e.g. varying whether irrelevant information is provided,
whether independent choices are made sequentially or simultaneously, whether subjects
are able directly to choose their favorite choice or can only choose between many pairs of
pre-determined plans, and whether lotteries are already reduced). We refer to each of these
7 sets of questions as a frame. The number of questions used in each frame varies from
only a single question to 10 questions. We divide these 7 frames into 2 broader categories:
4 Nodewise Action Choice Frames and 3 Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames. Similar frames
only differ by axiomatic “baby steps,” making things as simple as possible for subjects and
allowing us isolate specific axiomatic expected utility violations as distinct from mistakes.
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The simplest frame that includes all possible plans consists of only one question involv-
ing a two-period investment horizon over 20+ years. We call it the “Complete Contingent
Action Plan” see Figure 2.1. It is also one of the Nodewise Action Choice Frames. It asks
subjects to make 3 binary choices simultaneously: A v. B, C v. D, and E v. F. The latter
two choices are unnecessary if a person chooses A. In later rounds of experimenting3, if a
subject chose A, we followed-up by asking her to pretend she could not choose A, forcing
her also to choose between each of C v. D and E v. F.
The remaining 6 frames are derived from the Complete Contingent Action Plan. The
simplest Nodewise Action Choice Frame, which we call “Single Action in Isolation,” con-
sists of 2 questions (see Figure 2.2). Each is simply one of the individual questions asked
in the Complete Contingent Action Plan conditional on answering B > A, sans informa-
tion about any other choices. In other words, C v. D and E v. F are each asked separately
without additional context.
Adding a layer of complexity, the next Nodewise Action Choice Frame, which we call
“Single Action with Backdrop,” again asks participants to separately choose in each of C v.
D and E v. F (i.e. 2 questions, see Figure 2.3). However, unlike Single Action in Isolation,
the additional context available in the Complete Contingent Action Plan frame is grayed
out.
We form the final Nodewise Action Choice Frame, “Two Contingent Actions with
Backdrop,” by simply allowing the subject to choose C v. D and E v. F simultaneously
(i.e. a single question, see Figure 2.4). Note this is essentially combining the two questions
from the Single Action with Backdrop frame into a single question. Or, viewed another
way, it is the same as the Complete Contingent Action Plan frame but without allowing a
decision between A and B.
The Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames are a bit more complicated, each consisting of 10
questions (i.e. 5 potential investment plans choose 2 = 10 questions). The most compli-
cated, “Pairwise Choices Between Complete Strategies,” asks a subject to choose between
all possible pairs of already filled-out Complete Contingent Action Plans (see Figure 2.5).
Pairwise Choices Between Complete Strategies forms the basis of the remaining 2 Pair-
wise Strategy Choice frames. The first, “Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries,”
simplifies things by stripping the figures of grayed out information and de-emphasizing
the inter-temporal aspect of learning about probabilistic outcomes at age 50, but does not
reduce the compound lotteries (see Figure 2.6).
The second, “Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries” simply reduces the
3Namely, during the second round of surveying covering 311 subjects (as well as the second wave covering
264 subjects).
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compound lotteries from Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries (see Figure 2.7).
Of course, as already mentioned, it would be extremely difficult (and probably point-
less) to try to explain to a typical experimental subject why an entire set of choices among
all frames is considered normatively problematic. Instead, we systematically confront sub-
jects only with instances where their risk preferences violate normative axioms between
similar frames (what we refer to as a “step”). See Table 2.2 for the names of the steps
(denoting the axiom associated with that step), as well as the names of the two frames
associated with each. Moving forward, we therefore use the words “step” and “axiom”
interchangeably. Note that the adaptive software only walks the subject through whatever
set of simple steps was relevant for that subject’s choices.
Step/Axiom Frame 1 Frame 2
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfactuals
Single Action in Isola-
tion
Single Action with
Backdrop
Simple Actions = State-
Contingent Actions
Single Action with
Backdrop
Two Contingent Ac-
tions with Backdrop
Irrelevance of Counter-
factual Choices
Two Contingent Ac-
tions with Backdrop
Complete Contingent
Action Plan
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pairwise
Complete Contingent
Action Plan
Pairwise Choices be-
tween Complete Strate-
gies
Complete Strategies =
Implied Lotteries
Pairwise Choices be-
tween Complete Strate-
gies
Pairwise Choices Be-
tween Compound Lot-
teries
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
Pairwise Choices Be-
tween Compound Lot-
teries
Pairwise Choices Be-
tween Reduced Simple
Lotteries
Table 2.2: Name of each axiomatic baby step (or simply “step”) and the two frames asso-
ciated with each.
2.5 Experiment Design and Methods
The experiment has 6 parts: (1) Pre-Test, (2) Training Batteries, (3) Main Body Part 1:
Elicitation of Untutored Preferences, (4) Psychological and Cognitive Batteries, (5) Main
Body Part 2: Elicitation of Reasoned Preferences, and (6) Follow-Up and Demographic
Batteries.
There are a variety of challenges to implementing the kind of experiment we propose,
such as avoiding “experimenter demand effect” in which a subject agrees with a normative
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Figure 2.1: Complete Contingent Action Plan (1 question). Subjects are prompted with
instructions: ”Imagine you are currently 35 years old. You need to make three decisions.
The decision between A and B takes place now. If you choose B, you also need to make two
decisions that will lock in how you will invest at age 50. If you choose A, you do not need
to make any more decisions. All decisions will affect how much money you will be able
to spend each year during retirement (from age 65 on). In each decision, you will choose
between two strategies: risky or conservative. Each conservative strategy will guarantee
you a fixed amount to spend each year during retirement. Each risky strategy allows for
possibly higher amounts. You do not need to choose the same kind of strategy in each
decision.”
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Figure 2.2: Single Action in Isolation (2 questions). Subjects are prompted with instruc-
tions: ”You will be asked to make decisions that will affect how much you will be able to
spend each year during retirement (from age 65 on), imagining that you are currently 50
years old. You will choose between two strategies: risky or conservative. The conservative
strategy will guarantee you a fixed amount to spend each year during retirement. Under the
risky strategy, higher amounts are possible.”
axiom in order to please the experimenter (or in order to appear “rational” to herself or
others) rather than because she has been genuinely persuaded or genuinely holds those
preferences. We return to these issues after describing the experimental procedure in greater
detail.
2.5.1 Design Considerations
Informal conversations with subjects after our initial pilot study (see “Appendix: Pilot
Study”) indicated that many found it hard to understand how two frames represented the
same decision problem. Because we want to make sure that subjects do understand how
certain combinations of choices violate normative axioms, we decided to take several pre-
cautions to minimize subject confusion in our main experiment. First, we study much
simpler risky decision problems, where the equivalences follow from small steps of logical
reasoning4. Second, we quiz subjects on their comprehension of basic tenants of prob-
4Our pilot data also made us realize that when pilot subjects behaved inconsistently, it was impossible to
pinpoint which of many possible decision errors might account for subjects’ inconsistent behavior because
there were many differences in the pilot across the annual and long-term framing of returns. For example,
the annual framing requires individuals to compound the returns (which is difficult), and the chance that
stocks lose money is much higher in the annual framing (and individuals may be loss-averse). We focused on
studying the inconsistency between relatively high risk aversion over smaller-stakes choices and relatively low
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Figure 2.3: Single Action with Backdrop (2 questions). Subjects are prompted with in-
structions: ”You will be asked to make decisions that will affect how much you will be able
to spend each year during retirement (from age 65 on), imagining that you are currently
50 years old. You will also be given information about how decisions you made when you
were 35 turned out, that are beyond your control at this point. These grayed-out parts of
the picture are things that could have happened, but you know for sure did not happen.
You will choose between two strategies: risky or conservative. The conservative strategy
will guarantee you a fixed amount to spend each year during retirement. Under the risky
strategy, higher amounts are possible.”
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Figure 2.4: Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop (1 question). Subjects are prompted
with instructions: ”Imagine you are currently 35 years old, and have chosen risky decision
B. You do not yet know how this decision has turned out. So, you need to make two deci-
sions that will lock-in how you will invest at age 50. These decisions will affect how much
money you will be able to spend each year during retirement (from age 65 on). In each
decision, you will choose between two strategies: risky or conservative. Each conservative
strategy will guarantee you a fixed amount to spend each year during retirement. Each risky
strategy allows for possibly higher amounts. You do not need to choose the same kind of
strategy in each decision.”
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Figure 2.5: Pairwise Choices Between Complete Strategies (10 questions). Subjects are
prompted with instructions: ”In each question in this section you need to make a choice
between two investment plans, Option 1 and Option 2. Each investment plan has a set of
choices locked in along the way (at age 35 and age 50), shown by circled letters, that lead
to possible levels of yearly spending during retirement (from age 65 on). Grayed-out parts
are used to show things that can’t happen if you choose that investment plan. Spinners
show the chances of different outcomes. From a spinner, the chance of taking each fork
is shown next to that fork. Each fork can lead either to a locked in choice, or directly to
a level of yearly spending during retirement. Note that a path with a 50% chance at one
fork, followed by another 50% chance at a later fork, means that there is only 25% chance
of getting all the way to the end of that path. To select your choice for each question, you
have to click the small gray circle under the plan (not shown on this page).”
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Figure 2.6: Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries (10 questions). Subjects are
prompted with instructions: ”In each question in this section you need to make a choice
between two investment plans, Option 1 and Option 2, imagining that you are currently 35
years old. Each investment plan has different possible outcomes for how much you will
be able to spend each year during retirement (from age 65 on). Note that some investment
plans are named by one letter, ”A”; other investment plans are named by more than one
letter, like ”BCE”. Spinners show the chances of different outcomes. From a spinner, the
chance of taking each fork is shown next to that fork. Each fork can lead either to another
spinner, or directly to a level of yearly spending during retirement. Note that a path with a
50% chance at one fork, followed by another 50% chance at a later fork, means that there
is only a 25% chance of getting all the way to the end of that path. To select your choice
for each question, you have to click the small gray circle under the plan (not shown on this
page).”
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Figure 2.7: Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries (10 questions). Subjects
are prompted with instructions: ”In each question in this section you need to make a choice
between two investment plans, Option 1 and Option 2, imagining that you are currently 35
years old. Each investment plan has different possible outcomes for how much you will
be able to spend each year during retirement (from age 65 on). Note that some investment
plans are named by one letter, like ”A” ; other investment plans are named by more than
one letter, like ”BCE”. The picture shows the chance of each outcome happening next to
the outcome (if the chance is less than 100%). Note that a 50% chance is twice as likely
to happen as a 25% chance. To select your choice for each question, you have to click the
small gray circle under the plan (not shown on this page). ”
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ability, the various symbols and graphs used throughout the experiment to describe their
decisions, and the assumptions we ask them to make, but only after leading them through
an extensive training section. We verified through extensive piloting that these training sec-
tions are clear and our presentation of choice problems readily understandable. Third, the
decision problems in our experiment exclusively use probabilities of 25% and 50%, which
are more familiar to most people than the probabilities often used in tests of expected util-
ity. Fourth, in order to make sure that subjects are motivated, we conduct the experiment in
a laboratory setting where we have better control over subjects’ attention. Finally, we use
lotteries over yearly income during retirement as a means of simplifying the decisions and
reducing cognitive burden.
2.5.2 Subject Population
We collected 2 rounds of data at Cornell’s LEEDR and Business Simulation laboratories
on 628 people during 2013-2014 (almost all undergraduates) using adaptive survey soft-
ware we designed especially for this experiment (using the Rand Corporation’s Multimode
Interviewing Capability technology). Sessions were scheduled for 2 hours each, but mean
completion time was 68 minutes (not including initial introductions and interactions which
last about 10 minutes). Subjects were paid $40 for 2 hours. This lack of direct incentiviza-
tion is often worrying in survey research. However, our focus is on saving for retirement;
fully incentivizing subjects with a large fraction of lifetime resources is well beyond our
budget constraints (and would be even be well beyond our budget constraint if implemented
in a developing country)5. The first round consisted of 317 subjects (July, November, and
December 2013). The second round consisted of 311 subjects (April 2014). We invited
all 311 subjects from the second round back to the laboratory for a follow-up session 2-
4 weeks after the initial experiment. Almost 85% (264 subjects) returned for the second
wave. During this second wave, subjects only receive the Pre-Test, an abridged Training
risk aversion over larger-stakes choices because this discrepancy is a major stumbling block to determining
an appropriate retirement portfolio default allocation. Rather than trying to explain why large-stakes risk
tolerance is inconsistent with small-stakes risk aversion, we focus instead on identifying at which of the
intermediate steps of the argument the subject is inconsistent. This approach has the advantage that we
can pinpoint which decision errors subjects are making, as well as which normative axioms the subjects
themselves repudiate.
5Waiting many decades for payouts to realize is also more of an ambitious experiment than we hoped
to undertake. Fortunately, our Cornell student population, although not representative, is perhaps non-
representative in a way that makes up for the lack of direct, financial incentive. Cornell students are particu-
larly motivated to perform well on difficult tasks, so much so that this (non-representative) internal motivation
might be sufficient to overcome lack of direct, financial incentive. That being said, other non-representative
characteristics of the particular student subject pool might sully the external validity of our findings, although
we cannot do much more than caveat this potential difficultly.
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section, and both parts of the Main Body. Our motivation was to see how their decisions,
risk aversion, consistency, and transitivity change over the course of several weeks, and
to what extent any learning that took place during the first wave “stuck” with participants
over the short-term. We should note each participant who returns for a second wave sees
a re-randomized version of the survey—this mitigates concern over participants simply
remembering and repeating exactly what they did in the previous wave.
2.5.3 Pre-Test
The Pre-Test elicited preliminary risk aversion estimates for each subject using simple bi-
nary choices between hypothetical safe and risky assets. We present here a synopsis of our
findings using these data. For more information on the questions asked, and for the exact
details and outputs of these analyses, see “Appendix: Pre-Test.” After calculating cardinal
measures of risk aversion from subjects’ categorical responses (using the procedure devel-
oped by Kimball et al., 2008), we found (1) higher cognitive function was associated with
lower risk aversion in both waves and (2) male subjects were generally less risk averse.
These align with our intuition and past studies on risk aversion. Interestingly, among sub-
jects surveyed in two waves, higher cognitive function was associated with lower risk aver-
sion to a greater extent in the first wave than in the second wave. This is consistent with
our procedure lessening the impact of cognition on measured risk aversion over the course
of several weeks. Finally, we implemented a randomization for all 311 subjects surveyed
in the second round: approximately half were given the Pre-Test at the end of the survey
(instead of at the beginning). In both waves 1 and 2, being given the Pre-Test at the end
of the survey was associated with lower imputed log risk aversion. Again, if we think of
risk aversion as being associated with cognitive bias, our procedure (at least temporarily)
appears to alleviate this bias.
2.5.4 Training Batteries
The training sections reviewed basic facets of probability theory (through examples using
coin tosses and dice rolls), taught subjects to interpret the symbols and figures used to
convey the choices they would be faced with in the main body of the survey, and reviewed
central assumptions we wanted subjects to hold while making their decisions. Each training
module was followed by a short quiz meant to test subjects’ understanding. Subjects could
not continue to the next part of the survey until they got nearly all quiz questions correct.
The assumptions participants were instructed to make were as follows: (1) “The gov-
ernment provides free medical insurance, and you are in good health,” (2) “The government
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no longer provides social security (i.e. monthly checks),” (3) “There is no inflation,” (4)
“Imagine that your friends and extended family outside of your household do not need fi-
nancial help from you, and you cannot ask them for money,” (5) “When you retire at age
65, you plan to move into rental housing that will have a monthly payment,” and (6) “You
have no other resources beyond the amounts specified by your decisions. For example, any
money you get from selling your existing home has already been figured into the yearly
spending you can afford.” See the Survey Walk-Through Appendix for more details on all
the training sections.
2.5.5 Main Body Part 1: Elicitation of Untutored Preferences
Here we elicited subjects’ untutored preferences among the same 5 different investment
plans using 7 different ways of framing the decision. This section, which stops after elic-
iting untutored risk preferences, without any experimental intervention, is comparable to
most existing studies of risk preferences and is of interest in its own right. Again, all
questions involve hypothetical payoffs in “amount you have to spend each year during re-
tirement, from age 65 on.”
We randomized across participants which set of monetary amounts6 was used as payoffs
(among 6 different sets)7. To be clear, each subject in each wave only ever saw one set of
monetary amounts (i.e. monetary amounts are held fixed for a given subject and wave).
Subjects who returned for a second wave received a re-randomized version of the survey,
thereby potentially receiving a different set of monetary amounts. However, within a wave,
a participant was always asked questions drawing from the same monetary amounts. The
6 possible sets of monetary differ in how attractive the risky options is (see Table 2.3).
Each monetary amount is associated with a different level of constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA): 1.576, 2.958, 4.865, 7.184, 12.113, or 17.967. The 3rd, 5th, and 6th amounts
shown in Table 2.3 are always 100k, 150k, and 225k, respectively. The 2nd amount is the
6Our goal in constructing these dollar amounts was to provide gambles that would maximize initial in-
consistencies. Subjects are faced with three fundamental choices: A v. B, C v. D, and E v. F (where the latter
two are only relevant if “B” is initially chosen, resulting in 5 potential investment plans). However, according
to expected utility and CRRA, and given our monetary amounts, choosing the safer option in one pair usually
implies one should also choose the safer option in the other pairs (and vice-versa for the choosing the risky
option). We did not choose these amounts to maximize power in measuring cardinal risk aversion (see below
MLE).
7Unfortunately, our first round of data collection (317 students in summer 2013) were found to have
suffered from a systematic programming error. Inadvertently, our software was only randomizing between
2 sets of monetary levels (those amounts that made riskier investment plans more attractive). Therefore,
during the second round of data collection, we only randomized among the 3 monetary levels that made the
riskier investment plans look the least attractive. One monetary level was never used. This approach does
not substantively differ from having simply randomized over the 5 monetary levels throughout the entire data
collection process.
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dollar value such that an expected utility maximizer with CRRA preferences (given the
constant coefficient of relative risk aversion associated with that set of monetary amounts)
would be indifferent between 100k for sure and a 50-50 chance of 150k and the unknown
amount. Finally, the 1st amount is the 2nd amount squared and divided by 100.
1 2 3 4 5 6
52K 64K 74K 81K 88K 92K
72K 80K 86K 90K 94K 96K
100K 100K 100K 100K 100K 100K
108K 120K 129K 135K 141K 144K
150K 150K 150K 150K 150K 150K
225K 225K 225K 225K 225K 225K
Table 2.3: Columns represent 6 potential sets of monetary amounts, associated with con-
stant coefficients of relative risk aversion of 1.576, 2.958, 4.865, 7.184, 12.113, or 17.967,
respectively. Descriptions of how these amounts are calculated can be found in the main
text.
Approximately half of subjects were further randomized and given monetary amounts
that are exactly half of those appearing in Table 2.3. According to CRRA this should not
make a difference.
We also randomized the order that the frames were initially asked during Main Body
Part 1. This order was also used to determine the order in which subjects were allowed to
update their choices in Main Body Part 2. For approximately one-third of subjects, the or-
der was: Single Action in Isolation, Single Action with Backdrop, Two Contingent Actions
with Backdrop, Complete Contingent Action Plan, Pairwise Choices Between Complete
Strategies, Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries, and Pairwise Choices Between
Reduced Simple Lotteries. For another one-third, the order was reversed. A final one-third
was given a random ordering. This provides a means of empirically testing whether rea-
soned preferences are more relevant for optimal policy than untutored preferences. If rea-
soned preferences truly reflect underlying preferences, then reasoned preferences should
not depend on the order of reasoning. Unfortunately, we are not yet statistically well pow-
ered enough to analyze this randomization using our MLE procedure (see below). Further
planned data collection, however, will facilitate this analysis.
Approximately half of subjects received all of the survey questions oriented exactly as
appear in the figures presented in this section; remaining subjects were randomly assigned
to a “down” randomization that flipped the orientation of all figures such that option “A”
appeared on the bottom rather than at the top. This was meant to mitigate the tendency
of people to choose things toward the top of surveys and figures. Fortunately, this did not
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seem to matter for subjects’ choices. Also, throughout the initial elicitation of preferences,
the ordering of questions was randomized within a frame (for frames with more than one
question). Moreover, for relevant questions, the orientation of which option appeared on
the left and which option appeared on the right was also randomized. This was again to
mitigate the tendency of option orientation on the screen to impact choices.
2.5.6 Psychological and Cognitive Batteries
Interspersed between frames in Main Body Part 1, we measured several psychological and
cognitive covariates. These included: cognitive reflection task battery (Frederick, 2005),
number series battery (adopted from the CogUSA, McArdle et al., 2007-2009), abbreviated
Big-Five personality battery (Gosling et al., 2003), probabilistic sophistication battery (de-
veloped by Miles Kimball, see the Survey Walk-Through Appendix for details), need for
cognition battery (Cacioppo et al., 1984), and elicitation of SAT scores. Batteries appeared
in random order in between the elicitation of frames in Main Body Part 1. In other words,
subjects alternated between answering all of the questions in a particular frame and these
psychological and cognitive batteries.
2.5.7 Main Body Part 2: Elicitation of Reasoned Preferences
During Main Body Part 2 of the experiment we elicited reasoned preferences by providing
subjects the opportunity to systematically review and update their choices from each of
the 7 frames answered in Part 1. The adaptive software systematically confronted subjects
with one round of inconsistency checks (providing them the opportunity to update incon-
sistencies between similar frames, as well as the opportunity to update a random subset of
already-consistent choices), one round of intransitivity checks (allowing them to explicitly
rank options within a frame among which cyclical preferences are detected), another round
of inconsistency checks (using an identical algorithm as the first round), and another round
of intransitivity checks (also using an identical algorithm as the first round). We consider
a participant’s choices after these checks to be their reasoned preferences. The purpose of
this experimental intervention is to cause subjects to reason more fully through their risk
preferences. By comparing their reasoned preferences with their untutored preferences, we
can learn where untutored preferences exhibited decision errors that advisors and policy-
makers could help individuals overcome. In designing this part of the experiment we tried
to avoid being paternalistic, but instead strove to be deferentially light-handed. We note
that while our focus is on risk preferences, this approach could be adopted for any sort of
preferences (e.g. time preferences).
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2.5.8 Inconsistency Checks
The procedure for a particular inconsistency worked as follows: (1) when two choices
subjects made violated some axiom in Table 2.2, they were asked whether they think those
two choices should be the same ; (2) if they said their choices should be the same, they were
given the opportunity to revise, and then were asked why they revised as they did; (3) if
they said their choices should not be the same, they were asked why they should not be the
same. During the first round of surveying (covering 317 subjects), responses to these “why”
questions were open-ended. We used these open-ended responses to generate multiple-
choice responses that were used in the second round (covering 311 subjects). For details
on the exact wording of these questions, see “Appendix: Flow of Inconsistency Checks.” In
the vast majority of instances where a subject revised, they said it was because they either
originally made a mistake or learned something new about their preferences in answering
the questions. Experimenter demand was not often cited as a reason or switching. Those
who did not revise most often cited that they believed the situations were different enough
to merit different answers.
We also presented participants with “placebo inconsistencies” to test the influence of
experimenter demand. These checks were randomly interspersed among the standard in-
consistency checks. Subjects were given the opportunity to change already-consistent
choices, using nearly identical text and questions as the normal inconsistency checks. Of
course, the questions necessarily differed slightly: when subjects said their choices should
be the same, they were asked “why” without being given the opportunity to update; when
subjects said their choices should be different, they were given the opportunity to update,
and then asked why they did so. Subjects were given a random number of these placebo
checks. For each pair of questions in a step that could potentially trigger an inconsistency,
but did not, a random one-third were pushed to the subject as placebo checks. Fortunately,
we find that people updated already-consistent choices less than 2% of the time. In con-
trast, people revised actual inconsistencies more than 40% of the time. Indeed, our results
do not appear to be driven by experimenter demand.
2.5.9 Intransitivity Checks
We also confronted participants with intransitivities (i.e. instances of cyclical preferences)
among their choices in each of the Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames. Subjects were pre-
sented with, and asked to explicitly rank, the choices among which they had an intransitiv-
ity (or note that they could not rank them). Their pairwise choices in that frame were then
adjusted accordingly. See Figure 2.8for an example of one such resolution. Given 10 ques-
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Figure 2.8: Example of an intransitivity resolution.
tions were necessary to elicit all pairwise preferences among 5 potential investment plans
(i.e. 5 choose 2 = 10), intransitivities could come in a variety of flavors: 5-way, 4-way, or
3-way.
If a subject selected “I do not want to rank these options,” they were given the oppor-
tunity to answer a follow-up question, “Why couldn’t you rank the options on the previous
slide?” Their options were: (1) “I couldn’t rank the options because they are all equally
good to me,” (2) “I couldn’t rank the options because I don’t know which option I prefer,”
(3) “I should be able to rank the options, but it’s extremely hard,” or (4) “I couldn’t rank
the options for another reason.”
2.5.10 Follow-Up and Demographic Batteries
This section first asked subjects how much they agreed that the survey evoked each of the
following emotions on a 1-6 scale: enjoyment, annoyance, stress, and frustration (Fagerlin
et al., 2007). Responses are shown in Table 2.4. Subjects somewhat enjoyed the expe-
rience (44.7% respond 4/6 or higher); were somewhat annoyed by it (54.2% respond 4/6
or higher); were not overly stressed by it (66.3% respond 3/6 or lower), and were slightly
frustrated by it (36.2% respond 4/6 or higher).
Finally, we administered a demographics survey. Mean subject age was 20.9 years.
Approximately 90% of subjects were between the ages of 18 and 22 (i.e. college students).
Subjects were disproportionately female, with only 35.4% being male. Further details and
questions can be found in the Survey Walk-Through Appendix.
88
Emotion 1 (least) 2 3 4 5 6 (most)
Enjoyment 11.8% 18.1% 25.4% 32.5% 9.0% 3.2%
Annoyance 4.6% 17.0% 24.2% 23.8% 17.8% 12.6%
Stress 23.8% 22.2% 20.3% 19.5% 10.2% 3.8%
Frustration 15.2% 21.1% 22.2% 24.6% 10.2% 6.6%
Table 2.4: Percentage of respondents answering on a scale of 1-6, ”To what extent do you
agree with the following statement”: ”I enjoyed thinking through these choices,” ”Think-
ing through these choices was annoying,” ”Thinking through these choices made me feel
stressed,” ”Thinking through these choices was frustrating.”
2.6 Results
We now describe which normative axioms subjects initially endorsed, where they were
most likely to update their choices, and toward which frames they actually revised. Overall,
for any given axiom, most people endorsed consistency, although there was substantial
heterogeneity across axioms. There were always people who did not endorse consistency
for a given axiom, and there were relatively few people who were completely consistent
across axioms. However, subjects rarely moved from consistency to inconsistency.
2.6.1 Inconsistency Checks
Among all subjects’ first wave responses, out of 30 potential inconsistencies, subjects av-
eraged approximately 5.6 inconsistencies in their untutored preferences and approximately
2.6 inconsistencies in their reasoned preferences8.
In order hone in on resolution behavior at each axiom, we derive “inconsistency rates”
for each step for subjects’ untutored and reasoned preferences. Steps differ in the number
of inconsistencies possible between the two associated frames. Inconsistency rates control
for these differences, facilitating cross-axiom comparisons of inconsistency. For a given
step, the inconsistency rate is simply equal to the total inconsistencies for that axiom for a
given subject, divided by the total potential number of inconsistencies in that step, averaged
across all subjects.
See Table 2.5 for results from all 628 subjects (first wave only). We also report two-
sided p-values associated with testing differences in inconsistency rates between untutored
and reasoned preference for each axiom (using differences in proportions tests).
8Among participants who were surveyed during the second round (the vast majority of whom returned
for a second wave), people average approximately 6 inconsistencies in their untutored preferences during
the first wave, approximately 3 inconsistencies in their reasoned preferences at the end of the first wave,
approximately 4 inconsistencies in their untutored preferences during the second wave, and approximately 2
inconsistencies in their reasoned preferences at the end of the second wave.
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See Table 2.6 for results using only subjects who participated in the second round of
surveying (covering 311 subjects in wave 1 and 264 subjects in wave 2). Here, we report
inconsistency rates at 4 points in time (untutored and reasoned for each wave), and 3 sets
of proportion tests (between untutored and reasoned preferences in the first wave, between
wave 1 reasoned preferences and wave 2 untutored preferences, and between untutored and
reasoned preferences in the second wave).
Axiom Total Untutored Reasoned P-Value
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfactuals
2 0.118 0.055 <0.0005
Simple Actions = State-
Contingent Actions
2 0.116 0.055 0.002
Irrelevance of Counter-
factual Choices
2 0.101 0.107 0.602
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pairwise
4 0.215 0.115 <0.0005
Complete Strategies =
Implied Lotteries
10 0.189 0.079 <0.0005
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
10 0.221 0.080 <0.0005
Table 2.5: Average inconsistency rates for untutored and reasoned preferences, and two-
sided tests for differences in proportions (i.e. differences in inconsistency rates). ”Total”
denotes total potential inconsistencies for a given axiom. Inconsistency rates are calculated
by averaging across subjects: total inconsistencies divided by total potential inconsisten-
cies, by axiom.
Results are similar whether we look at first wave responses from all subjects or restrict
attention to first wave responses from the second round of surveying. Initially, subjects
were particularly apt to endorse axioms involving the Nodewise Action Choices Frames
relative to axioms involving the Pairwise Strategy Choices Frames. They were especially
unlikely initially to endorse: (1) Shift Between Nodewise and Pairwise and (2) Reduction
of Compound Lotteries. However, Reduction of Compound Lotteries also saw the most
movement toward consistency.
The second wave of surveying (which was completed by 264 of 311 subjects invited to
return 2-4 weeks after their first wave surveys) allows us to analysis the short-term impact
of our procedure. Two axioms exhibited significant retention in reduced inconsistencies,
as is evidenced by (1) significant differences in inconsistency rates between wave 1 un-
tutored preferences and wave 1 reasoned preferences, and (2) insignificant differences in
inconsistency rates between wave 1 reasoned preference and wave 2 untutored preferences:
(1) Irrelevance of Background Counterfactuals and (2) Fusion + Shift from Nodewise to
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Axiom Untut.
Wave
1
Reas.
Wave
1
Untut.
Wave
2
Reas.
Wave
2
P-Val.
Wave 1
B/w P-
Val.
P-Val.
Wave 2
Irrelevance of
Background
Counterfactuals
0.113 0.056 0.079 0.035 <0.0005 0.1137 0.0010
Simple Actions =
State-Contingent
Actions
0.117 0.084 0.058 0.059 0.0477 0.0768 0.9040
Irrelevance of
Counterfactual
Choices
0.119 0.138 0.084 0.111 0.3090 0.0021 0.1038
Fusion + Shift
from Nodewise
to Pairwise
0.207 0.126 0.150 0.096 <0.0005 0.0917 <0.0005
Complete Strate-
gies = Implied
Lotteries
0.202 0.089 0.129 0.075 <0.0005 <0.0005 <0.0005
Reduction of
Compound
Lotteries
0.236 0.092 0.161 0.083 <0.0005 <0.0005 <0.0005
Table 2.6: Average inconsistency rates for untutored and reasoned preferences in waves 1
and 2, respectively, and two-sided tests for differences in proportions (i.e. differences in
inconsistency rates) within wave 1 between untutored and reasoned preferences, between
wave 1 reasoned preferences and wave 2 untutored preferences, and within wave 2 between
untutored and reasoned preferences. Inconsistency rates are calculated by averaging across
subjects: total inconsistencies divided by total potential inconsistencies, by axiom.
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Pairwise.
Irrelevance of Counterfactual Choices was the only step in which subjects exhibited es-
sentially no updating. One possible theory for why there was such little updating between
these questions is because subjects forgot to treat frames as independent. They might have
been trying to diversify their answers across frames in a misplaced attempt to adopt one of
the central tenants of investing9. A more testable theory is whether subjects who choose
“A” in the Complete Contingent Action Plan are driving the results. Recall for subjects sur-
veyed during the second round, if a person chose “A” in the Complete Contingent Action
Plan, they were prompted for their second-favorite choice as though they could not choose
B (distinct from the Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop decision, which does not even
show A v. B). These people might have cared far less about their second-favorite options,
which were used to determine whether they had an inconsistency in this step, and there-
fore are unusually, highly inconsistent. Considering only participants who were not given
the opportunity to report their second-favorite choice conditional on choosing “A” in the
Complete Contingent Action Plan, the inconsistency rate decreases slightly, but the drop
is not statistically significant. Considering participants who could report a second-favorite
choice, both (1) subjects who did not choose “A” (and therefore whose inconsistencies are
driven by their favorite choice) and (2) subjects who did in fact choose “A” (and therefore
whose inconsistencies are driven by their second-favorite choice), show no statistically sig-
nificant change in the inconsistency rate in the first wave. However, both groups show a
small, significant increase in the inconsistency rate in the second wave. These findings
suggest that people choosing “A” are not driving the lack of increased consistency in Irrel-
evance of Counterfactual Choices.
Aside from this anomaly, it appears that subjects readily updated toward consistency.
However, there are other measures of consistency that paint a less rosy picture. See Table
2.7for the percentages of respondents with any inconsistency among all possible axioms,
restricting attention to subjects in the second round of surveying who were invited back
for a second wave. Although approximately 87% of subjects initially had at least one
inconsistency, this number only declined to approximately 69% by the end of the first
wave. Wave 2 saw the percentage with at least one inconsistency go from 74% to 58% from
untutored to reasoned preferences. So, while there were significant improvements toward
consistency in most individual axioms, most subjects still retain at least one inconsistency
after two full sessions.
9Unfortunately this is the sole step in which the follow-up questions about why a subject wanted to retain
an inconsistency were inadvertently not implemented. It is plausible they would have responded that the
frames differed significantly enough that they wanted to make different choices (as in all other steps), though
we cannot say for sure.
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Survey Stage Mean Std. Dev.
Wave 1 Untutored 0.871 0.335
Wave 1 Reasoned 0.688 0.464
Wave 2 Untutored 0.736 0.441
Wave 2 Reasoned 0.576 0.495
Table 2.7: Percentage of respondents with any inconsistency.
Table 2.8 shows, for each axiom, conditional on being inconsistent, the percentage of
the time subjects chose to update (or not). For each axiom “Frame 1” and “Frame 2” refer
to the frames as labeled in Table 2.2. Consistent with our findings above, subjects are least
likely to update when faced with inconsistencies in Irrelevance of Counterfactual Choices.
For the axiom with the most updating toward consistency, Reduction of Compound Lot-
teries, we see subjects tend to update toward their choices in the non-reduced lotteries (i.e.
from their initial decisions in Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries toward
their decisions in Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries).
Table 2.9 details why subjects said they did not revise (only among participants sur-
veyed during the second round, i.e. those whose answers come from multiple-choice ques-
tions). Results are similar across the axioms. Overall, 57% of the time subjects said the
situations were sufficiently different as to merit different answers; 25% of the time they
said they were indifferent10; and the remainder of the time subjects were either deferring to
apparent experimenter demand, did not know what their preferences were, were confused,
or “Other.”
Table 2.10 details why subjects said they revised one of their answers, again only among
participants surveyed during the second round. Results are again broadly similar across the
axioms. Overall, 45% of the time subjects cite that they previously made a mistake in mak-
ing their choices; 35% of the time that they learned something new about their preferences
in answering questions; and 12% of the time that they are indifferent. The remainder of the
time, they cite some combination of experimenter demand, not knowing their own prefer-
ences, confusion, or “Other.” The axiom Simple Actions = State-Contingent Actions is a bit
of an outlier: subjects are only 37% likely to say they initially made a mistake, 37% likely
to say they learned something new, 17% likely to cite indifference (with literally nobody
citing experimenter demand).
For more details on how subjects update, particularly whether they tend to update
toward riskier or safer options, see “Appendix: Updating Conditional on Riskiness of
Choices.” It appears there is a weak preference toward updating toward riskier choices,
10Note that in these cases, we still consider subjects to be “inconsistent” despite specifically saying they
were indifferent.
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but this is by no means ubiquitous across axioms.
Axiom Toward
Frame
1
Toward
Frame
2
No Up-
date
Swap
Choices
Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfactuals
23% 24% 49% 3% 197
Simple Actions = State-
Contingent Actions
20% 12% 62% 5% 196
Irrelevance of Counter-
factual Choices
7% 3% 88% 0% 246
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pairwise
21% 17% 55% 6% 449
Complete Strategies =
Implied Lotteries
21% 25% 48% 4% 1504
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
27% 20% 45% 5% 2005
Table 2.8: Percentage of the time that subjects updated toward each frame, did not update,
or swapped their choices for normal inconsistency checks.
Tables 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 show these percentages for the placebo inconsistency checks.
These results stand in stark contrast with those from the regular inconsistency checks. Sub-
jects only very rarely update results that are already consistent. When asked why they do
not update, more than 89% of the time subjects cite that the situations are similar enough
to merit the same answer, 7% of the time subjects cite indifference, and the remainder of
the time they cite some combination of experimenter demand (only 0.4%), that they don’t
know their own preferences, confusion, or “Other.” Results are similar across axioms. In
the rare occasions where subjects do switch an already-consistent answer, they tend to cite
having learned something new about their preferences, indifference, having made a mistake
before, and confusion. There is heterogeneity among axioms, but these instances happen
so infrequently as not to merit further analysis.
2.6.2 Intransitivity Checks
The results from the intransitivity checks (only applicable to the Pairwise Strategy Choice
Frames) are also interesting. Let us focus on participants who are surveyed during the
second round of surveying (and hence are invited back for a second wave)11.
11Focusing on all subjects’ first wave responses yields similar results. Overall, subjects’ untutored pref-
erences averaged 1.2 intransitivities among all Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames. After the first round of
94
Axiom (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfac-
tuals
54.6% 21.6% 3.1% 9.3% 9.3% 2.1% 97
Simple Actions =
State-Contingent
Actions
73.2% 17.9% 2.4% 1.6% 4.1% 0.8% 123
Irrelevance of Coun-
terfactual Choices
55.0% 25.8% 1.7% 9.2% 3.3% 5.0% 120
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pair-
wise
62.7% 20.5% 2.0% 7.2% 4.0% 3.6% 249
Complete Strategies
= Implied Lotteries
55.9% 24.3% 3.7% 7.3% 3.2% 5.7% 725
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
54.5% 27.4% 3.0% 5.1% 4.1% 5.9% 920
Total 56.9% 24.8% 3.0% 6.3% 4.0% 5.1% 2234
Table 2.9: Percentage of the time that subjects gave each of the following responses to
“Why do you want to make different choices in these two situations?”: (1) “The two sit-
uations are different enough that I want different choices”, (2) “Some of the options are
equally good to me, so it doesn’t matter which one I choose”, (3) “I chose how I thought
the experimenters wanted me to chose”, (4) “I don’t know which options I prefer”, (5) “I
don’t know or am confused”, or (6) “Other.”
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Axiom (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfac-
tuals
47.9% 35.1% 11.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 2.1% 94
Simple Actions =
State-Contingent
Actions
36.9% 36.9% 16.9% 0.0% 4.6% 1.5% 3.1% 65
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pair-
wise
47.1% 31.0% 13.2% 1.1% 4.6% 2.3% 0.6% 174
Complete Strategies
= Implied Lotteries
45.7% 34.7% 10.9% 1.0% 4.7% 1.3% 1.8% 709
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
45.1% 36.4% 12.0% 1.1% 2.3% 1.4% 1.6% 979
Total 45.4% 35.3% 11.8% 1.0% 3.4% 1.4% 1.7% 2021
Table 2.10: Percentage of the time that subjects gave each of the following responses to
“Why did you want to change your choices as you did?”: (1) “I made a mistake when I first
chose”, (2) “Answering all of these questions made me change what I want”, (3) “Some of
the options are equally good to me, so it doesn’t matter which one I choose”, (4) “I chose
how I thought the experimenters wanted me to chose”, (5) “I don’t know which options I
prefer”, (6) “I don’t know or am confused”, or (7) “Other.”
Axiom Update
Frame
1
Update
Frame
2
No Up-
date
Update
Both
Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfactuals
0% 0% 100% 0% 506
Simple Actions = State-
Contingent Actions
0% 0% 100% 0% 449
Irrelevance of Counter-
factual Choices
0% 0% 99% 0% 172
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pairwise
1% 3% 95% 0% 355
Complete Strategies =
Implied Lotteries
0% 0% 97% 0% 2107
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
1% 0% 97% 0% 2249
Table 2.11: Percentage of the time that subjects updated each frame, did not update, or
updated both their choices for placebo inconsistency checks.
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Axiom (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfac-
tuals
90.2% 7.6% 0.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 490
Simple Actions =
State-Contingent
Actions
85.2% 11.1% 0.2% 1.9% 0.9% 0.7% 432
Irrelevance of Coun-
terfactual Choices
85.5% 9.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 3.5% 172
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pair-
wise
91.4% 7.1% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.3% 338
Complete Strategies
= Implied Lotteries
88.9% 7.0% 0.5% 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 2063
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
90.6% 6.7% 0.4% 0.8% 1.0% 0.6% 2191
Total 89.4% 7.3% 0.4% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 5686
Table 2.12: Percentage of the time that subjects gave each of the following responses to
“Why do you want to make the same choices in these two situations?”: (1) “The two
situations are similar enough that I want to make the same choices”, (2) “Some of the
options are equally good to me, so it doesn’t matter which one I choose”, (3) “I chose
how I thought the experimenters wanted me to chose”, (4) “I don’t know which options I
prefer”, (5) “I don’t know or am confused”, or (6) “Other.”
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Axiom (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfac-
tuals
16.7% 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 12
Simple Actions =
State-Contingent
Actions
23.1% 7.7% 15.4% 7.7% 0.0% 23.1% 23.1% 13
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pair-
wise
26.7% 13.3% 20.0% 6.7% 6.7% 20.0% 6.7% 15
Complete Strategies
= Implied Lotteries
13.3% 40.0% 23.3% 0.0% 3.3% 13.3% 6.7% 30
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
23.5% 26.5% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0% 17.6% 2.9% 34
Total 20.2% 28.8% 24.0% 1.9% 1.9% 16.3% 6.7% 104
Table 2.13: Percentage of the time that subjects gave each of the following responses to
“Why did you want to change your choices as you did?”: (1) “I made a mistake when I first
chose”, (2) “Answering all of these questions made me change what I want”, (3) “Some of
the options are equally good to me, so it doesn’t matter which one I choose”, (4) “I chose
how I thought the experimenters wanted me to chose”, (5) “I don’t know which options I
prefer”, (6) “I don’t know or am confused”, or (7) “Other.”
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During the first wave, initially, subjects averaged 1.3 intransitivities in their untutored
preferences. During this wave, subjects were confronted with a total of 433 intransitivities;
20% of the time subjects did not update, instead checking the box: “I do not want to rank
these options!” These subjects were given the opportunity to answer a follow-up question,
“Why couldn’t you rank the options on the previous slide?” Their options were: (1) “I
couldn’t rank the options because they are all equally good to me,” (2) “I couldn’t rank the
options because I don’t know which option I prefer,” (3) “I should be able to rank the op-
tions, but it’s extremely hard,” or (4) “I couldn’t rank the options for another reason.” 59%
of subjects who could not rank answered that they did not know which option they pre-
ferred; 27% answered that it was extremely hard; the remainder were evenly split between
the other two options. After the first wave was over (i.e. after 2 rounds of inconsistency
checks and 2 rounds of intransitivity checks), subjects’ reasoned preferences only averaged
0.4 intransitivities.
In the second wave, subjects were confronted with a total of 313 intransitivities, aver-
aging 1.1 and 0.6 intransitivities in their untutored and reasoned preferences, respectively.
There thus appeared to be mild “stick” to our procedure with respect to transitivity, but
less so than with respect to consistency. Not only did people have approximately the same
number of intransitivities at the beginning of the second wave as at the beginning of the first
wave, but by the end of the second wave they appeared to have even more intransitivities
than at the end of the first wave. It thus appears that sometimes, as people become more
consistent, they become less transitive (something very much at odds with traditional deci-
sion theory). 39% of the time during the second wave, subjects did not update, citing that
they did not want to rank the options among which they had an intransitivity. 43% of these
subjects followed-up that they did not know which option they preferred; 20% answered
that it was extremely hard; 24% responded that the options were all equally good; and the
rest cited “another reason.”
There was little heterogeneity in terms of incidence of intransitivities among the Pair-
wise Strategy Choice Frames. One exception was the fact that both waves’ untutored pref-
erences in Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries were slightly more likely
to be intransitive. However, in both waves, this difference disappears by the time reasoned
preferences were reached. With respect to the type of intransitivities: 3-way intransitivities
inconsistency checks, average intransitivities dropped to 1.0, indicating that as people initially became more
consistent, they also become more transitive. The initial round of intransitivity checks further lowered this
average to 0.4. The second round of inconsistency checks slightly raised the average number of intransitivi-
ties to 0.5, only to see it drop to 0.3 after the second round of intransitivity checks. Untutored preferences in
Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries were slightly more likely to be intransitive. However,
this difference disappeared by the time reasoned preferences were reached.
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were the most common (52% overall), followed by 4-way intransitivities (32% overall),
and finally 5-way (16%). These percentages were roughly homogenous across frames and
over time.
2.7 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Let us now turn to quantifying risk aversion and incidence of decision errors using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (MLE). In so doing, we wish to explore how estimates of risk
aversion and incidence of decision errors vary by frame, as well as how they change be-
tween untutored and reasoned preferences12. Estimation is carried out using the Berndt-
Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) numerical optimization algorithm, which uses the outer prod-
uct of scores to approximate the hessian (see Berndt et al., 1974). We use a MATLAB im-
plementation programmed by Thomas Jørgensen13, which also enables the computation of
robust standard errors. Although orders of magnitude faster, point estimates using BHHH
match those found using global search optimization.
We assume subjects are expected utility maximizers with utility functions that obey
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of the canonical form, with (directly unobserved)
risk aversion parameter γift, for individual i, frame f , and snapshot t. We use the term
“snapshot” to refer to a particular point in the survey. We denote snapshot 1 as after elicita-
tion of initial, untutored preferences; snapshot 2 as after the initial round of inconsistency
checks; snapshot 3 as after the initial round of intransitivity checks; snapshot 4 as after
the second round of inconsistency checks; and finally snapshot 5 as after the second round
of intransitivity checks (i.e. when subjects have reached their first set of reasoned prefer-
ences). Snapshots 6-10 refer to the same points in the survey for the second wave. Because
of individual response error, ift, which is assumed to be the same across questions within
a snapshot and frame, we can only observe ηift. We also make the following distributional
assumptions:
xift = ln(γift) (2.5)
12To provide further evidence on whether reasoning ability plays a role in driving a wedge between un-
tutored and reasoned preferences, we will eventually, once we have more data, explore how cognitive traits
relate to untutored preferences, reasoned preferences, and the frequency and type of decision errors we un-
cover. Are reasoned preferences less correlated with cognition and more homogeneous across individuals
than untutored preferences? How does untutored risk aversion vary with gender? How about reasoned risk
aversion? Do reasoned preferences depend on the order in which individuals reason through their violations
of normative axioms?
13http://www.econ.ku.dk/phdstudent/jorgensen/code.htm
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ηift = xift + ift (2.6)
ift ∼ N(0, σ2ft) (2.7)
xift ∼ N(µft, σ2xft) (2.8)
Our MLE therefore estimates the vector of parameters: (µft, σxft , σft). µft is the
mean of the distribution of log risk aversion for a particular frame and snapshot; σxft is
the standard deviation of the distribution of log risk aversion for a particular frame and
snapshot. σft represents within-frame decision error for a particular frame and snapshot.
Next, we define CEk as the log certainty equivalent of choice k (where k can be one
of: A, BCE, BCF, BDE, or BDF) conditional on some known coefficient of relative risk
aversion λ, as well as the (also known) monetary amounts on which the subject’s payoffs
are based (see Table 2.3 where MLr denotes the monetary amount in row r for the specific
column randomly assigned to a given subject):
CEA = ln[ML3] (2.9)
CEBCE = ln
[
((1− λ)(1
2
ML2
1−λ
1− λ +
1
2
ML5
1−λ
1− λ ))
1
1−λ
]
(2.10)
CEBCF = ln
[
((1− λ)(1
2
ML2
1−λ
1− λ +
1
4
ML4
1−λ
1− λ +
1
4
ML6
1−λ
1− λ ))
1
1−λ
]
(2.11)
CEBDE = ln
[
((1− λ)(1
4
ML1
1−λ
1− λ +
1
4
ML4
1−λ
1− λ +
1
2
ML5
1−λ
1− λ ))
1
1−λ
]
(2.12)
CEBDF = ln
[
((1− λ)(1
4
ML1
1−λ
1− λ +
1
2
ML4
1−λ
1− λ +
1
4
ML6
1−λ
1− λ ))
1
1−λ
]
(2.13)
2.7.1 Nodewise Action Choice Frames
As described above, in each of the Nodewise Action Choice Frames, respondents choose
among either 4 or 5 different investment plans: A, BCE, BCF, BDE, or BDF. “A” is an
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option only in the Complete Contingent Action Plan. Let CEk denote the chosen plan’s
conditional log certainty equivalent. LetCE−k denote the vector of other plans’ conditional
log certainty equivalents. Utilizing a multinomial logit discrete choice functional form, the
MLE problem can be written as follows, where m either iterates to 4 or 5:
max
µ,σx,σ
n∑
i=1
ln
(∫ ∞
−∞
1
σx
√
2pi
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2x f
[
CEk
σ
,
CE−k
σ
]
dx
)
(2.14)
f(
CEk
σ
,
CE−k
σ
) =
1∑
m e
CEm−CEk
σ
(2.15)
For Complete Contingent Action Plan, we conduct two separate analyses, treating them
as two separate frames. “Complete-1” uses all available data for each snapshot, including
both initial response data, and, where available, follow-up data on subjects’ second-favorite
choices (conditional on having initially chosen “A”). This specification requires a slight al-
teration of the likelihood function relative to what is written above. The inner likelihood
function with m = 5 (representing their first-favorite choice versus the other 4 options) re-
mains the same. However, when the person originally chose “A” and indeed was prompted
to provide their second-favorite choice, we multiply the inner likelihood function with an-
other nearly identical likelihood function that hasm = 4 (representing their second-favorite
choice versus the remaining 3 options).
On the other hand, “Complete-4” only considers 4 possible investment plans for each
snapshot (all those except “A”). For subjects who initially chose “A,” we consider their
second-favorite choice among the other 4 options, if that information is available; other-
wise, the subject is not included in the estimate. For subjects who initially did not choose
“A,” we only consider their favorite choice among the 4 options sans “A.”
Note that all available data are used for each snapshot and frame, meaning the first
5 snapshots are better powered than the latter 5 (given all 627 subjects have data on the
first wave, i.e. the first 5 snapshots, but only 264 of a possible 311 subjects returned for
a second wave, i.e. the latter 5 snapshots). Unfortunately, our analyses in this section are
statistically underpowered across all snapshots (but especially for snapshots 6-10), resulting
in likelihood functions that break down and behave erratically. This is driven by the fact
that subjects in these frames are only asked for their favorite investment plan (or sometimes
second-favorite investment plan) among the 5 possible options. This is in contrast with the
Pairwise Complete Strategy Choice Frames, which are indeed well-powered, and which
elicit a full ranking of preferences among the 5 possible investment plans (i.e. we have
information not only on a subject’s favorite investment plan, but their second favorite, third
favorite, and fourth favorite.). Initial results by frame and snapshot can be seen in Figure
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2.9. Note that Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop behaves erratically, with enormous
standard errors even in early snapshots 2 and 3 (note the large scale of the y-axes). We
conduct diagnostic tests to get a sense of the behavior of the likelihood function when our
standard errors are large. We do this by manually varying one of the three parameters while
fully optimizing over the remaining two. We next plot the log likelihood as a function of
the manually varied parameter, noting its behavior. We repeat this separately for each of the
three parameters. For all snapshots, Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop’s likelihood
functions indeed also behave erratically. These plots and more details of these tests can be
found in “Appendix: MLE Diagnostic Tests.”
We therefore ignore Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop and re-plot the MLE re-
sults (Figure 2.10). Still, two sets of results are problematic: estimates from snapshots 6-10
as well as both Complete Contingent Action Plan frames. The diagnostic procedure yields
similar conclusions for these sets of estimates: their likelihood functions break down and
act erratically. We therefore try individually dropping, in turn, (1) both Complete-1 and
Complete-4 and (2) snapshots 6-10.
Results after dropping both Complete Contingent Action Plan frames can be seen in
Figure 2.11, leaving only Single Action in Isolation and Single Action with Backdrop.
Standard errors are again fairly large across all parameters. The most that can be concluded
from these results is that the two frames are indistinguishable, which is consistent with out
conclusions above. The diagnostic tests in the appendix still indicate a slightly erratic
likelihood function.
Results after dropping snapshots 6-10 can be seen in Figure 2.12. These are simi-
larly uninformative. Most frames are indistinguishable. The only apparent result is that
“Complete-1” has a higher error response variance. This is intuitive: considering choices
that involve both an initial choice among 5 investment plans, as well as a second-best
choice among 4 investment plans (conditional on having chosen “A” initially), is more dif-
ficult than simply making a single choice among 4 investment plans (as is the case in all
other frames in the figure).
2.7.2 Pairwise Complete Strategy Frames
The MLE for the Pairwise Complete Strategy Frames differs only slightly from the Node-
wise Action Choice Frames in terms of setup, but its results are far more conclusive. Diag-
nostic tests described above are repeated and do not indicate unstable likelihood functions
nor lack of statistical power (see “Appendix: MLE Diagnostic Tests”). Recall here that
subjects must choose between each of 10 pairs of options. Let q index each of these 10
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Figure 2.9: MLE results for Nodewise Action Choices Frames, snapshots 1-10. Error
bars denote standard errors. “Isolation” refers to Single Action in Isolation; “Backdrop”
refers to Single Action with Backdrop; “Two Backdrop” refers to Two Contingent Actions
with Backdrop; “Complete-1” refers to Complete Contingent Action Plan with all available
data; and “Complete-4” refers to Complete Contingent Action Plan but only using data on
choices BCE, BCF, BDE, and BDF (not A). Unless otherwise indicated, all available data
are used for each snapshot and frame.
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Figure 2.10: MLE results for Nodewise Action Choices Frames, snapshots 1-10. Error bars
denote standard errors. “Isolation” refers to Single Action in Isolation; “Backdrop” refers
to Single Action with Backdrop; “Complete-1” refers to Complete Contingent Action Plan
with all available data; and “Complete-4” refers to Complete Contingent Action Plan but
only using data on choices BCE, BCF, BDE, and BDF (not A). Unless otherwise indicated,
all available data are used for each snapshot and frame.
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Figure 2.11: MLE results for Nodewise Action Choices Frames, snapshots 1-10. Error bars
denote standard errors. “Isolation” refers to Single Action in Isolation; and “Backdrop”
refers to Single Action with Backdrop. All available data are used for each snapshot and
frame.
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Figure 2.12: MLE results for Nodewise Action Choices Frames, snapshots 1-5. Error bars
denote standard errors. “Isolation” refers to Single Action in Isolation; “Backdrop” refers
to Single Action with Backdrop; “Complete-1” refers to Complete Contingent Action Plan
with all available data; and “Complete-4” refers to Complete Contingent Action Plan but
only using data on choices BCE, BCF, BDE, and BDF (not A). Unless otherwise indicated,
all available data are used for each snapshot and frame.
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pairs, and furthermore assume that for a given q, a subject chooses option q1 over q2 when
the former certainty equivalent is greater than the latter (after including error on each term
so a gamble is evaluated as CEk + k, where response errors are distributed normal with
zero mean and σ). Utilizing 10 different multinomial logit discrete choice functions (each
between 2 options), the MLE can be written as follows:
max
µ,σx,σ
n∑
i=1
ln
(∫ ∞
−∞
1
σx
√
2pi
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2x
∏
q
f
[
CEq1
σ
,
CEq2
σ
]
dx
)
(2.16)
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CEq2
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1 + e
CEq2−CEq1
σ
(2.17)
Results by frame and snapshot can be seen in Figure 2.13. Note that all available data
are used for each snapshot and frame, meaning the first 5 snapshots are again better powered
than the latter 5. Results are broadly consistent with our non-MLE analyses above.
First focusing attention on the leftmost pane: there is limited convergence in mean risk
aversion across the frames. Untutored preferences for Pairwise Choices Between Reduced
Simple Lotteries start with relatively high mean risk aversion, declining over the course of
the survey. Untutored preferences for both Pairwise Choices Between Complete Strategies
and Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries start with relatively low mean risk
aversion, increasing over the course of the survey. Focusing next on the middle pane:
Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries are associated with overall lower
variance in risk aversion compared to the other two pairwise frames. Across all frames, this
variance slightly increases over the course of the survey. Finally, focusing on the rightmost
pane, all pairwise frames see a significant overall decrease in the error response variance,
except between waves, when it jumps up slightly before again declining. Pairwise Choices
Between Reduced Simple Lotteries are, overall, associated with lower error, as might be
expected, given these questions are already reduced (and hence simpler).
2.8 Conclusions and Plans for Further Research
People generally revise toward consistency during our procedure, although few subjects
are completely consistent across all 30 potential inconsistencies. There is substantial het-
erogeneity across frames in both initial consistencies and propensity to update. Initially,
subjects are particularly apt toward consistency in Nodewise Action Choice Frames (as
opposed to Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames). They are particularly unlikely initially to
endorse Reduction of Compound Lotteries, although this axiom also sees the most resolu-
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Figure 2.13: MLE results for Pairwise Strategy Choices Frames, snapshots 1-10. All avail-
able data are used for each snapshot and frame. Error bars denote standard errors. “Com-
plete” refers to Pairwise Choices Between Complete Strategies; “Compound” refers to
Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries; and “Reduced” refers to Pairwise Choices
Between Reduced Simple Lotteries.
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tion toward endorsement after sufficient reasoning. Moreover, when brought back into the
laboratory for a second wave 2-4 weeks later, we find evidence of persistence: people are
far more consistent than they were relative to their wave 1 untutored preferences, but still
not quite as consistent as they were relative to their wave 1 reasoned preferences. While
subjects also tend to reduce their intransitivities among Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames,
there is less evidence of persistence between waves.
We are able to conclude much more from the MLE of Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames
than of Nodewise Action Choice Frames. This is because in the Nodewise Frames, we
only ask participants their favorite choice (and sometimes their second-favorite choice in
the Complete Contingent Action Plan), and hence our MLE analyses are statistically un-
derpowered; these frames are mostly indistinguishable according to our MLE results. The
Pairwise Frames are far better statistically powered because we ask subjects to choose be-
tween each potential pair of options among all 5 investment plans (meaning we can always
ascertain subjects’ second, third, and fourth favorite choices). Subjects tend to be more risk
averse in their responses for Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries as com-
pared to the other Pairwise Frames. That being said, estimates of mean risk aversion mildly
converge among all Pairwise Frames. As expected, decision errors are more prevalent in
the non-reduced Pairwise Frames, and generally decline (but more so for the non-reduced
frames).
Overall, we have demonstrated a method that makes progress in reducing the range
of uncertainty surrounding risk aversion. However, the method is still imperfect. More
data collection and further tweaks to our procedure are necessary for us to state what “the”
level of risk aversion across frames is definitively (and provide default asset allocation
recommendations). We have several ideas moving forward. First, our procedure focused
on being as light-handed as possible in terms of encouraging resolution; we gave subjects
ample opportunity to do what they wanted, and our results strongly reject experimenter
demand as a driving force. However, heavy-handed promotion could help close the gap
between measures of risk aversion derived from different frames (e.g. by changing the
wording of the inconsistency checks to more strongly encourage resolution). Perhaps this
extra push could facilitate even more updating and hence greater convergence in measures
of risk aversion across frames. Second, as mentioned above, we would like to elicit second-
, third-, and fourth-favorite choices among the Nodewise Action Choice Frames. This will
help boost the statistical power of our MLE procedure and provide a more comprehensive
picture of subjects’ preferences. It would also facilitate greater comparability between
Nodewise and Pairwise Frames (the latter already elicits a full set of preferences). Third, it
would be interesting to bring subjects back into a lab for third or even fourth waves. We saw
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substantial evidence of persistence of first wave reasoned preferences into the second wave;
it would be interesting to evaluate how preferences persist over greater periods of time.
Moreover, subjects had the greatest amount of consistency, and lowest within-frame error
responses, after the second wave. It would be interesting see whether this trend continues
into further waves (or to what extent there are declining marginal returns to further rounds
of inconsistency and intransitivity checks). Fourth, it would be useful to start collecting
data on a more nationally representative sample. External validity is a concern that we can
only really address by broadening our subject pool.
Once we are confident we have validated a procedure for accurately assessing reasoned
risk preferences (that transcend framing effects), our next step will be to find a short survey
that successfully approximates the results of the more thorough procedure. Such a survey
could be implemented to identify individual-specific optimal asset allocation (in addition to
continuing to inform mean levels of population risk aversion and hence default allocations).
Since the question of determining optimal policy when choices violate normative ax-
ioms is central to behavioral welfare economics (Bernheim and Rangel, 2008), we believe
that the idea of eliciting reasoned preferences could have quite general implications for
economics and policy. We envision that applying the kind of procedure we develop here
could help distinguish decision errors from reasoned preferences in a wide range of eco-
nomic settings aside from investment decision making and for other kinds of preferences
besides risk preferences (e.g. time preferences, elasticity of intertemporal substitution).
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2.10 Appendix: Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot experiment in Fall 2008 that partly motivates the design of the main
experiment in this paper. Our pilot builds on Benartzi and Thaler’s (1999) finding that in-
dividuals choose to invest 41% of their retirement portfolio in stocks when shown annual
rates of return on stocks and bonds, but they invest 82% in stocks when shown 30-year
rates of return (but see Beshears et al., 2009, for counterevidence). These two presenta-
tions should not differentially affect behavior because they provide essentially the same
information. Our pilot study sought to assess which (if either) choice more accurately re-
flects individuals’ risk preferences. We surveyed 54 adult subjects (mean age: 39.5 years)
in an outdoor pedestrian mall. While Benartzi and Thaler showed half their subjects the an-
nual returns and half the long-term returns, we showed all subjects both presentations. As
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in Benartzi and Thaler’s research, we found that subjects put a significantly higher fraction
in stocks in the long-term presentation (63% v. 41%, p < 0.0001). Our key innovation was
a follow-up question: we explained that the two presentations represented the same rates of
return, and we asked subjects what they would prefer, now that they knew the two presen-
tations were just two ways of framing the same information. Now subjects invested 55% in
stocks, which is significantly larger than the 41% in the one-year framing (p < 0.05) and
not-quite-significantly smaller than the 63% in the long-term framing (p = 0.13).
2.11 Appendix: Flow of Inconsistency Checks
To be more concrete, let us outline the exact flow of questions during a representative
inconsistency check (with screenshots from an actual example from the survey).
First, a subject is asked: “In one question you chose X over Y but in another question
you chose Y over X. Do you think the two situations are different enough that it makes
sense to have different choices, or should they be the same?” The screen also displays the
filled out choices. They may answer one of the following: (1) “It makes sense to have
the same choices in both questions”, or (2) “It makes sense to have different choices.” See
Figure 2.14 for a screenshot.
Let us assume they answered: “It makes sense to have different choices.” They are then
asked “Why do you want to make different choices in these two situations?” and given the
following options (which were developed after extensive piloting): (1) “The two situations
are different enough that I want different choices”, (2) “Some of the options are equally
good to me, so it doesn’t matter which one I choose”, (3) “I chose how I thought the
experimenters wanted me to chose”, (4) “I don’t know which options I prefer”, (5) “I don’t
know or am confused”, or (6) “Other”. See Figure 2.15 for a screenshot. After answering
this question, they either move on to the next inconsistency, the next placebo inconsistency,
or the next part of the survey. Note that we explicitly address experimenter demand in
asking this question; this option is rarely chosen.
Instead, let us assume they answered: “It makes sense to have the same choice in both
questions.” They are then asked: “Please look at your choices from before. Which better
represents what you want to do in both, X or Y?” The following choices are possible: (1)
“Choice of X” (with image showing filled out choice), (2) “Choice of Y” (with image show-
ing filled out choice), (3) “I changed my mind: I realized that it does make sense to have
different choices in these two situations. I would like to change *both* of my choices”, or
(4) “I changed my mind: I realized that it does make sense to have different choices in these
two situations. I would like to keep my current choices.” See Figure 2.16 for a screenshot.
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Figure 2.14: Example of an inconsistency check, initial question.
If they answer (4), they are brought to the screen in the prior paragraph. Otherwise, they
are shown a new screen with their updated preferences filled out in the actual choice graph-
ics, and told “Is this what you wanted your choices to be changed to? If so, click next. If
not, click back and change your choices to what you want.” See Figure 2.17 for a screen-
shot. After a subject has verified her new preferences, she is asked “Why did you want to
change your choices as you did?” She is given the following choices (again developed after
extensive piloting): (1) “I made a mistake when I first chose”, (2) “Answering all of these
questions made me change what I want”, (3) “Some of the options are equally good to me,
so it doesn’t matter which one I choose”, (4) “I chose how I thought the experimenters
wanted me to chose”, (5) “I don’t know which options I prefer”, (6) “I don’t know or am
confused”, or (7) “Other”. See Figure 2.18 for a screenshot. Note that we explicitly address
experimenter demand in asking this question; this option is rarely chosen.
The flow of a placebo inconsistency is very similar, see Figures 2.19, 2.20 2.21, 2.22,
2.23, and 2.24.
2.12 Appendix: Pre-Test
The Pre-Test consisted of 4 rounds of 3 questions each, yielding 4 distinct measures of risk
aversion. The introduction to this section of the survey read:
“We will now ask you to make choices in make-believe situations. These are serious
make-believe situations involving long-run investing decisions you could face. Please focus
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Figure 2.15: Example of an inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It makes sense
to have different choices.”
Figure 2.16: Example of an inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It makes sense
to have the same choices.”
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Figure 2.17: Example of an inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It makes sense
to have the same choices” and now verifying updated preferences
Figure 2.18: Example of an inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It makes sense
to have the same choices,” having verified updated preferences.
Figure 2.19: Example of an placebo inconsistency check, initial question.
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Figure 2.20: Example of an placebo inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It
makes sense to have the same choice...”
Figure 2.21: Example of an placebo inconsistency check, initial question.
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Figure 2.22: Example of an placebo inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It
makes sense to have different choices...”
Figure 2.23: Example of an placebo inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It
makes sense to have different choices...” and now verifying updated preferences.
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Figure 2.24: Example of an placebo inconsistency check, conditional on answering ”It
makes sense to have different choices...” and having verified updated preferences.
on the situations we give you, without bringing in any other opportunities you have in the
real world. What happens to you depends on both your choices and luck.”
The questions themselves were all of the following form: “Imagine that you must
choose between two retirement plans. One guarantees you will receive X each year during
your retirement, from age 65 on. The other is uncertain, and gives you a 50-50 chance of
receiving either a higher amount every year during retirement, or a lower amount every year
during retirement. Pretend that this is the only money you will be able to spend each year
during retirement. Medical care and taxes have already been taken care of, but this money
is all you have for rent, food, clothing, entertainment, etc. Which would you choose?”
Subjects could then either choose (1) X for sure to spend each year during retirement,
or (2) 50-50 chance of Y or Z to spend each year during retirement.
X, Y, and Z varied from question-to-question. The 4 rounds were identical other than
varying the upside of the risky choice. After answering these questions, we applied the
procedure developed in Kimball et al. 2008 to impute a cardinal measure of risk aversion
from subjects’ categorical responses.
Subjects during wave 1 averaged an imputed log risk aversion of 1.99 with a standard
deviation of 0.69 (and a median of 1.77). During wave 2, subjects averaged an imputed
log risk aversion of 1.96 with a standard deviation of 0.75 (and a median of 1.62). The
within-person correlation between these measures was 0.71. Among subjects who were
surveyed in both waves, there is no statistically significant difference in these measures
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between waves (p = 0.5350 of the hypothesis that the mean difference being not equal to
0). Of course, we do not necessarily need persistence across waves for our procedure to
elicit a “purer” measure of risk aversion.
Using results from our demographic and psychological batteries, we could verify some
common conceptions about risk aversion. First, higher cognitive function was associated
with lower risk aversion in both waves, but more so in the first wave than in the second
wave. Cognition was measured as the first principal component derived from a combination
of several batteries: probabilistic sophistication battery, number series battery (CogUSA),
number of statistics and economics classes taken, SAT math score, and a cognitive reflec-
tion task (Frederick, 2005). Note that all factor loadings for the cognition measure were in
the intuitive direction. Among all subjects, regressing wave 1’s imputed log risk aversion
measure on the first principal component of cognition and gender yields a highly significant
negative coefficient estimate for cognition (p < 0.001) with an R2 of 0.1249. Restricting
the sample to only those subjects who participated in 2 waves, regression wave 1’s imputed
log risk aversion measure on the first principal component of cognition and gender also
yields a highly significant negative coefficient estimate for cognition (p < 0.001) with an
R2 of 0.1020. Doing the same for wave 2 also yields a significant negative coefficient for
cognition (p = 0.007) with a much lower R2 of 0.0602. This is consistent with our proce-
dure lessening the impact of cognition of measured risk aversion. Given that risk aversion
is associated with lower cognitive functioning, our results are therefore consistent with our
procedure partially correcting for the biases introduced by low cognition on risk aversion.
Moreover, throughout these analyses, the coefficient on an indicator for male gender
was always highly significant, and indicated (as expected) that male subjects are generally
less risk averse.
Recall also there was a randomization involving the Pre-Test. Among participants
brought in for both waves, approximately half of participants were given the Pre-Test at
the end of the survey, rather than at the beginning; the hope was to observe how our exper-
imental procedure impacted the very simple risk aversion questions asked in the Pre-Test.
In both waves 1 and 2 among subjects who were surveyed in both waves, being given the
Pre-Test at the end of the survey was associated with lower log risk aversion. In wave 1,
regressing the measure of imputed log risk aversion on an indicator for having given the
Pre-Test at the end of the survey (rather than at the beginning) yielded a coefficient estimate
of -0.166 (p = 0.046). In wave 2, a similar analysis yielded a coefficient estimate of -0.202
(p = 0.030). Again, if we think of risk aversion as being associated with cognitive bias, our
procedure (at least temporarily) alleviates said bias.
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2.13 Appendix: Updating Conditional on Riskiness of Choices
Table 2.14 shows, for each axiom and inconsistency, the percentage of time each frame is
associated with the riskier choice. Again, for each axiom “Frame 1” and “Frame 2” refer
to the frames as labeled in Table 2.2.
Axiom Frame 1 Riskier Frame 2 Riskier Total
Irrelevance of Background Coun-
terfactuals
.4 .59 197
Simple Actions = State-Contingent
Actions
.52 .47 196
Irrelevance of Counterfactual
Choices
.50 .50 246
Fusion + Shift from Nodewise to
Pairwise
.38 .61 449
Complete Strategies = Implied Lot-
teries
.47 .52 1504
Reduction of Compound Lotteries .51 .48 2005
Table 2.14: For each axiom and inconsistency, the percentage of time each frame is associ-
ated with the riskier choice. For each axiom “Frame 1” and “Frame 2” refer to the frames
as labeled in Table 2.2.
Tables 2.15 and 2.16 show, conditional on either Frame 1 or Frame 2 being the riskier
choice in an inconsistency, toward which frames people tend to update (or whether they
choose not to update or to swap their choices). When Frame 1 is the riskier choice in an
inconsistency, subjects tend to update toward that choice. However, when Frame 2 is the
riskier choice, results are more mixed.
2.14 Appendix: MLE Diagnostic Tests
We conducted diagnostic tests of our MLE procedure to get a sense of the behavior of
the likelihood function. We did this by manually varying one of the three parameters while
fully optimizing over the remaining two. We next plotted the average log likelihood (across
subjects) as a function of the manually varied parameter, noting its behavior. We repeated
this separately for each of the three parameters, for each frame and snapshot. Moreover,
to get a sense of precision using a measure that can be visualized in the same space as the
average log likelihoods, we next drew horizontal lines representing confidence intervals.
These horizontal lines were drawn at vertical distances from the global optimum equal to
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Axiom Toward
Frame 1
Toward
Frame 2
No Up-
date
Swap
Choices
Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfactuals
.33 .22 .41 .02 80
Simple Actions = State-
Contingent Actions
.22 .07 .66 .02 103
Irrelevance of Counter-
factual Choices
.05 .01 .92 0 120
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pairwise
.21 .17 .55 .04 174
Complete Strategies =
Implied Lotteries
.23 .22 .48 .05 715
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
.31 .17 .45 .05 1023
Table 2.15: Conditional on Frame 1 being the riskier choice in an inconsistency, percentage
of the time subjects’ update toward each frame (or whether they choose not to update or
to swap their choices). For each axiom “Frame 1” and “Frame 2” refer to the frames as
labeled in Table 2.2.
Axiom Toward
Frame 1
Toward
Frame 2
No Up-
date
Swap
Choices
Total
Irrelevance of Back-
ground Counterfactuals
.16 .25 .54 .03 117
Simple Actions = State-
Contingent Actions
.18 .17 .56 .07 93
Irrelevance of Counter-
factual Choices
.09 .05 .84 0 126
Fusion + Shift from
Nodewise to Pairwise
.2 .17 .54 .06 275
Complete Strategies =
Implied Lotteries
.19 .28 .47 .04 789
Reduction of Com-
pound Lotteries
.23 .24 .46 .05 982
Table 2.16: Conditional on Frame 2 being the riskier choice in an inconsistency, percentage
of the time subjects’ update toward each frame (or whether they choose not to update or
to swap their choices). For each axiom “Frame 1” and “Frame 2” refer to the frames as
labeled in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.25: Diagnostic tests for µ, Single Action in Isolation, Snapshots 1-10.
the critical values from the likelihood ratio test. We conclude several things from these
tests: (1) Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames are statistically well powered across all snap-
shots, (2) Nodewise Action Choice Frames for snapshots 1-5 are barely well powered, but
snapshots 6-10 are certainly underpowered.
We first present results for the Nodewise Action Choice Frames for each parameter and
all 10 snapshots (Figures 2.25-2.39 ). Horizontal lines from top to bottom always represent
90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals. As is obvious, the likelihood functions for many
parameters (especially µ and often for σx) behave erratically and often have extremely wide
confidence intervals. We appear to lack statistical power. Next, we show abbreviated results
for the Pairwise Strategy Choice Frames, namely only for snapshot 1 and each parameter
(Figures 2.40-2.48). The results for the other snapshots are extremely similar. Here, we are
statistically well powered.
126
Figure 2.26: Diagnostic tests for σx, Single Action in Isolation, Snapshots 1-10.
Figure 2.27: Diagnostic tests for σ, Single Action in Isolation, Snapshots 1-10.
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Figure 2.28: Diagnostic tests for µ, Single Action with Backdrop, Snapshots 1-10.
Figure 2.29: Diagnostic tests for σx, Single Action with Backdrop, Snapshots 1-10.
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Figure 2.30: Diagnostic tests for σ, Single Action with Backdrop, Snapshots 1-10.
Figure 2.31: Diagnostic tests for µ, Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop, Snapshots
1-10.
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Figure 2.32: Diagnostic tests for σx, Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop, Snapshots
1-10.
Figure 2.33: Diagnostic tests for σ, Two Contingent Actions with Backdrop, Snapshots
1-10.
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Figure 2.34: Diagnostic tests for µ, Complete Contingent Action Plan-1, Snapshots 1-10.
Figure 2.35: Diagnostic tests for σx, Complete Contingent Action Plan-1, Snapshots 1-10.
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Figure 2.36: Diagnostic tests for σ, Complete Contingent Action Plan-1, Snapshots 1-10.
Figure 2.37: Diagnostic tests for µ, Complete Contingent Action Plan-4, Snapshots 1-10.
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Figure 2.38: Diagnostic tests for σx, Complete Contingent Action Plan-4, Snapshots 1-10.
Figure 2.39: Diagnostic tests for σ, Complete Contingent Action Plan-4, Snapshots 1-10.
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Figure 2.40: Diagnostic tests for µ, Pairwise Choices between Complete Strategies, Snap-
shot 1.
Figure 2.41: Diagnostic tests for σx, Pairwise Choices between Complete Strategies, Snap-
shot 1.
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Figure 2.42: Diagnostic tests for σ, Pairwise Choices between Complete Strategies, Snap-
shot 1.
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Figure 2.43: Diagnostic tests for µ, Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries, Snap-
shot 1.
Figure 2.44: Diagnostic tests for σx, Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries, Snap-
shot 1.
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Figure 2.45: Diagnostic tests for σ, Pairwise Choices Between Compound Lotteries, Snap-
shot 1.
Figure 2.46: Diagnostic tests for µ, Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries,
Snapshot 1.
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Figure 2.47: Diagnostic tests for σx, Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries,
Snapshot 1.
Figure 2.48: Diagnostic tests for σ, Pairwise Choices Between Reduced Simple Lotteries,
Snapshot 1.
138
CHAPTER 3
The Genetics of Cigarette Excise Tax
Responsiveness
3.1 Abstract
Tobacco is among the leading causes of preventable death worldwide. While public poli-
cies and increased awareness of the health consequences of smoking have been effective
at reducing its incidence in America, cigarette excise taxes do not appear to deter smok-
ing across the entire distribution of smokers. Fletcher (2012), using data from the National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), looks toward genetics as a source of
tax response heterogeneity. He tests for differential responsiveness to cigarette excise taxes
based on individuals’ genotypes on single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) rs2304297,
finding that only individuals with the GG genotype are responsive along both extensive
and intensive margins, and individuals with other genotypes are unresponsive along both
margins. However, better-powered genome-wide association (GWA) studies that attempt
to uncover genetic variants associated with smoking do not implicate rs2304297 as being
related to human smoking behavior (Tobacco and Genetics Consortium (TAG), 2010; Liu
et al., 2010; Thorgeirsson et al., 2010). For behavioral phenotypes, incongruence between
candidate gene studies and genome-wide association studies is fairly common, given lack
of statistical power in the former driven by the fact that genetic variation in behavioral
phenotypes is associated with small effect sizes for any particular SNP. Moreover, lack
of extensive genetic data in NHANES only allowed Fletcher to control for self-reported
ethnicity, not subtler within-population genetic variation (i.e. population stratification). I
therefore have three goals. First, I repeat Fletcher’s tax response heterogeneity analysis
with respect to rs2304297 and state excise taxes, using the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) instead of NHANES. I do not replicate his main finding of genetic tax response het-
erogeneity along the extensive margin in the HRS. I am able partially to replicate his finding
that individuals with the GG genotype on rs2304297 are more responsive to cigarette taxes
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along the intensive margin. I find this effect in the HRS sample including subjects of all
ethnicities, but not the sample including only subjects of European decent. Second, I show
variation in rs2304297 is driven by ethnicity, i.e. population stratification. Third, I use
estimates from two large, well-powered GWA studies to perform out-of-sample prediction
on the HRS’s European-decent subjects. These predictors, or polygenic scores, utilize the
full gamut of SNPs available on the HRS and can be interpreted as measures of genetic pre-
disposition. In particular, I construct measures of genetic predisposition to two outcomes
plausibly related to smoking behavior: lifetime maximum cigarettes per day (CPD) and ed-
ucational attainment (EA). Controlling for population stratification, I show these measures
robustly predict cigarette consumption along both the extensive and intensive margins in
the expected directions. However, when interacted with state tax rates, and additionally
controlling for a host of relevant covariates, I find no evidence of tax response hetero-
geneity along either margin. It therefore seems appropriate to turn to other, non-genetic
explanations for the fact that cigarette excise taxes do not have an impact across the entire
distribution of smokers.
3.2 Motivation
Tobacco is among the leading causes of preventable death worldwide. The World Health
Organization (WHO)1 estimates that about 5.4 million people die every year from tobacco
use (or about one person every 6 seconds). Almost 600,000 of these deaths are due to
second-hand smoke. It’s estimated that 100 million deaths were caused by tobacco in
the 20th century. To get a sense of scale, 50 million people died during World War II (see
Keegan 1989). In 2014, the U.S. Surgeon General reported that nearly 500,000 adult Amer-
icans would die prematurely because of smoking that year (see ”The health consequences
of smoking–50 years of progress”). The report also highlights that smoking costs America
over $289 billion each year in terms of medical expenditures and productivity losses.
Federal and state governments have thus sought to discourage cigarette consumption
with cigarette taxes, combined with bans on various forms of advertisement (e.g. to chil-
dren, on television), restrictions on sales (e.g. to children), and limitations on where smok-
ers may light up (e.g. workplaces, restaurants, on commercial and public transportation).
While public policies and increased awareness of the health consequences of smoking have
been effective at reducing its incidence in America, cigarette excise taxes do not appear
to deter smoking behavior across the entire distribution of smokers (Fletcher, 2012). Us-
1Accessed 2/18/2015, see www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/ and www.
who.int/tobacco/mpower/tobacco$_$facts/en/
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ing data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), Fletcher
(2012) looks toward genetics as a novel source of tax response heterogeneity. He tests
for differential responsiveness to cigarette excise taxes based on individuals’ genotype on
single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) rs2304297, finding that only individuals with the
GG genotype are responsive along both extensive and intensive margins, i.e. evidence of
“policy-by-gene” interaction (a specific example of a “gene-by-environment” interaction).
He finds individuals with other genotypes are unresponsive along both margins.
Analyzing variation in this particular SNP as a source of tax response heterogeneity, as
opposed to other forms of genetic variation, was admittedly out of necessity. At the time,
NHANES only contained information on 8 SNPs, among which rs2304297 was the only
one plausibly related to smoking.
Human DNA is billions of units long; SNPs are the tens of millions of markers that
commonly differ among us. SNPs are a more fundamental unit of genetic variations than
genes, as genes themselves typically contain many SNPs. SNPs typically come one of
two alleles, one inherited from each parent. By holding fixed the “reference allele” at a
particular SNP to one of the two possible alleles, we can measure the genetic information
at that SNP as the number of reference alleles (i.e. 0, 1, or 2).
Rs2304297 is located on chromosome 8, specifically within the CHRNA6 gene, which
encodes an alpha subunit of neuronal nicotine acetylcholine receptors related to nicotine
use in the brain (Mineur and Picciotto, 2008). A number of “candidate” gene studies
have specifically linked CHRNA6 with tobacco use outcomes (Saccone et al., 2007; Zeiger
et al., 2008; Greenbaum and Lerer, 2009; Hoft et al., 2009). However, better-powered
genome-wide association (GWA) studies do not implicate rs2304297, nor other SNPs in
CHRNA6, in human smoking behavior (Tobacco and Genetics Consortium (TAG), 2010;
Liu et al., 2010; Thorgeirsson et al., 2010). While it is still likely that SNPs in CHRNA6
have some effect on smoking, the fact that these SNPs are not implicated in these better-
powered GWA studies implies that their effect sizes are much smaller than those SNPs that
are indeed implicated. These GWA studies implicate three genes for lifetime maximum
cigarettes smoked per day: CHRNA3 on chromosome 15, coding for another member of
the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor family of genes; LOC100188947 on chromosome 10,
a non-coding RNA region; and EGLN2 (near CYP2A6) on chromosome 19, coding for a
transcriptional complex involved in oxygen homeostasis. For smoking initiation, BDNF on
chromosome 11 is implicated, while for smoking cessation a region near DBH on chromo-
some 9 is implicated. To get a sense of scale, note that in the TAG consortium, the three
most significant individual SNPs accounted for 0.5%, 0.03%, and 0.19% of the variation in
maximum CPD, initiation, and cessation, respectively.
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Candidate gene studies were typically employed before technologies allowing mea-
surement of large numbers of SNPs were readily available. For behavioral phenotypes or
complex diseases, incongruence between older candidate gene studies and GWA studies
is fairly common, given lack of statistical power in the former driven by the fact that ge-
netic variation in behavioral phenotypes is generally driven by a large number of genetic
variants, each with small effect sizes2 (Benjamin 2012).
Lack of extensive genetic data in NHANES also only enabled control for self-reported
ethnicity, not subtler within-population genetic variation (i.e. population stratification).
Different ancestral groups even within a broad ethnic category tend to differ systematically
in their allele frequencies (Price et al., 2009). Outcomes can also differ systematically for
non-genetic reasons, causing spurious association. For example, if one tried to measure
the genetic underpinnings of chopstick use, yet failed to control for population stratifica-
tion, one would no doubt find all sorts of associations with SNPs related to Asian ancestry
(Lander and Schork, 1994). However, these associations would only be based on hap-
penstance cultural mechanisms, not true genetic associations. In conducting association
tests, researchers therefore typically control for at least the first 10 principal components
(PCs) derived from variation in millions of SNPs, capturing subtle ancestral differences
among subjects. These continuous controls not only have a direct geographic interpreta-
tion (Novembre et al., 2008), but help avoid false positives driven by stratification3. While
Fletcher acknowledges he could not rule out stratification as a confounding factor in his
analysis, he was unable to test the extent to which it drove his results.
This paper has three goals. First, I repeat Fletcher’s analysis of tax response hetero-
geneity with respect to rs2304297 and state excise taxes using the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). The HRS is a longitudinal study of older Americans with comprehensive
genetic and smoking information, including data on variation in millions of SNPs. To my
knowledge, the HRS is the largest available sample of Americans that offers such extensive
individual genetic data and longitudinal smoking data. I show that Fletcher’s main finding
2A notable exception involves Alzheimer’s disease and the APOE gene. Plaques found in the brains
of Alzheimer’s patients contain apolipoproteins, which are produced by the APOE gene. SNPs coding for
variation in APOE were originally discovered using the candidate gene approach and are among the most
powerful common genetic variants that predict Alzheimer’s (Strittmatter et al., 1993). However, the candidate
approach is not this successful in a broader range of medical and behavioral phenotypes.
3Traditional measures of ethnicity and ancestral background also have flaws: (1) they are discrete and
therefore coarse, in contrast with the (ever increasing) diversity of modern populations; and (2) they are
subjectively measured via in-person surveys. Genetic counterparts to these metrics are (1) continuous, thereby
allowing for a more nuanced appreciation of the effects of ethnicity on behavior; (2) objective, immune to
participants misrepresenting their true identities and odd surveyor demand effects, and (3) increasingly cheap
to measure. Whether conclusions derived these genetic measures match their survey-based cousins may help
elucidate which notion of ethnic identity dominates in terms of its impact on economic behavior (a topic I do
not delve further into here).
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of genetic tax response heterogeneity along the extensive margin does not replicate in the
HRS. I find doubling taxes is associated with ∼5% lower likelihood of smoking across
all rs2304297 genotypes. I am able partially to replicate his finding that individuals with
the GG genotype on rs2304297 are more responsive to cigarette taxes along the intensive
margin: I find the effect in the HRS sample including subjects of all ethnicities, but not the
sample including only subjects of European decent. In the full sample, I find doubling taxes
is associated with ∼1.13 fewer CPD among individuals with the GG genotype, compared
with ∼0.86 fewer CPD among individuals with other genotypes. Even my results for the
full sample differ from Fletcher’s results, which are consistent only with responsiveness
for the GG genotype group. Among only Europeans-decent subjects, I find doubling taxes
is associated with ∼1.08 fewer CPD across all rs2304297 genotypes.
Second, I evaluate the extent to which variation in rs2304297 is driven by popula-
tion stratification. I find that the first 10 PCs derived from all SNPs explain ∼28% of the
variation in rs2304297 among HRS participants. Genetically European participants are
more likely to have an additional G reference allele, while genetically African participants
are much less likely to have an additional G reference allele. I also find that variation in
rs2304297 predicts state tax rate, reflecting the fact that different states tend to be composed
of individuals from different ancestral backgrounds. These results indicate Fletcher’s find-
ings, as well as my limited successful replications, are likely to be driven by population
stratification.
Third, I use estimates from two large, well-powered GWA studies to perform out-of-
sample prediction on the HRS’s European-decent subjects. These predictors, or polygenic
scores, utilize the full gamut of SNPs available on the HRS and can be interpreted as mea-
sures of genetic predisposition to a particular phenotype or behavior. They capture much
more genetic variation than any potential candidate SNP and are therefore better powered
for predictive and gene-by-environment interaction analyses. Indeed, despite an inability
to robustly identify individual SNPs that jointly account for the full heritability of a given
trait (“missing heritability”), we are still able to use the joint predictive power of a large
number of SNPs to investigate genetic predisposition (Benjamin et al., 2009). In particu-
lar, I construct measures of genetic predisposition to two phenotypes plausibly related to
smoking behavior: high lifetime maximum cigarettes per day (CPD) and high educational
attainment (EA), the latter proxying for genetic predisposition to high cognition (Okbay et
al, 2015). I use a GWA study based on maximum CPD to construct my polygenic scores,
rather than GWA studies associated with other smoking phenotypes (e.g. ever versus never
smoker, smoking cessation, or age of first cigarette), given analyses using these other phe-
notypes found far fewer robust genetic associations.
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Controlling for population stratification, I show these polygenic scores robustly predict
cigarette consumption along both the extensive and intensive margins in the expected di-
rections. However, when interacted with state tax rates, and additionally controlling for
state economic conditions (per capita income and unemployment), self-reported individual
health, state fixed effects, and wave fixed effects, I find no evidence of response hetero-
geneity along either margin. It therefore seems appropriate to turn to other, non-genetic
potential explanations for the fact that cigarette excise taxes do not have an impact across
the entire distribution of smokers.
More broadly speaking, insight into genetic heterogeneity may help tailor-fit addic-
tion recovery methods (an example of ”personalized medicine”). Indeed, identifying indi-
viduals who are most susceptible to different types of incentives could help improve the
cost-effectiveness of recovery programs, isolating those who might respond to financial
versus non-financial incentives or programs. The fact that my results constitute null find-
ings disables me from forwarding any such cost-effectiveness strategy. However, this study
still forwards the gene-by-environment interaction literature, which has historically been
plagued by lack of replicability and low power, driven by utilization of candidate gene
approaches (Duncan and Keller, 2011).
3.3 Related Literature
An extensive literature exists detailing the effects of taxes and prices on cigarette consump-
tion. See Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for an excellent review of the literature to that
point. Citing evidence from both aggregate and individual data, various authors find siz-
able elasticities along both the intensive and extensive margin (for individual data, roughly
between 0 and -0.9, centered at approximately -0.7). Studies range in their care in ad-
dressing endogeneity and parsing the margins of consumption. Something of a consensus
emerges that older people are less price responsive, but this is by no means ubiquitous (e.g.
Wasserman et al., 1991 finding no difference between teenagers and adults but unstable es-
timates over time; DeCicca amd McLeod, 2008 finding sizable responsiveness among older
adults, especially among less educated and low-income households). Maclean et al. (2015)
also uses the HRS, finding extremely modest intensive margin tax elasticities between -0.02
and -0.04.
My focus on excise taxes rather than sales taxes is well supported. Evidence suggests
that sales taxes on alcohol, which are only added to the price at the register, are far less
salient than excise taxes; their associated elasticities are therefore much smaller (Chetty
et al., 2009, using a field experiment to directly test for relevant demand effects). Goldin
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and Homonoff (2013) extend this analysis to cigarettes, finding that sales taxes are more
salient to poorer individuals. Relevant to our purposes, they verify that sales taxes are far
less salient than excise taxes across income groups.
The budding subdiscipline of ”genoeconomics” investigates the intersection of genet-
ics and economics (Benjamin et al., 2012; Cesarini et al., 2009, 2010, 2012; Zyphur et
al., 2009). However, little is known about biologically driven heterogeneity in individual
responsiveness to taxes on addictive goods. Guo et al. (2010) explores sin good use with re-
spect to both genotype and age-based legal status, i.e. the 21 year old drinking age, finding
certain genes mitigate use to a greater extent at ages when said activity is illegal. Boardman
(2009) uses twin pairs from the NHANES, finding daily smoking activity is highly heri-
table and that there is significant variation in the influence of genetics on smoking across
states, with genetic influences lowest in states with high taxes on cigarettes. Using poly-
genic scores for detecting gene-by-environment interactions is also relatively unexplored.
Okbay et al. (2015) uses an EA-based polygenic score and the Swedish Twin Registry,
finding a decline in the explanatory power yielded by the score, as well as a decline in its
associated regression coefficient, for younger birth cohorts. They argue that these declin-
ing genetic effects can be explained by a series of education reforms in Sweden during
the middle of the 20th century. Belsky et al. (2013) constructs a risk score using the 3
SNPs robustly identified as being associated with smoking behavior by the TAG consor-
tium to construct a polygenic score for a sample of New Zealanders. They find the score is
unrelated to smoking initiation, but predicts (above and beyond familial background) con-
version to daily smoking as a teenager (and conversion to heavy smoking), persistence of
smoking, using smoking as a coping mechanism for stress, and failing to be able to quit.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Health and Retirement Study
The HRS’s biennial waves spanning 1992-2010 offer data on 2.5 million SNPs (imputed
to over 20 million) for 12,595 older individuals, along with comprehensive socioeconomic
and demographic information. Residence by state is available for each wave for most
individuals (enabling matching to relevant cigarette excise tax rates). Also available is self-
reported information on whether an individual has ever been a smoker, is a current smoker,
and daily cigarette consumption (cigarettes per day).
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3.4.2 Genome-Wide Association Studies
Past genetic studies, estimating effect sizes for each SNP, are necessary to calculate poly-
genic scores measuring genetic predisposition. I use the results of two large genetic studies
that omit HRS to perform out-of-sample prediction on HRS and generate these polygenic
scores. These studies are the Tobacco and Genetics Consortium (TAG, 2010), with n =
74,053 (for predisposition to high CPD4) and Okbay et al. (2015), with n = 285,072 (for
predisposition to high EA). I focus on TAG’s analysis of lifetime maximum CPD (as op-
posed to other smoking-related outcomes) given greater success in identifying highly robust
SNPs associated with that outcome.
3.4.3 Cigarette Excise Taxes
Cigarette tax data at the federal and states levels are available from The Tax Burden on
Tobacco (2012), compiled by Orzechowski and Walker. Federal cigarette taxes changed
in 1993, 2000, 2002, and 2009. See Figure 3.3 for federal and average state taxes over
time, expressed in cents per cigarette. Note that the most significant increase in 2009 was
part of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Given that the HRS is only
administered every two years, I consider ”the tax” for a specific wave and individual to
be the average tax in her location over the prior year. I ignore local and other municipal
excise taxes. While I conduct all below analyses with real tax rates (using the STATA’s CPI
package), results are almost identical using nominal tax rates. State unemployment rates
and state real per capita income are from FRED and BEA, respectively.
3.5 Summary Statistics
See Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for summary statistics on static and time-dependent variables, re-
spectively. On average, the sample was born in approximately 1938 and is disproportion-
ately female. By design, the HRS over-samples minorities relative to the percentages of
these groups in the overall American population. Almost 57% of the sample admits to
having ever been a smoker, while 13% of the sample smokes in any given wave of the
survey. Among all subjects and waves (including those who do not smoke), average CPD
is almost 2 (among only smokers this number is almost 16). Moreover, among all subjects
4There are two other large cigarette consortia: Liu et al. (2010) using the Oxford-GlaxoSmithKline
(OxGSK) consortium, n = 41,150; and Thorgeirsson et al. (2010) using the European Network of Genetic
and Genomic Epidemiology (ENGAGE) consortium, n = 46,481. Unfortunately, only TAG’s results are
publicly available. However, TAG reports that their main findings replicate in a combined sample of the three
consortia.
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and waves, the average combined real (in 2000 dollars) tax from both federal and state
governments is about $1.03 per pack.
3.6 Replication of Fletcher (2012)
First, I repeat Fletcher (2012)’s main results using the HRS rather than NHANES. He
regresses an indicator for tobacco use on the log state excise tax rate, an indicator for the GG
genotype on rs2304297, an interaction term between the two, and additional covariates (see
his Table 2). Exogeneity of the tax rate rests on an institutional feature of state budgetary
regimes: all states except Vermont have balanced budget rules. In other words, they cannot
issue and carry forward long-term debt as the federal government can. While the series
of tax increases in the 1960s and 1970s were an endogenous response to the smoking
and drinking culture of the era, tax increases in the 1990s and 2000s are more plausibly
exogenous responses to countercyclical budgetary shortfalls, meant merely as a convenient
way to raise necessary revenue (Maag and Merriman, 2003).
Fletcher’s analysis clusters standard errors at the state level because variation in taxation
is at the state level. While the NHANES contains cross-sectional data, the HRS contains
longitudinal data, so I must additionally cluster standard errors by individual, lest end up
with standard errors that are too tight. I therefore employ a 2-dimensional clustering pro-
cedure (Cameron et al., 2011; Thompson, 2011), implemented by the cluster2 package in
STATA developed by Mitchell Petersen5.
See Figure 3.4 for my extensive margin results. Column (1) includes only the tax rate;
the coefficient is significant and negative, and thus similar to the first column in Fletcher’s
Table S1, although my effect size is larger in absolute value. Column (2) includes only
the rs2304297 GG indicator; the covariate is significant and negative, and is thus similar
to the second column in Fletcher’s Table S2, although my effect size is smaller in absolute
value. Column (3) mimics Fletcher’s main specification in his Table 2. Fletcher’s find-
ing of genetic tax response heterogeneity along the extensive margin does not replicate in
the HRS. He does not find a significant main tax effect, but significant negative effects
for both the rs2304297 GG genotype indicator and its interaction with log taxes. In the
HRS, I only find a significant main tax effect, namely that doubling taxes is associated with
∼4.5% lower likelihood of being a smoker across all rs2304297 genotypes (i.e. no sig-
nificant interaction). Fletcher notes his findings are robust to analyzing only self-reported
European-decent subjects, although he does not include additional covariates in this verifi-
5www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_
programming.htm
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cation (his Table S3). My Column (4) mimics this specification with additional covariates,
finding that doubling taxes is associated with∼5.2% lower likelihood of smoking across all
rs2304297 genotypes among self-reported European-decent subjects (i.e. no significant in-
teraction). Therefore, along the extensive margin, Fletcher’s results based on the NHANES
do not replicate in the HRS.
See Figure 3.5 for my intensive margin results. Column (1) regresses CPD on the log
tax rate alone, finding a significant, negative association. Column (2) regresses CPD on
an indicator for GG genotype on rs2304297, finding no significant association. Column
(3) mimics the Fletcher’s only intensive margin specification (his Table S2). My estimates
imply that doubling taxes is associated with ∼1.13 fewer CPD among individuals with the
GG genotype, but ∼0.86 fewer CPD among individuals with other genotypes. However,
Fletcher’s results indicate that only individuals with the GG genotype are responsive, and
that a doubling of taxes is associated with GG genotype individuals reducing consump-
tion by ∼0.64 CPD. Non-GG genotype subjects, according to Fletcher’s analysis, do not
respond to taxes at all. Therefore, although both our analyses are consistent with some
degree of tax response heterogeneity with respect to the GG genotype on rs2304297, our
results still differ. Column (4) restricts the sample to self-reported European-decent sub-
jects; the coefficients on rs2304297 and the interaction lose significance, indicating that
among all subjects, doubling taxes is associated with a reduction of ∼1.08 CPD.
In sum, along the extensive margin, I do not replicate Fletcher (2012)’s results in the
HRS. Along the intensive margin, I find suggestive evidence of tax response heterogeneity
with respect to the GG genotype on rs2304297 and the full HRS sample, but my findings
still differ from Fletcher’s. Differences between the HRS and NHANES samples are no
doubt driving these divergent findings.
3.7 Population Stratification and rs2304297
Rs2304297 genotypes marginally predict individual state tax rates (Figure 3.6). Here, I use
indicators for the three potential genotypes: GG, CG, and CC (omitted). This mimics the
specification presented by Fletcher in his Table S4. My results indicate that variation in
rs2304297 marginally predicts state tax rate, reflecting the fact that different states tend to
be composed of individuals from different ancestral backgrounds. This is indirect evidence
of population stratification driving variation in rs2304297.
I next directly test whether variation in rs2304297 is driven by population stratifica-
tion, see Figure 3.7. Column (1) regresses an indicator for the GG genotype on indicators
for ancestral background based on principal components (PCs) derived from all genotyped
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SNPs (and all HRS participants) and HRS’s quality control manual6 for delineating whether
someone is genetically of European, African, or Hispanic/Asian decent (with the latter
as the omitted category). In particular, African decent individuals have PC1 >= 0.008,
European-decent individuals have PC1 < 0.008 and PC2 < 0.006, and Hispanic/Asian
decent individuals have PC2 >= 0.006. Coefficients on each indicator are highly signifi-
cant. Column (2) directly regresses the GG indicator on the first 10 PCs, finding significant
explanatory power of the first three PCs, and joint predictive power in terms of R2 of
∼13.0%. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the analyses in the first two columns, only using a
count variable for the dependent variable that enumerates how many G alleles an individual
has (it can therefore take on the values of 0, 1, or 2). Results are consistent with the first
two columns, indicating that the first 10 PCs derived from all SNPs and HRS participants
explain ∼27.7% of the variation in the number of G alleles on rs2304297. Participants of
European decent are more likely to have an additional G reference allele, while participants
of African decent are much less likely to have an additional G reference allele.
These results indicate Fletcher’s findings, as well as my limitedly successful replica-
tions along the intensive margin, are at least partially driven by population stratification.
Indeed, given the fact that participants of Europeans decent are more likely to have a GG
genotype on rs2304297, and Fletcher finds GG genotype people are the only ones respon-
sive to taxes, it is likely that at least some of the gene-by-environment interaction is driven
by ancestry. This result is consistent with MacClean (2015), finding greater intensive mar-
gin responsiveness to cigarette taxes among Europeans on the HRS. However, it is inconsis-
tent with other studies using younger samples, consistently finding greater responsiveness
among non-Europeans (Gruber and Zinman, 2001; DeCicca et al., 2000; Chaloupka and
Pacula, 1999).
3.8 Polygenic Scores and Cigarette Tax Response Hetero-
geneity
I next use effect size estimates from two large, well-powered GWA studies (Tobacco and
Genetics Consortium, 2010; Okbay et al., 2015) to perform out-of-sample prediction on
the HRS’s European-decent subjects. These predictors, or polygenic scores, utilize the
full gamut of SNPs available on the HRS and measure genetic predisposition to a partic-
ular phenotype or behavior. They capture much more genetic variation than any single
candidate SNP and are therefore better powered for predictive and gene-by-environment
6hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/sitedocs/genetics/HRS_QC_REPORT_MAR2012.pdf
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interaction analyses. In particular, I construct measures for genetic predisposition to two
phenotypes related to smoking behavior: lifetime maximum CPD and EA. I choose life-
time maximum CPD as my smoking phenotype because the relevant GWA study found
many more robustly replicable SNPs than those based on ever versus never smoking sta-
tus or smoking cessation. Okbay et al. (2015) provides compelling evidence that EA is a
proxy-phenotype for cognition; studying EA is preferred given measuring years of school-
ing is much easier than measuring cognition, facilitating a much larger sample size (and
more statistical power) for genetic discovery. I calculate these polygenic scores only for
the European-decent HRS subsample because the GWA studies on which the coefficient
estimates are based are also conducted on European-decent samples; coefficient estimates
from GWA studies are generally not robust to different ancestral backgrounds. I therefore
only conduct my heterogeneity analyses in this section on the HRS subjects of European
decent.
These scores are simple to calculate. GWA studies, including those whose effect size
estimates I utilize, posit millions of regressions7 of the following form, one per SNP:
yi = µ+ βjxij + δzi + i (3.1)
yi is the phenotype or behavior of interest for individual i. βj is the effect of SNP xij .
zi is a vector of non-genetic controls (e.g. age, gender, and PCs); δ is the associated vector
of coefficients; and i is the residual. Note this additive specification assumes that the
difference between having 0 and 1 reference alleles is the same as the difference between
having 1 and 2 reference alleles. Gene-gene interactions are also ignored.
How exactly to weigh and combine these coefficients into predictive polygenic scores
is a subject of active research, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
If we define xi as the stacked column vector of SNPs xij for individual i, and βˆ as the row
vector of related coefficient estimates from a particular GWA study, then we can calculate
a simple polygenic score for individual i:
gˆi = βˆxi (3.2)
While this method fails to take into account double counting and systematic spatial cor-
relation among SNPs (i.e. linkage disequilibrium), in practice, it has shown to be successful
in measuring genetic predisposition (e.g. for EA and HRS participants, see Okbay et al.,
2015). It is important to note that GWA estimates used to construct my polygenic scores
7Multiple testing necessitates Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels. Qualifying for ”genome-wide sig-
nificance” requires a p-value of 5 ∗ 10−8 or less.
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come from younger birth cohorts than those included in HRS. If genetic associations differ
among birth cohorts, my scores will tend to be worse predictors and thereby lessen our
power to detect heterogeneity. This same logic applies spatially given the fact that not all
cohorts used to derive the GWA estimates are American, while the HRS is indeed entirely
American.
Figures 3.2 and 3.1 show histograms of the cigarette- and EA-based scores, respectively,
for the HRS sample of European decent. Higher scores represent increased genetic predis-
position to cigarette consumption and cognition. Note their raw correlation is -0.08378.
Both scores are significant predictors of smoking status and CPD in the expected direc-
tions, i.e. the cigarette score predicts higher incidence of smoking along both consumption
margins, and the EA score predicts lower incidence and of smoking along both consump-
tion margins (Figure 3.8 for smoking status and the cigarette score, Figure 3.9 for CPD
and the cigarette score, Figure 3.10 for smoking status and the EA score, and Figure 3.11
for CPD and the EA score). Note that these analyses ignore the longitudinal nature of the
data since all covariates are non-time varying. There is also no need for clustering at the
state nor individual levels. Along the extensive margin, the cigarette score has incremental
predictive power in terms of R2 of less than 0.1% (comparing Columns 2 and 3). Along the
intensive margin, this incremental predictive power is ∼0.1%. The EA scores have a much
higher incremental predictive power: ∼0.7% along both margins. This difference owes to
the much larger sample size of the GWA study underlying EA.
I then repeat and expand on the tax heterogeneity analyses conducted above, separately
substituting rs2304297 for each score. Aside from avoiding issues of population stratifica-
tion that come with analyzing rs2304297 without PC controls, my analyses based on the
polygenic scores are better powered than their candidate gene counterparts given the scores
capture much more genetic variation than any single SNP. See Figure 3.12 for smoking
status and the cigarette score, Figure 3.13 for CPD and the cigarette score, Figure 3.14 for
smoking status and the EA score, Figure 3.15 for CPD and the EA score. These analyses
use only the European sub-sample of the HRS as defined by the HRS’s own genetic qual-
ity control guidelines. Again, this is because the GWA studies’ estimates underlying the
polygenic scores are only valid for European-decent individuals.
Column (1) in each figure uses the same covariates as Fletcher (2012) and my above
replication attempts. Column (2) in each figure replaces self-reported indicators of eth-
nicity with 10 PCs (derived using only the European-decent subsample and all available
8I also estimate a genetic correlation of -0.284 (se: 0.064) between these traits using the LD score method
developed by Bulik-Sullivan et al. (2015) and implemented in their LDSC python software package (with
LD score data outlined in Finucane et al., 2015).
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SNPs, thereby controlling for even more subtle population stratification among those with
European decent). I then try a number of additional specifications by adding different
covariates to Column (2). Column (3), continuing to use the European PCs, adds state eco-
nomic conditions as controls (log per capita income and log unemployment, see Goldin and
Homonoff, 2013; Ruhm, 2005). I control for state economic conditions because if states
introduce excise taxes to overcome budgetary shortfalls, which themselves tend to happen
in bad economic climates, excluding relevant proxies could introduce omitted variable bias
if cigarette consumption is also correlated with the business cycle. Column (4), again us-
ing the PCs, instead controls for self-reported change in health, given the central role of
health shocks in changing smoking behavior among older populations. Column (5) uses
state fixed effects (preferred to controlling directly for time-invariant state-specific trends
of cigarette consumption). Column (6) uses wave fixed effects, thereby controlling for
unobserved temporal heterogeneity. Finally, Column (7) in each figure includes all these
covariates together in a single specification.
In all specifications, for both scores and along both margins, I robustly find no evidence
of genetic tax response heterogeneity among European-decent subjects, i.e. the interaction
terms between the scores and log tax rates are always insignificant (even at the 10% level).
While I continue to find in many specifications that taxes deter behavior along both margins,
only the EA scores, not the cigarette scores, are significant predictors of behavior.
Figure 3.12 shows results for smoking status and the cigarette score. Among all speci-
fications, there is no evidence of the cigarette score remaining predictive nor of any inter-
action effect with the log tax rate. However, taxes do have the expected, dissuasive impact
on smoking status in most specifications. This effect ranges from a doubling of taxes being
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of being a smoker by∼6.5% to∼9.6%. When
economic covariates or wave fixed effects are included, as in Columns (3), (6), and (7),
taxes no longer significantly impact smoking status. This points to time-specific economic
conditions, which happen to be correlated with increases in cigarette excise taxes thanks to
states using these policies during bad economic times (Maag and Merriman, 2003), driving
much of the observed tax effect. While broader questions involving the relationship among
economic conditions, government policy, and cigarette consumption are interesting, they
are beyond the scope of this paper. Toward my aims, it is sufficient to highlight that there
is no evidence of tax response heterogeneity along the extensive margin with respect to
genetic predisposition to heavy smoking.
Figure 3.13 displays results for CPD and the cigarette score, with broadly similar con-
clusions as the extensive margin. The tax effect, when it appears, does not display het-
erogeneity with respect to genetic predisposition to heavy daily smoking. A doubling of
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the tax rate is associated with a reduction between ∼0.87 and ∼0.1.39 CPD depending on
the specification. The score is again not directly predictive along the intensive margin, and
there is no evidence of tax response heterogeneity.
Figure 3.14 presents results for smoking status and the EA score. Across all specifica-
tions, the EA score is predictive of smoking status in the expected direction: higher genetic
predisposition to EA is associated with lower propensity to smoke. The tax effect again
appears in most specifications, ranging from a doubling of taxes being associated with a
reduction in the likelihood of being a smoker by ∼5.3% to ∼8.6%. This disappears in
Columns (3), (6), and (7), when economic covariates or wave fixed effects are included.
There is no evidence of genetic tax response heterogeneity along the extensive margin with
respect to the EA score.
Figure 3.15 shows results for CPD and the EA score. Again, across all specifications,
the EA score is predictive of CPD in the expected direction: higher genetic predisposition
to EA is associated with fewer CPD. The tax effect again appears in most specifications.
Unlike prior analyses, the tax effect does not disappear in Column (6) (with only the in-
clusion of wave fixed effects); however, the significant point estimate is much lower than
in the other specifications (∼-0.46 versus between ∼-1.16 to ∼-1.70). This again points
to time-specific economic conditions driving much of the observed tax effect. Again, the
interaction term between the score and log tax rate is insignificant, indicating no genetic
tax response heterogeneity along the intensive margin with respect to the EA score.
3.9 Conclusions
Genetic predisposition to heavy smoking and high cognition do not appear to mediate the
impact of cigarette excises taxes on consumption among HRS participants. It therefore
seems appropriate to turn to other, non-genetic explanations for why cigarette excise taxes
do not have an impact across the entire distribution of smokers, and why elasticities appear
to be falling over time. These explanations include internet-based purchases that evade
state taxes (Goolsbee et al., 2010; Emery et al., 2002; Ribisl et al., 2001); substitution to-
ward other, differentially taxed tobacco products or cigarettes with higher nicotine content
(Obsfeldt et al., 1998, Delnevo et al., 2004; Evans and Farrelly, 1998; Obsfeldt and Boyle,
1997), especially e-cigarettes (Huang et al., 2014); the pool of smokers having dwindled
to the most addicted, least responsive smokers; and responding to tax changes not by ad-
justing number of cigarettes smoked, but by the manner of smoking (e.g. consuming a
particular cigarette for longer by taking deeper drags and smoking to the butt, Adda and
Cornaglia, 2006, 2012; Abrevaya and Puzzello, 2012). Some of these explanations are less
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relevant to the HRS’s older sample of Americans, namely internet-based smuggling and
substitution (especially toward e-cigarettes). The notion that the pool of smokers among
the HRS sample has dwindled to the most addicted, least responsive, is likely the most
relevant explanation.
That being said, further replication is warranted to verify these results beyond the HRS
and the particular polygenic scores considered here. Although a null finding, this study for-
wards the gene-by-environment interaction literature, which has historically been plagued
by lack of replicability and low power, driven by utilization of candidate gene approaches
(Duncan and Keller, 2011). The editor of Behavior Genetics has responded to these chal-
lenges by requiring potentially publishable candidate gene studies to be well-powered, ad-
just for all sources of multiple testing, and replicate in at least one other sample (Hewitt,
2011). One particularly relevant limitation of my study is the fact that not many genetic
variants associated with smoking have been robustly identified. Once more have been dis-
covered, it is possible we will observe response heterogeneity with respect to those newly
discovered variants. Using a polygenic score based on estimates from a better-powered
GWA study of smoking, which capture the effects of variants with smaller effect sizes,
might also uncover response heterogeneity. Replication with a younger sample would also
be particularly useful, ensuring that my null results are not driven by the HRS’s older sam-
ple. These analyses could also be extended to alcohol, coffee, fatty foods, sugary foods,
or entire diets; any consumption that is impacted by genetic predisposition and depends on
some price or policy might be analyzed for this sort of response heterogeneity.
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3.10 Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics, Static Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Birth Year 1938.391 10.575 12507
Female 0.591 0.492 12507
Black 0.133 0.34 12507
Hispanic 0.096 0.295 12506
Other Race 0.03 0.169 12507
Years of Education 12.582 3.164 12489
rs2304297 (GG) 0.512 0.5 12454
rs2304297 (G) 1.384 0.702 12454
European Decent by PCs 0.774 0.418 12419
African Decent by PCs 0.134 0.341 12419
Hispanic or Asian Decent by PCs 0.092 0.289 12419
CPD Polygenic Score 4.148 1 8651
EA Polygenic Score 3.528 1 8651
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, Time-Varying
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Ever Smoker 0.566 0.496 124510
Smoker 0.13 0.336 108592
CPD 1.944 6.547 107521
CPD (Smokers) 15.932 11.333 13119
Real Cigarette Tax (cents/pack) 103.589 59.179 94861
Married 0.551 0.497 125070
Income ($1000’s) 14.18 38.452 96452
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of polygenic scores based on GWA study estimates from Okbay et
al. (2015), measuring genetic predisposition to high educational attainment (EA).
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of polygenic scores based on GWA study estimates from the TAG
Consortium (2010), measuring genetic predisposition to high daily cigarette consumption.
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Figure 3.3: Federal, average state, and combined real (in 2000’s dollars) cigarette excise
taxes over time. The tax is levied per pack (20 cigarettes), expressed here in cents per pack.
Note a dramatic increase in 2009 corresponding to provisions in the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke
ln(Tax) -0.0472∗∗∗ -0.0454∗∗∗ -0.0524∗∗∗
(0.00520) (0.00711) (0.00878)
rs2304297(GG) -0.00987∗ 0.0411 0.0118
(0.00522) (0.0341) (0.0301)
ln(Tax) X GG -0.00842 -0.00173
(0.00733) (0.00637)
Birth Year 0.0267 0.0794
(0.0891) (0.0951)
Birth Year Squr’d -0.00000478 -0.0000185
(0.0000231) (0.0000246)
Female -0.0412∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗
(0.00621) (0.00631)
Black -0.000273
(0.0127)
Hispanic -0.0823∗∗∗ -0.0863∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0165)
Other Race -0.0304
(0.0190)
EA -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.0145∗∗∗
(0.000962) (0.00127)
Married -0.0745∗∗∗ -0.0787∗∗∗
(0.00734) (0.00796)
Income (1000’s) -0.000297∗∗∗ -0.000228∗∗∗
(0.0000934) (0.0000754)
Observations 92305 108125 90501 76360
R2 0.005 0.000 0.056 0.056
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.4: Fletcher (2012)’s specification along the extensive margin. OLS regression of
smoking status on log cigarette excise tax rate, an indicator for having the GG genotype on
rs2304297, an interaction term between log tax rate and the GG indicator, and covariates:
birth year, birth year squared, an indicator for being female, indicators for self-reported
race (with the omitted category being white), educational attainment (EA), being currently
married, and income in thousands of dollars. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the full HRS
sample; Column (4) uses only self-reported whites. Standard errors are clustered by state
and individual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
CPD CPD CPD CPD
ln(Tax) -0.940∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗∗ -1.084∗∗∗
(0.0818) (0.126) (0.163)
rs2304297(GG) 0.0934 1.313∗ 0.422
(0.0926) (0.677) (0.722)
ln(Tax) X GG -0.274∗∗ -0.0733
(0.139) (0.148)
Birth Year 1.269 1.621
(1.579) (1.575)
Birth Year Squr’d -0.000293 -0.000383
(0.000409) (0.000408)
Female -1.027∗∗∗ -0.967∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.115)
Black -1.125∗∗∗
(0.211)
Hispanic -2.260∗∗∗ -2.452∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.311)
Other Race -0.494
(0.303)
EA -0.238∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0279)
Married -1.177∗∗∗ -1.320∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.131)
Income (1000’s) -0.00462∗∗∗ -0.00397∗∗∗
(0.00166) (0.00152)
Observations 91434 107060 89636 75608
R2 0.005 0.000 0.043 0.045
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.5: Fletcher (2012)’s specification along the intensive margin. OLS regression of
cigarettes per day (CPD) on log cigarette excise tax rate, an indicator for having the GG
genotype on rs2304297, an interaction term between log tax rate and the GG indicator, and
covariates: birth year, birth year squared, an indicator for being female, indicators for self-
reported race (with the omitted category being white), educational attainment (EA), being
currently married, and income in thousands of dollars. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the
full HRS sample; Column (4) uses only self-reported whites. Standard errors are clustered
by state and individual.
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(1) (2)
ln(Tax) ln(Tax)
rs2304297(CG) 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0219∗
(0.0118) (0.0127)
rs2304297(GG) 0.0747∗∗∗ 0.0231∗
(0.0113) (0.0129)
Birth Year -0.478∗∗∗
(0.0938)
Birth Year Squr’d 0.000123∗∗∗
(0.0000242)
Black -0.0612∗∗∗
(0.0132)
Hispanic 0.116∗∗∗
(0.0102)
Other Race 0.0620∗∗∗
(0.0195)
EA 0.00821∗∗∗
(0.00115)
Income (1000’s) 0.000313∗∗∗
(0.000111)
Wave FE No Yes
Observations 94471 90871
R2 0.002 0.404
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.6: Fletcher (2012)’s specification. OLS regression of log cigarette excise tax rate
on indicators for genotype on rs2304297 (CC as the omitted category), birth year, birth
year squared, indicators for self-reported race (with the omitted category being white),
educational attainment (EA), and income in thousands of dollars. Column (2) additionally
includes wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and individual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
rs2304297(GG) rs2304297(GG) rs2304297(G) rs2304297(G)
European by PC’s 0.0533∗∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0188)
African by PC’s -0.475∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0231)
PC1 -19.96∗∗∗ -40.83∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.598)
PC2 1.575∗∗∗ 4.595∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.597)
PC3 - PC10 No Yes No Yes
Observations 12367 12367 12367 12367
R2 0.128 0.130 0.268 0.277
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.7: OLS regressions testing for the extent to which population stratification drives
variation in rs2304297. Column (1) regresses an indicator for the GG genotype on indi-
cators for race (determined by the first two principal components (PCs) derived from the
full HRS sample and all genotyped SNPs, according to HRS’s quality control manual, with
the omitted category being “Hispanic/Asian”). Column (2) regresses an indicator for the
GG genotype on the first 10 principal components (PCs) of genotyped SNPs from the full
HRS sample. Columns (3) and (4) repeat these analyses with the number of G alleles on
rs2304297 as the dependent variable.
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(1) (2) (3)
Smoke Smoke Smoke
Cig. Score 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.00966∗∗
(0.00461) (0.00463)
Birth Year 2.108∗∗∗ 2.101∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.113)
Birth Year Squr’d -0.000544∗∗∗ -0.000542∗∗∗
(0.0000292) (0.0000292)
Female 0.00517 0.00462
(0.00929) (0.00929)
PC’s No Yes Yes
Observations 6133 6133 6133
R2 0.001 0.035 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.8: OLS regressions testing the predictive power of a polygenic score for smoking
on smoking status. Column (1) regresses smoking status on the score. Column (2) regresses
smoking status on birth year, birth year squared, an indicator for being female, and the first
10 principal components (PCs) of genotyped SNPs from European-decent HRS subjects.
Column (3) combines these covariates into a single specification.
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(1) (2) (3)
CPD CPD CPD
Cig. Score 0.382∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.111)
Birth Year 41.06∗∗∗ 40.82∗∗∗
(2.684) (2.684)
Birth Year Squr’d -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗
(0.000693) (0.000693)
Female -0.739∗∗∗ -0.757∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.239)
PC’s No Yes Yes
Observations 6133 6133 6133
R2 0.002 0.027 0.028
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.9: OLS regressions testing the predictive power of a polygenic score for smoking
on cigarettes per day (CPD). Column (1) regresses CPD on the score. Column (2) regresses
CPD on birth year, birth year squared, an indicator for being female, and the first 10 prin-
cipal components (PCs) of genotyped SNPs from European-decent HRS subjects. Column
(3) combines these covariates into a single specification.
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(1) (2) (3)
Smoke Smoke Smoke
EA Score -0.0334∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗
(0.00449) (0.00445)
Birth Year 2.108∗∗∗ 2.058∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.112)
Birth Year Squr’d -0.000544∗∗∗ -0.000531∗∗∗
(0.0000292) (0.0000289)
Female 0.00517 0.00299
(0.00929) (0.00927)
PC’s No Yes Yes
Observations 6133 6133 6133
R2 0.009 0.035 0.042
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.10: OLS regressions testing the predictive power of a polygenic score for edu-
cational attainment (EA) on smoking status. Column (1) regresses smoking status on the
score. Column (2) regresses smoking status on birth year, birth year squared, an indicator
for being female, and the first 10 principal components (PCs) of genotyped SNPs from
European-decent HRS subjects. Column (3) combines these covariates into a single speci-
fication.
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(1) (2) (3)
CPD CPD CPD
EA Score -0.771∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.105)
Birth Year 41.06∗∗∗ 39.89∗∗∗
(2.684) (2.653)
Birth Year Squr’d -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗
(0.000693) (0.000685)
Female -0.739∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.239)
PC’s No Yes Yes
Observations 6133 6133 6133
R2 0.008 0.027 0.034
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.11: OLS regressions testing the predictive power of a polygenic score for edu-
cational attainment (EA) on cigarettes per day (CPD). Column (1) regresses CPD on the
score. Column (2) regresses CPD on birth year, birth year squared, an indicator for being
female, and the first 10 principal components (PCs) of genotyped SNPs from European-
decent HRS subjects. Column (3) combines these covariates into a single specification.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke
ln(Tax) -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.0677∗∗∗ -0.0238 -0.0674∗∗∗ -0.0960∗∗∗ -0.0258 0.000547
(0.0232) (0.0226) (0.0239) (0.0226) (0.0211) (0.0229) (0.0225)
Cig. Score -0.00506 -0.00653 -0.00521 -0.00410 -0.00252 -0.00446 -0.000777
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0241)
ln(Tax) X Score 0.00232 0.00276 0.00254 0.00205 0.00198 0.00238 0.00146
(0.00507) (0.00500) (0.00503) (0.00497) (0.00500) (0.00498) (0.00512)
Non-Race Cov. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-Rep. Race Yes No No No No No No
PC’s No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Cov. No No Yes No No No Yes
Health Cov. No No No Yes No No Yes
State FE No No No No Yes No Yes
Wave FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 63819 63819 63208 60327 63819 63819 59737
R2 0.061 0.062 0.066 0.061 0.072 0.069 0.078
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.12: OLS regressions testing for cigarette excise tax response heterogeneity along
the extensive margin with respect to genetic variation in a polygenic score for cigarette
smoking. All analyses include only genetically European-decent HRS participants. Col-
umn (1) regresses smoking status on the log cigarette excise tax rate, the score, their inter-
action, and covariates: birth year, birth year squared, educational attainment (EA), income
in thousands of dollars, and indicators for self-reported race. Column (2) replaces indi-
cators for self-reported race with the first 10 principal components (PCs) of genotyped
SNPs from European-decent HRS subjects. Column (3) augments this specification with
state economic covariates (log per capita income and log unemployment). Column (4) in-
stead includes self-reported change in health as a covariate. Column (5) instead uses state
fixed effects, and Column (6) wave fixed effects. Column (7) combines all covariates from
Columns (3) through (6). Standard errors are clustered by state and individual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CPD CPD CPD CPD CPD CPD CPD
ln(Tax) -0.872∗ -0.927∗ -0.0670 -0.945∗ -1.386∗∗∗ -0.187 0.517
(0.488) (0.475) (0.537) (0.486) (0.417) (0.495) (0.460)
Cig. Score 0.456 0.418 0.428 0.525 0.501 0.444 0.579
(0.525) (0.524) (0.518) (0.549) (0.470) (0.519) (0.487)
ln(Tax) X Score -0.0696 -0.0604 -0.0609 -0.0848 -0.0766 -0.0649 -0.0943
(0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.114) (0.0992) (0.109) (0.102)
Non-Race Cov. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-Rep. Race Yes No No No No No No
PC’s No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Cov. No No Yes No No No Yes
Health Cov. No No No Yes No No Yes
State FE No No No No Yes No Yes
Wave FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 63172 63172 62570 59843 63172 63172 59261
R2 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.052 0.059 0.063 0.072
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.13: OLS regressions testing for cigarette excise tax response heterogeneity along
the intensive margin with respect to genetic variation in a polygenic score for cigarette
smoking. All analyses include only genetically European-decent HRS participants. Col-
umn (1) regresses cigarettes per day (CPD) on the log cigarette excise tax rate, the score,
their interaction, and covariates: birth year, birth year squared, educational attainment
(EA), income in thousands of dollars, and indicators for self-reported race. Column (2)
replaces indicators for self-reported race with the first 10 principal components (PCs) of
genotyped SNPs from European-decent HRS subjects. Column (3) augments this spec-
ification with state economic covariates (log per capita income and log unemployment).
Column (4) instead includes self-reported change in health as a covariate. Column (5) in-
stead uses state fixed effects, and Column (6) wave fixed effects. Column (7) combines
all covariates from Columns (3) through (6). Standard errors are clustered by state and
individual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke Smoke
ln(Tax) -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0115 -0.0581∗∗∗ -0.0861∗∗∗ -0.0142 0.00757
(0.00745) (0.00733) (0.0121) (0.00758) (0.00589) (0.0103) (0.00842)
EA Score -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0151∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗
(0.00380) (0.00386) (0.00392) (0.00384) (0.00506) (0.00380) (0.00517)
ln(Tax) X Score -0.000405 -0.000262 -0.000303 -0.0000261 -0.000353 -0.000258 -0.000178
(0.00106) (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00106) (0.00109) (0.00104) (0.00110)
Non-Race Cov. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-Rep. Race Yes No No No No No No
PC’s No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Cov. No No Yes No No No Yes
Health Cov. No No No Yes No No Yes
State FE No No No No Yes No Yes
Wave FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 63819 63819 63208 60327 63819 63819 59737
R2 0.063 0.063 0.068 0.063 0.074 0.070 0.079
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.14: OLS regressions testing for cigarette excise tax response heterogeneity along
the extensive margin with respect to genetic variation in a polygenic score for educational
attainment (EA). All analyses include only genetically European-decent HRS participants.
Column (1) regresses smoking status on the log cigarette excise tax rate, the score, their
interaction, and covariates: birth year, birth year squared, educational attainment (EA),
income in thousands of dollars, and indicators for self-reported race. Column (2) replaces
indicators for self-reported race with the first 10 principal components (PCs) of genotyped
SNPs from European-decent HRS subjects. Column (3) augments this specification with
state economic covariates (log per capita income and log unemployment). Column (4)
instead includes self-reported change in health as a covariate. Column (5) instead uses
state fixed effects, and Column (6) wave fixed effects. Column (7) combines all covariates
from Columns (3) through (6). Standard errors are clustered by state and individual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CPD CPD CPD CPD CPD CPD CPD
ln(Tax) -1.158∗∗∗ -1.183∗∗∗ -0.325 -1.323∗∗∗ -1.703∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗ 0.110
(0.151) (0.147) (0.249) (0.158) (0.122) (0.196) (0.185)
EA Score -0.325∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗
(0.0844) (0.0846) (0.0870) (0.0838) (0.0984) (0.0842) (0.101)
ln(Tax) X Score 0.000180 0.00369 0.00347 0.00875 0.00193 0.00424 0.00596
(0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0212) (0.0215) (0.0214)
Non-Race Cov. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-Rep. Race Yes No No No No No No
PC’s No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Cov. No No Yes No No No Yes
Health Cov. No No No Yes No No Yes
State FE No No No No Yes No Yes
Wave FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 63172 63172 62570 59843 63172 63172 59261
R2 0.051 0.051 0.056 0.053 0.060 0.064 0.074
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.15: OLS regressions testing for cigarette excise tax response heterogeneity along
the intensive margin with respect to genetic variation in a polygenic score for educational
attainment (EA). All analyses include only genetically European-decent HRS participants.
Column (1) regresses cigarettes per day (CPD) on the log cigarette excise tax rate, the
score, their interaction, and covariates: birth year, birth year squared, educational attain-
ment (EA), income in thousands of dollars, and indicators for self-reported race. Column
(2) replaces indicators for self-reported race with the first 10 principal components (PCs)
of genotyped SNPs from European-decent HRS subjects. Column (3) augments this spec-
ification with state economic covariates (log per capita income and log unemployment).
Column (4) instead includes self-reported change in health as a covariate. Column (5) in-
stead uses state fixed effects, and Column (6) wave fixed effects. Column (7) combines
all covariates from Columns (3) through (6). Standard errors are clustered by state and
individual.
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